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ABSTRACT
Preventive deployment as a conflict prevention tool has not recurred in the past
decade-plus, despite the broadly acclaimed success of the United Nations Preventive
Deployment in Macedonia (UNPREDEP 1995-1999; and its predecessor mission,
UNPROFOR/Macedonia, UNPROFOR/M 1992-1995). The United Nations in particular
has continued with mainly first- and second-generation peacekeeping, peacemaking and
peacebuilding actions. What may best explain why has there has been no other
engagement in preventive deployment missions, when there has been much emphasis
placed formally and informally on early warning, detection, mitigation, and prevention of
conflict? There have also been an increasing numbers of violent conflicts worldwide, so
again, why no more preventive deployments?
Realism, organizational learning and constructivism in particular offer potential
theoretical insights. Several research innovations were established: first, the main
organizations involved (the UN Headquarters, UN HQ) and the field organization
(UNPREDEP) were conceived of as two separate entities; second, the examination of the
case was expanded temporally, and third, theoretical approaches infrequently utilized in
international relations, particularly organization and organizational learning theory, were
applied.
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Learning in the field organization pre-, during and post-deployment, and learning
situated at key UN Departments and sections were to have been critical but largely
unexamined factors in this outcome relevant to the absence, post-UNPROFOR/M and
UNPREDEP of preventive deployment as part of preventive diplomacy. Interviews with
primary field and headquarters actors were crucial to addressing this question. Primary
materials from the UN Archives were also made partially available for the first time, and
were an important source for this case study.
It is found that learning and knowledge interactions between organizations
(especially between the field and UN HQ) resulted in flawed processes and outcomes at
headquarters, and thereby blurred opportunities for understanding, learning and change,
instead allowing decisions, principles, practices, policies and norms that at the very least
marginalized preventive deployment as an ongoing, viable tool of pre-conflict
management.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Preventive deployment, a physical manifestation of preventive diplomacy, was
first conceived roughly fifty years ago by Dag Hammarskjöld as Secretary-General of the
UN. The United Nations Preventive Deployment in the Republic of Macedonia
(UNPREDEP), the single case of a preventive deployment UN mission, was based on
those principles of preventive deployment first given formal shape in Agenda for Peace
in 1992, and restated in its Supplement in 1995.1 In Agenda for Peace, intervention in a
conflict at the behest of a state or states prior to bloody confrontation, was considered a
key aspect of preventive diplomacy, a concerted and focused effort to avoid full-out interor intra-state war between entities at violence-prone odds with one another.
Section II.20 of the Agenda defines preventive diplomacy as, “… action to prevent
disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into
violent conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.”2 Preventive

1

An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping Report of the Secretary
General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January
1992, UN Document A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June (unnumbered pages). NY: United Nations. Accessed at
http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/report-un-secretary-general-agenda-peace/p23439. See also Supplement
to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the United Nations. United Nations Document A/50/60 – S/1991/1 (3 January 1995).
Accessed at http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html.
2

An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, 1992, UN Document A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June
(unnumbered pages). Accessed at http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/report-un-secretary-general-agendapeace/p23439.

1

2

deployment is described in Section III.28-29 of the same report; Section III.32 (under
Preventive Deployment) was applied specifically to the eventual Macedonian mission:
In cases where one nation fears a cross-border attack, if the Security Council
concludes that a United Nations presence on one side of the border, with the
consent only of the requesting country, would serve to deter conflict, I
recommend that preventive deployment take place. Here again, the specific nature
of the situation would determine the mandate and the personnel required to fulfil
it.3
In all instances, states’ sovereignty was to be respected in accordance with the original
UN Charter.4 But importantly, the Agenda recognized formally and specifically that
intervention pre-bloodshed or pre-tipping point was preferred to an outbreak of armed
conflict.5 Yes, UN missions would continue to engage in peacekeeping, peacebuilding,
and peacemaking. But early intervention would be preferred whenever and wherever
possible, as the Secretary General and author of Agenda for Peace, Boutros BoutrosGhali, made clear:
Our aims must be:
- To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce
conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before
violence results;
- Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues
that have led to conflict;
- Through peace-keeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where
fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the
3

Section III.32 of An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping Report of
the Secretary General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council
on 31 January 1992, UN Document A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June (unnumbered pages). NY: United Nations.
Accessed at http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/report-un-secretary-general-agenda-peace/p23439.
4

5

United Nations Charter at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml/.

An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping Report of the Secretary
General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January
1992, UN Document A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June (unnumbered pages). NY: United Nations. Accessed at
http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/report-un-secretary-general-agenda-peace/p23439. See especially
“Section III. Preventive Diplomacy” forward.
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peacemakers;
- To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the
institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building
bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;
- And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic
despair, social injustice and political oppression. It is possible to discern an
increasingly common moral perception that spans the world's nations and peoples,
and which is finding expression in international laws, many owing their genesis to
the work of this Organization.6
Peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding in international relations are
usually examined from a limited group of theoretical and practical approaches: conflict
prevention, management and resolution; human rights and legal studies; nation/state
building; and security studies, military strategy and logistics. One finds analyses of
troubled missions viewed through these lenses: Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
Somalia are icons of failed United Nations peacekeeping efforts.7 It evidently has largely
escaped scholarly notice that the other side of the failure coin is success. Surprisingly,
there have been few examinations of how and why success has occurred.

6

Section I.15 in An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping Report of
the Secretary General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council
on 31 January 1992, UN Document A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June (unnumbered pages). NY: United Nations.
Accessed at http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/report-un-secretary-general-agenda-peace/p23439.
7

Cf. Frederick Fleitz, Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions and U.S. Interests (NY:
Praeger, 2003); James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War
(NY: Columbia University Press, 1997); David Rohde, Endgame: the Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica,
Europe’s Worst Massacre since World War II (NY: Basic Books, 1998); William J. Durch, ed., TwentyFirst-Century Peace Operations (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006); Roméo
Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Cambridge MA: Da Capo
Books, 2004); Thomas G. Weiss, “Collective Spinelessness: U.N. Actions in the Former Yugoslavia,” in
The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars, ed. Richard Ullman (NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996),
59-96; Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers, rev. ed. (NY: Time
Books, 1999); Walter Clarke and J. Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed
Humanitarian Intervention (CO: Westview Press, 1997), 207-253; William J. Durch, ed., UN
Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1996) as
examples of the most recent scholarly research on these topics.
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UNPREDEP, far less the subject of scholarly endeavors, engaged in pre-conflict
prevention and protection, utilizing a relatively small force, and was considered a solid
success case—yet more traditional peacekeeping missions have followed it for the past
decade-plus. There has been no other specifically preventive deployment under UN
auspices. Why has this positive outcome not engendered additional efforts at preventive
deployments? Or is this a situation in which, counterintuitively, nothing failed like
success?
Central Question of this Dissertation
This dissertation explores why preventive deployment has not been undertaken
again by the UN, when the United Nations Preventive Deployment’s (UNPREDEP)
preventive characteristics appear applicable to a broad range of early-warning and preconflict circumstances and their management. This is puzzling, particularly since more
traditional peacekeeping missions continue, given high-profile failures such as Somalia
(UNOSOM I and II), the Democratic Republic of Congo (ONUC and MONUC), and
Rwanda (UNAMIR), to name a few besides UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.8
Yet UNPREDEP (1995-1999) remains the sole case of a formal preventive
deployment mission to date. This status is both puzzling and intriguing, particularly given
its success. If the United Nations Charter’s Preamble is to be fulfilled, “to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought
untold sorrow to mankind,” then ceteris paribus, one would expect more preventive
deployments, not fewer. Intra-state wars and conflicts have not vanished, and inter-state

8

Hillen, 2000; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United
Nations Peace Operations (NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
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ones have not disappeared. Early-warning signs abound for which a preventive
deployment would be applicable and preferable. The central question of this examination
of UNPREDEP is, “Why no more?” since that mission?
Three potential explanations are explored for preventive deployment’s disuse
after UNPREDEP. First, powerful states discarded it as a viable option. This is examined
by testing the evidence against the approach of realism. The most powerful states, after
all, form the Permanent Five (P-5) in the UN Security Council, hold veto power, and
authorization over preventive deployment and/or the use of other types of preventive
diplomacy.9 It is conceivable that preventive deployments are understood not to be in the
national interests of these powerful states, in that they diminish economic and other
resources vital to national interests and national security, or that they otherwise militate
against the accretion of power by the P-5 countries.
Second, discrete yet interlinked organizations in the field and at headquarters may
well have experienced learning in quite different ways, possibly leading to dysfunctions
or “disconnects” between some (or all) learning sites. This potential explanation is
explored through organizational learning approaches and the terms of social
constructivism.10
The third conceivable related set of prospects is that security organizations, as a
group of actors, interacted post-UNPREDEP to promote a norm obviating use of

9

The P-5 of the United Nations Security Council is comprised of the United States, Russia, China (PRC),
the United Kingdom, and France.
10

Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global
Politics (NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Michael Barnett, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of
International Organizations,” International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999): 699-732.

6

preventive deployment in conflict prevention and mitigation. This is suggested under
constructivist terms. There is evidence of some inter-IGO communications during the
course of UNPREDEP and afterward, particularly between the OSCE, NATO and the UN
in Macedonia and at various field headquarters, available in mission records and
described in interviews with mission leadership.
Another group, epistemic communities, not only IGOs, security organizations or
NGOs, could also have disregarded preventive deployment as a viable option in peace
operations, or have moved toward a different type of underlying peace keeping
motivation. Peter M. Haas, in addressing epistemic communities, argues that systemic
constraints and domestic political considerations are not the only determinants of states’
preferences and actions.11
Often epistemic communities [of experts] are influential in highly technical policy
areas where the causal linkages between policy and outcomes are especially
unclear. …Shocks to the systems – failures or unexpected outcomes – will prompt
leaders to rethink policies and consider ideas generated by epistemic
communities. There are three causal dynamics through which epistemic
communities exert influence over preferences and outcomes: uncertainty,
interpretation, and institutionalization. Decision-makers facing uncertainty will
turn to epistemic communities to clarify substantive causal relationships and
linkages with other issues, define the interests of states, and formulate policy.
Ideas become institutionalized through the efforts of transnational networks, often
bureaucrats within governments or employed by international organizations.
These coalitions push for the adoption of policy measures corresponding to the
consensus of the epistemic community. The shared normative commitment of
epistemic communities distinguishes them from other professional groups. 12

Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination”,
International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 1-35.
11

12

P.M. Haas, 1992; see also Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in
International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 40-46, 90, 129-130, 163, 188
and passim, especially regarding epistemic communities, learning and international organizations.
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Howard Adelman analyzes this “missing link” regarding epistemic communities
and conflicts, and takes it one step further:
…the major problem behind the resort to violence in complex emergencies and
the inadequate international response to dealing with such conflicts is the absence
of an epistemic community sharing a common body of knowledge and a set of
minimal values [emphasis added]. In other words…we need better knowledge and
analysis of conflict situations, their causes, and strategies for dealing with them
not simply as instruments upon which to base better policies, but because the
process of developing that knowledge and those analyses provides an opportunity
to create a cosmopolitan epistemic community which is the essential missing
substantive element in such policies and actions.13
This is a puzzle: even though admittedly successful, what happened to engaging
in more preventive deployment mission engagements after UNPREDEP’s achievements?
Exploring success, and the learning that was part of it, would be logical approaches in
helping ensure a future preventive deployment with positive outcomes. Could we learn
from this previous accomplishment about how to engage in a similar mission? Learning
results from and leads to change; policy arises from learning and change, and policy leads
to praxis.
Only within the past decade or so has scholarly attention been paid to missions
broadly considered successful by academics, scholars and the military. Even then, these
entities have tended to examine predominantly traditional, multidimensional, postconflict UN peacekeeping missions, particularly those operating in close relation to civil
wars.14 There have been only occasional analytical and/or narrative works that have

Howard Adelman, “Epistemic Communities and Conflict Prevention: Reconceptualizing Multilateralism
after the Rwanda Genocide” (draft manuscript), August 1, 1996, at http://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui
/bitstream/handle/10315/2625/H%20A%20Epistemic%20Communities%20and%20Conflict%20Prevention
%20-%20Reconcept.PDF.
13

14

Multidimensional UN missions encompass military, police and civilian components, usually with many
development and capacity-building efforts by others in the host country. The majority of UN missions
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attempted to explain, inter alia, the success of differing operations such as observer-only
or preventive deployment.15 The majority of such examinations and explanations of
success tend to be of logistical, strategic (including conflict management), and
operational approaches.16
Why Preventive Deployment?
Preventive deployment is of substantial and relevant interest because this method
has been adjudged effective, and was considerably more economical than traditional, inconflict or post-conflict peacekeeping missions.17 Furthermore, with growing numbers of
intra- and inter-state conflicts worldwide (including those undertaken by non-state
actors), and a plethora of early-warning systems and organizations, there would appear to
be no shortage of solicitations and appropriate conflicts for such missions. The case
examined herein is the United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) in

were/are multidimensional, in that they undertake other functions such as state/nation/institution-building
(often termed “peacebuilding”), education and/or training as part of development in the host country
(Howard 2008).
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Macedonia during 1995-1999. It was a highly effective field operation undertaken in the
midst of a number of other regional conflict situations that involved UN mission failures.
Those fiascos included the United Nations Protection Force mission in the rump
Yugoslavia (Serbia), Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia.18 UNPREDEP’s mandate was
aimed at preventing spillover into Macedonia from the former Yugoslavia’s conflicts.
During its tenure, in this it succeeded.
UNPREDEP is therefore the ideal (and only) preventive deployment case
available for exploration: it was invited into Macedonia by the state’s President at that
time, Kiro Gligorov, and it was a pre-bloodshed, pre-tipping point situation. The mission
was in a neighborhood fraught with tensions and violence, although the violence was then
outside of the small, new state, mainly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, with
outbreaks in Croatia and Eastern Slavonia that were more quickly settled. Both internal
and external tensions abounded, some due to Macedonia’s demography: about 25%
ethnically Albanian Macedonians (mostly Muslims) and about 60% ethnic Macedonians
(mostly Orthodox Christians), with other minorities making up the balance.
Some tensions were geo-politically based: Macedonia had not only been a
Republic in the former Yugoslavia, it remains a central point of the Balkans
geographically. Thus, it could well have been part of any “Greater Serbia” aspirations on
the part of that warring state. At the very least, both similarities and differences among

UNPROFOR’s mandate included five former Yugoslav Republics with the addition of Montenegro,
Serbia and Macedonia (cf. UN Department of Public Information reports at http://www.un.org/Depts/
DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm).
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the former constituent Yugoslav Republics and their neighbors were too great to ignore
the distinct possibility of the surrounding conflicts overwhelming Macedonia.
Crucially, Macedonia was exceptionally vulnerable; it had no real military force
at that time. While it was the sole former Yugoslav republic to declare independence
bloodlessly, when the Yugoslav National Army withdrew from Macedonia into Serbia,
they removed with them almost all assets of military value. In addition, the nascent
Macedonian national police and military were ethnically unbalanced and less than welltrained, which led to major inter-ethnic mistrust and law enforcement issues. There was
real fear in Macedonia that violence would engulf it; to make the situation worse, there
were few states or security communities in the region upon whom it could absolutely rely
for assistance and protection, particularly since it had little valuable to offer in return.19
Turning to the UN in this case made sense politically, domestically, and in other
respects; Gligorov clearly understood this, and was willing to concede a degree of
absolute state sovereignty for a time in order to ensure the newly democratic state of
Macedonia survived.20 The international community was also openly supportive of his
plea to the United Nations for a peace mission there. There was a meaningful level of
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international belief that the Balkans were heading toward powder keg status once again,
and that Serbia had “Greater Serbia” aspirations. Europe and most of the Great Powers
did not want a historically unstable area to reignite, or, in this case, to have the
conflagration spread further.21
The United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Serbia from February 1992 through December 1995), and then a semi-independent
UNPROFOR/M (Macedonia 1993) preceded the fully autonomous UNPREDEP. They
were established and implemented as traditional, first-generation peacekeeping missions.
In fact, they had some characteristics of a second-generation mission in that they were
multi-dimensional: they had limited capacities expansion responsibilities (state and
economic reconstruction) and institutional transformation duties (reforming police, army
and judicial system; fair elections’ oversight; and rebuilding civil society). 22
Many aspects of the original UNPROFOR have been extensively analyzed
through various theoretical lenses, including those related to military strategies and to
conflict management and resolution. UNPROFOR’s operations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and, in particular, its enforcement mission to deter, dissuade, and deny the
Serb forces their goals, especially through establishing safe havens in Bosnia and
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Herzegovina, have been assessed as failures of varying extents (with the exception of the
mission in Eastern Slavonia).23
In addressing narrower, praxis-oriented analyses of peacekeeping and peacerelated issues, Roland Paris stresses that, “Building a study of peace missions into a
mature academic subfield will require a concerted effort to move beyond the current
preoccupation with practical operational issues and, instead, to use these missions as
windows into larger phenomena of international politics.”24 These “larger phenomena”
that move toward broader insights into international politics, as developed in this
research, include the illustrative powers of learning and constructivist approaches to
international governmental organizations (IGOs), their related entities and endeavors in
peacekeeping operations.
Organizational learning perspectives and constructivism seem most appropriate to
complement the existing literature, as they emphasize the organizational and learning
parts of the IGO and its missions, along with related but different issues such as conflict
management, prevention or resolution; military strategy; logistics and the like, since these
may be crucial traits of the organization. This research is predicated upon organizational
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and learning analytical lines, along with constructivist views, in examining the sole UN
preventive deployment mission from 1995 through 1999 in the Republic of Macedonia,
i.e., UNPREDEP.
Organization theories and organizational learning have long been applied to
evaluating, analyzing and examining an extensive swath of business organizations. But
they rarely have been applied to IGOs like the United Nations, the European Union (EU),
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Cooperation
and Security in Europe (OSCE).25 This is a curious omission for a number of reasons.
First, IGOs are unquestionably organizations, in that they share many characteristics with
business firms, and therefore can conceivably be addressed and analyzed as such. 26
Second, security-oriented IGOs and NGOs—those undertaking inter- and intra-national
security work—are growing in number, size, and roles in peace and security efforts. Yet

25

Cf. James March, Organizations, 2nd ed. (NY: Wiley-Blackwell, 1993) and The Pursuit of
Organizational Intelligence (NY: Wiley-Blackwell, 1999); Karl Weick, Making Sense of the Organization
(NY: Wiley-Blackwell, 2000) and Weick’s “The Nontraditional Quality of Organizational Learning,”
Organization Science 2, no. 1 (1995): 116-124; Chris Argyris, Understanding Organizational Behavior
(Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, Inc., 1960); Jeffrey Pfeffer, Organizations and Organization Theory
(Boston, MA: Pitman, 1982); Stewart Clegg and Cynthia Hardy, eds., Studying Organization: Theory and
Method (CA: SAGE Publications, 1996) and Stewart R. Clegg, Cynthia Hardy, Thomas Lawrence and W.
R. Nord, eds. The SAGE Handbook of Organization Studies, 2nd ed. (CA: SAGE Publications, 2006.);
Stephen Robbins, Organization Theory: Structure, Design and Applications, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1990); and Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International
Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
Gayl D. Ness and Steven R. Brechin, “Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as Organizations,”
International Organization 42 no. 2 (1988): 246-273; Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The
Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” International Organization 53, no. 4
(1999): 699-732; Thorsten Benner and Philipp Rotmann, “Learning to Learn? UN Peacebuilding and the
Challenges of Building a Learning Organization,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2, no. 1
(March 2008): 43-62; Thorsten Benner, Andrea Binder and Philipp Rotmann, “Learning to Build Peace?
United Nations Peacebuilding and Organizational Learning: Developing a Research Framework,” GPPi
Research Paper Series No. 7 (2007), http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/GPPiRP_LearningToBuild
Peace_Feb2007final.pdf.
26

14

there has not been a corresponding growth in the application of potentially useful
explanatory theories to them, with the notable more recent exception of principal-agent
theory focused largely on the UN, EU, central banking, and certain security questions.27
Third, IGOs such as the UN and others have or had “Lessons Learned” and “Best
Practices” units. But it has not been evident that learning and the learning process itself
(rather than operational, logistical and/or strategy-focused analyses) have informed those
lessons, or been used to expand or explore such learning and lesson meanings and
applicability.
There also has been a dearth of scholarly attention given to differentiated
segments of IGOs: some IGOs include “special” organizations, such as field
organizations that are affected by distance, language, culture, location, and other factors.
In this work, organizations in the field mission versus the headquarters (HQ) organization
are examined discretely and as interlinked entities, in order to explore learning endeavors
regarding preventive peacekeeping more fully, examine empirical evidence of
organizational learning at the United Nations and in the field, and more particularly, to
open up the “black box” of field learning in Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs).
Headquarters’ organizational learning especially may hold explanatory potential
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regarding why preventive deployment has not been institutionalized and reproduced
under preventive diplomacy as an approach to conflict prevention/mitigation.
Why have such learning theories not been applied to the “boots on the ground”
field organization responsible for the best possible peaceable outcomes in UN peace
operations? Conceivably, as Paris notes, it is because in the face of rapidly rising
demands on peacekeeping, that much of the analytical focus has shifted to the practical
and utilitarian: for example, operational issues, logistics, conflict management/resolution,
and strategy. This, however, ignores distinctive factors and differences that shape the
discrete IGOs and their cultures, including language(s), culture(s), and distance(s)
between organizations, and more specifically, between HQ and field operations. These
variances also exist between states who supply peacekeepers, regarding physical
placement and utilization of the blue helmets, vis-à-vis command and control variables in
peace operations, and even the ways in which the field and HQ communicate with one
another. 28 The states and governments with peacekeeping missions on their territory add
further elements to the processes in the field and at HQ.
The hybrid nature of peacekeeping and peacebuilding endeavors—their civilmilitary, domestic and international aspects—has been examined to some extent from
practical and utilitarian perspectives. During the Cold War, peacekeeping was largely
marginalized and exceptional, and, when undertaken, less militarily-oriented. This may

“Blue helmets” has become a common reference in the media and elsewhere for UN troops because of
their distinctive official blue headwear (helmets and berets), as in John Hillen’s Blue Helmets: the Strategy
of UN Military Operations (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), and the UN’s The Blue Helmets: A Review
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explain why peacekeeping endeavors have eluded intensive examination under a broader
range of theoretical lenses, including dominant international relations (IR) theories such
as realism, and its variants, and constructivism , much less organization theory and
organizational learning theory. 29
Put succinctly, it appears the most common questions about traditional
peacekeeping were - and are, “Does it work? If so, how can we make it even better?”
with the ancillary question, “If it doesn’t work, what do we do from here on, given the
many conflicts in the world? Why not turn to preventive peacekeeping?” These queries
arguably should lead to an analysis of learning and learning processes, along with related
inquiries under a social constructivist approach, such as that utilized by Barnett and
Finnemore.30
The assumptions maintained here are that UN peace-oriented field operations
uniformly engage in learning in the field as organizations (military and political) in and
of themselves. Further learning takes place at the headquarters (HQ) of the involved
and/or interested international organizations (and in the various states that contribute
troops and other support), even though outcomes and assessments regarding success or
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failure may vary considerably among learning sites and organizations in part or in total.31
Still, each entity – the field and headquarters – is an organization engaged in learning.
It is also possible that further learning takes place between organizations, in this
case, specifically between field and HQ organizations with a security interest: NATO, the
OSCE, and the EU, as examples. How are learning outcomes shaped, transmitted and
applied inter- and intra-organizationally? Do they inform policy and practice outcomes,
especially regarding preventive deployment missions? It is further hypothesized in this
dissertation that policies and practices are developed, perhaps with and among several
organizations, not solely in the organization in which such learning originated, and that
such policies and practices are not only disseminated within the originating
organization(s), but among them.32
Why This Research is Important for Theory and Practice
The questions of learning from preventive deployment as a tool in the preventive
diplomacy arsenal, how learning occurred, and what learning outcomes have been and
why, are important for several reasons. First, in an era in which there is no shortage of
intrastate and regional tensions and conflicts, it seems especially appropriate to examine
UNPREDEP, not only as a case of successful pre-conflict intervention, but also as a
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mission from which much could be learned about effective PKOs and about preventive
diplomacy, including conflict prevention, in a broader sense. Analyzing what was learned
from it, and how and why it was learned is a critical step in this process, as yet
unexamined.
Second, given the outcome that there have been no further preventive deployment
missions, it appears this means of early conflict prevention and conflict mitigation has
been marginalized, if not outright adjudged “off the table,” as part of preventive
diplomacy. This is in spite of its success. Lest one assume that this writer is the only one
to adjudge it positively, note that Richard Solomon, President of the United States
Institute of Peace, commented, “…perhaps the most telling sign of UNPREDEP’s
success came two years after the mission left, when the “unfinished war” in Kosovo
breached Macedonia’s largely unmonitored northern border and swept across much of the
country’s overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian northern and western regions.”33In other
words, when UNPREDEP was present, “the dog didn’t bark”. Alice Ackermann wrote,
“…the success of UNPREDEP is beyond doubt and was conducted much in the way
envisioned by Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace. …Boutros-Ghali emphasized that
although it should never be a static concept, ‘preventive deployment can work where
there is political will, a clear mandate and purpose, and the necessary commitment on the
part of all parties concerned.’”34
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Ripiloski comments less directly but insightfully on UNPREDEP’s success,
writing “Yet, as with any form of prevention, precisely because nothing happened—
UNPREDEP’s ultimate yardstick—can the mission be deemed a success. … In effect,
UNPREDEP’s presence was vindicated only upon the outbreak of violence” after the
mission was terminated.35 Another analyst and expert on the area, Peter Siani-Davies,
said, “…only in Macedonia can the UN deployment be seen as an almost unqualified
success.” The late P.H. Liotta remarked that “UNPREDEP – an amazing situation, the
first preventive deployment ever – and it was a success. The leadership in the field must
take the fullest credit for this.”36
Each of the military Field Commanders pronounced UNPREDEP itself a success;
it fulfilled terms of its mandate, even if terminated prematurely. Henryk Sokalski, a
highly respected Polish diplomat and Special Representative of the Secretary-General,
who led the civilian and political side of UNPREDEP, also said openly it was a success,
as did Abiodun Williams, one of Sokalski’s chief aides during the mission. Michael
Lund, long considered a conflict management and resolution expert with a special interest
in Eastern Europe, stated UNPREDEP was successful.37
Representatives and delegates from various international organizations and
countries also positively assessed UNPREDEP, including those from the EU, OSCE,
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OECD, NATO, Geert Ahrens of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,
Lord David Owen of the UK, Thorvald Stoltenberg of Norway, Macedonian Army
General Mitre Arsovki, and Macedonian Air Force General Mile Manolev, Bulgarian
leadership, Finland’s Minister of Defence Anneli Taina, and various U.S. diplomats and
representatives. Kofi Annan as Secretary-General of the UN was unstinting in terming it
“successful” when discussing UNPREDEP privately and publicly. All of these statements
are available in a multitude of articles, news reports, UN files on UNPREDEP, books and
recordings.
Yet, it seems evident that pronouncing a mission a success does not necessarily
mean it will be replicated in any way in the future—this is the unusual situation regarding
preventive deployment. Could it be that saying it was a success did not indicate real
learning had taken place from it, or that some other factor(s) intervened to militate
against a repeat effort at preventive deployment?
This dissertation questions what the learning outcomes may have been among
various actors, explores both why and how these might have occurred, and examines the
effects. Outcomes and effects could be due to distance, primary language differences,
communications issues or incomplete feedback, as examples. Organizational learning
theory has not been widely applied in the international relations (IR) field and has much
to offer in understanding the complexities of such endeavors and interrelationships.
Third, this work modifies a social constructivist approach, which should test the
explanatory power and generalizability of Barnett and Finnemore’s approach, expanding
it first to the actors in the field and at UN headquarters. Then, this approach is used to test
other IGOs as interrelated organizations regarding preventive deployment—including the
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Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), NATO and the European Union (EU. It is possible that interactions between
these IGOs promoted norms or principles (perhaps due to flawed communications as well
as for other reasons) as outcomes of learning so that preventive deployment would not be
undertaken again.38 Furthermore, this work explores a peacekeeping success in testing the
explanatory power of social constructivism, keeping constant the involvement of the UN
and a mission, but changing the case study from a failure (the Rwandan genocide in
Barnett and Finnemore 2004, and Barnett 2003) to one adjudged successful.39
Dissertation Structure
The following chapters address the issues introduced above. Chapter II delves into
such theoretical approaches as realism, organization/learning theory, and constructivism
and their terms, as well as the expectations that arise from each, considered regarding
preventive deployment’s non-recurrence. Chapter III describes the case study and
methodological considerations for exploring this preventive deployment. Chapter IV
examines case context relevant to the former Yugoslavia, the Balkans, and to
UNPREDEP in Macedonia. Chapter V presents original and other evidence from experts
on UNPREDEP, preventive deployment and peacekeeping. Chapter VI explains how
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realism, social constructivism, and organizational/learning theories apply, fully or
partially, to this case. It includes rationales and findings to examine which theoretical
approach or approaches hold the greater explanatory power for the research question
regarding why there have been no further preventive deployments. Suggestions are
offered as to what those explanations could most likely be. Finally, Chapter VII offers a
summary of findings and outcomes, along with potential directions for further exploration
on pre-violence peacekeeping operations in particular.

CHAPTER II
CONSIDERING MAJOR THEORIES:
PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT’S NON-RECURRENCE
Realism
There is no question that powerful United Nations member states were (and
continue to be) principal actors with meaningful influence regarding UN endeavors.
According to the approach of realism articulated by Hans J. Morgenthau, states act in
their self-interest (national interest), with those self-interests defined as power
(particularly economic and military power).1
The United States, China, France, the United Kingdom and the Russian
Federation (the P-5) hold permanent, veto-wielding positions of on the Security Council.
These five powerful states may well have had significant degrees of influence on other
member states, on the views of intergovernmental organizations (other than the UN)
concerning preventive deployments, and on eventual positions and actions taken by the
UN itself.2 Research into the views of the White House, the U.S. Department of Defense,
U.S. Congress, American think tanks, and press coverage of UNPREDEP may offer
evidence regarding the position of the United States on the relevance of preventive
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deployment to its national interests. Thus, there should be some signs regarding a
dominant U.S. position, negative or positive, regarding both UNPREDEP and potential
future preventive deployments. While the United States contributed troops to
UNPREDEP, there has been little examination of how the U.S. and other powerful states
viewed the experience, and whether or not the “lessons learned” led to disinterest in—if
not outright preclusion of—similar efforts in the future.
Russia did not contribute UNPREDEP troops, but has had centuries of interest
and involvement, especially in the post-World War eras, in Eastern Europe.3 It openly
expressed support for Serbia and the rump Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s and beyond,
and abstained from voting in the Security Council on matters relating to the former
Yugoslavia and its successor states.4 This placed Russia in a unique position: not directly
vetoing UNPREDEP, but always capable of bringing a veto or veto threat to bear in the
Security Council should its interests change.
Russia, in any case, did not have to use its veto power. China did so on
continuation of UNPREDEP in February 1999, publicly asserting that UN military
missions must have exit points, and that the situation in Macedonia and the region was
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much stabilized, so such an endeavor was no longer vital. However, that veto was widely
seen as China’s response to Macedonia’s recognition of Taiwan (in return for promised
direct aid to Macedonia from Taiwan estimated at between $1 and $2 billion); China has
historically utilized its veto in matters related to Taiwan, because it is in its national
interest to do so and it has the power to veto.5 That makes some sense under realism;
certainly, little credence was given to China’s public explanation of its veto that “every
mission must have an exit point.”6 No one knows exactly when any UN mission will end,
and exit points cannot be pre-determined.7 China’s professed rationale was also far less
credible because it was publicly and widely known that China threatened Macedonia that
it would do everything it could to ensure the small country received no UN or other aid
unless the small, poor state withdrew its recognition of Taiwan completely. 8

5

Macedonia recognized the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) in 1999. Taiwan severed diplomatic ties
with Macedonia in June 2001, as Macedonia prepared to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC or
China) instead. Various reports attributed this “change of heart” on Macedonia’s part to China’s threat to
veto UN aid to the struggling Republic unless Macedonia recognized the PRC. This was perceived
domestically as a credible threat by the PRC against Macedonia, given its veto in February 1999 against
UNPREDEP’s continuation. From interview with BG Juha Engstrom, 17 June 2009, in Mäntsälä, Finland.
See also Sasho Ripiloski, Conflict in Macedonia: Exploring a Paradox in the Former Yugoslavia. CO:
FirstForumPress (Div. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.), 2011; and Henryk J. Sokalski, An Ounce of
Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy. Washington D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 2003.
6

Drawn from various experts, in particular Stevo Pendarovski, National Security Advisor to President
Branko Crvenkovski at that time; Ljubomir Kekenovski, PhD, and Gjorge Ivanov, PhD, interviews with the
author in Skopje, Macedonia, June 2006. Stated by UNPREDEP Brigadier Generals Bent Sohnemann and
Ove J. Stromberg in interviews with author, Summer 2010; P.H. Liotta, interview with author, May 2011.
See also Ripiloski, Conflict in Macedonia, 2011, and Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 2003.
7

Consider the UN missions of various types in Cyprus, the Golan Heights, Southern Morocco/Western
Sahara, and Haiti, in Serbia, Guatemala, Lebanon, the military observer group in Kashmir, and others that
remain ongoing, in certain cases for more than twenty years.
8

Anonymous informant, UNDPKO, NY, on 12 November 2010; P.H. Liotta, Interview and emails with
author, May 2011.

26

Which theoretical lens would be most helpful to consider the question posed here,
that is, why have the international and/or security communities mounted no more
preventive deployment missions since UNPREDEP’s success in Macedonia?
Do Realism, Neorealism or Offensive Realism Explain This?
Realism
On first glance, realism, often referred to as today’s dominant theoretical and realworld paradigm, would not adequately explain preventive deployment’s nonreproduction. But this initial impression might not be fully accurate. Realism is, after all,
centered on power measured through economic and military means; it is “interest defined
as power,” as Morgenthau wrote. “For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and
giving them meaning through reason.” It assumes rational actors and rational alternatives
in foreign policy. It further assumes “that statesmen think and act out of interest defined
as power…It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their
consequences that gives theoretical meaning to the facts of international politics.” 9 As
Max Weber wrote, “Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions
of men.”10
The “Melian Dialogue” by Thucydides is regarded as a core document reflecting
early realism. The well-known quote from Chapter XVII in volume five is spoken by the
militarily and economically strong Athenians, “…you know as well as we do that right,
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as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what
they can and the weak suffer what they must.”11
The idealistic islanders of Melos, militarily and economically weaker than
Athens, counter that statement with “…you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of
interest…you are as much interested in this as any, as your fall would be a signal for the
heaviest vengeance and an example for the world to meditate upon.” Athens’
representatives are unimpressed. The discussion between the Athenians and the Melians
continues, with Athens holding fast to its rational, realist approach against any idealist (or
other) arguments or potential threats the Melians raise, including the latter’s belief that
others will come to their aid and rescue them.
The Melians’ would-be “rescuers,” calculating what they would sacrifice to do so,
do not come to Melos’s deliverance. Athens eventually conquers the island, killing all
military-aged men, taking the women and children as slaves, and sending five hundred
Athenians to settle there. Such is the world-view of classical realism and realpolitik:
“…the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” 12
Attributing war and conflict less to human nature than to anarchy, a world
condition where there is no sovereign body to control relations among states, Kenneth

Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.17.235-240, “The Sixteenth Year of the War—The
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B.C.E. The work ends in 410 B.C.E. (arguably due to Thucydides’ death), thereby omitting the final six
years of the Peloponnesian War.
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Waltz proposed a theory of structural realism (also termed neorealism), a system-level
theory, in international politics. Because of ongoing international anarchy and the
absence of a centralized system (structure), states are constrained by conditions regarding
their choices to ensure their security, which is their main goal.13 They are continually
contending with one another. They cannot, as the Melians found to their great
disadvantage, rely on others to help them achieve this security, so states must always be
ready to help themselves.14 The costs to a state in terms of security, political autonomy,
and cultural integrity would be too great if they are not always thus prepared. States,
furthermore, may be willing to form alliances; in fact, according to Waltz, for security,
states will align with anyone (external balancing). 15
Even if flawed, states will never disappear entirely, because there is arguably no
non-state actor or sovereign body holding the capabilities of the state. These outcomes
are not the result of any kind of structural determinism. The two relevant characteristics
of the international system under neorealism are, after all, anarchy and relative capacity,
that is, again, power. “To explain outcomes, one may look at the capabilities, the actions,
and the interactions of states, as well as the structure of their system. …Causes at both the
national and international level make the world more or less peaceful and stable. I
concentrate attention at the international level because the effects of structure are usually
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overlooked or misunderstood and because I am writing a theory of international politics,
not foreign policy.” 16
While Waltz denies formulating a theory of foreign policy, he argues neorealism
has value for explanatory capability alone. It may be applied in order to hypothesize or
develop explanatory propositions about international politics.
Offensive Realism
John J. Mearsheimer, closely associated with neorealism and more particularly
with offensive realism, held to offensive realism (a sub-set of neorealism) in his The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics.17 He proposed that Great Powers seek first to survive.
They then seek to increase their power at each other’s expense, in order to become the
regional hegemon (the dominant state power in a given geographic area) in an anarchic
world. A Great Power, in its quest for survival, will also seek to maximize its wealth, to
be the greater land power militarily, and to attain nuclear superiority. 18 Mutually assured
destruction (MAD) is not a credible hindrance to Great Powers seeking nuclear
superiority, he asserted.19
What are a hindrance to world-wide hegemony are oceans. Mearsheimer claimed
that oceans stop any state from reaching more than regional hegemony. Oceans, he
contended, constrain the power projection capabilities of militaries; logically then, land
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forces are the prevailing military power.20 Furthermore, Great Powers will not tolerate
their rivals gaining power at their expense.21
Mearsheimer differentiated offensive realism from the neorealist lens by adding a
system-centric focus to the study of state behavior in an interdependent world, based on
the structure of the international system. The tragedy that he notes is that, when viewed
through the lenses of neorealism and offensive realism, conflicts between Great Powers
will not end.
Does realism or any of these variants help explain more fully why preventive
deployments have not been attempted since UNPREDEP? The presence of the five Great
Powers as a permanent part of the UN Security Council certainly matters when power,
i.e., national interests, are considered under realism. The projection of power through U.S
involvement fulfills one of the key requirements of the theory, no matter if classical or
neorealism. Economic benefit is much harder to argue in preventive deployments or
peacekeeping ventures of any type; indeed, they cost the states involved, even the host
state. So wealth accumulation was out of the question in this case, since the Balkans had
little to offer a Great Power especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9,
1989, and even less after the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc as former member states
declared independence over the ensuing few years.
Did any state have the largest land force at that time? Surely the U.S. was a
contender for this, as well as for nuclear superiority, but taking part in a preventive
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deployment would not contribute to either of those requirements under Mearsheimer’s
offensive realism interpretation of realism. And taking part in a mission in the
Southeastern Balkans certainly did not enhance the U.S.’s “regional Great Power” status.
Was there any risk that, because of conflicts overseas in Eastern Europe, the U.S. would
not survive as a state? Of course not.
Furthermore, the U.S. was not directly stopping any other Great Power from
gaining on it—although were one to consider Russia’s support for the FRY during the
Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict, and its historic involvement in Eastern Europe, it may have
initially appeared so. Yet Russia did not veto the preventive deployment’s inception nor
its mandate renewals throughout their multiple cycles.
China vetoed continuation of UNPREDEP in February 1999, publicly asserting
that UN military missions must have exit points, and that the situation in Macedonia and
the Balkans was much stabilized, so such an endeavor was no longer vital. 22 The Chinese
veto makes some sense under realism; certainly, little credence was given to China’s
public explanation of its veto that “every mission must have an exit point.”23 It is simple:
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no one knows exactly when a UN mission will end, and exit points cannot be predetermined in most cases, even within months.24 China’s veto explanation was not
generally accepted because it was also publicly known that China threatened Macedonia
that it would do everything it could to ensure the small, fragile country received no UN or
other aid as long as the Balkan state recognized Taiwan.25
When considering the explanatory power of realism, many of the same analytical
outcomes apply to the Nordics, Canada, and other states involved in UNPREDEP—those
who would be likeliest to become involved in another preventive deployment after
February of 1999, given their extensive peacekeeping focus, heritage and prior
involvement in UN missions.
In addition, realists favor stability: is stability in the Balkans important to Great
Powers like the U.S. in contemporary times? An examination of the facts suggests not
significantly in this instance for the U.S., although much more plausibly for closer states
in Europe and for Russia, even though the Balkans have long been viewed as the “powder
keg” of Eastern Europe. The First and Second Balkan Wars (1912 and 1913) had already
blown the keg apart twice prior to the June 1914 assassination in Sarajevo, BosniaHerzegovina, of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria. Austria had already occupied a
weak Bosnia in 1878 and then annexed it in 1908, much to the despair and rage of Serbia
and Russia. Serbia had openly indicated its desire to unify all Slavs under pan-Slavism
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with Serbia claiming leadership and control (as it did during the Bosnian conflict period),
and Russia supported that goal. Did the assassination in Sarajevo lead to World War I, as
some have argued? Was it more the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire?26 Those
questions remain a matter of scholarly debate.
For World War II, some of the Eastern European states joined the Axis powers.
The Italians invaded Greece (without notifying Germany in advance); Germany invaded
Yugoslavia and Greece; Albania was used as a battleground between the Greeks and
Italians; and all warring factions and forces transited the Balkans, particularly
Macedonia, at one point or another in pursuit of their goals. 27
Tito had kept the area largely out of the limelight for decades, even during the
USSR’s activities in the region, so attention to it across the Atlantic had been minimal.
Tito’s death, the Berlin’s Wall fall, and the USSR’s break-up changed that to an extent.
Then war broke out in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Eastern Slovenia as the
former Yugoslavia broke apart into distinct, largely nationalistic states.
President William J. Clinton expressed no real interest in the Balkans or their
stability, at least initially, although he had humanitarian concerns as the Bosnia-Serbia
situation deteriorated. Yet he insisted he would not put American boots on the ground in
Bosnia unless and until a solid peace accord had been signed by all parties.28 On 19 May,
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1992, the U.S. State Department implied that “there was no American security interest at
stake in Bosnia”; this was interpreted by extension to include all of the former Yugoslav
republics. A week later, then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker insisted to European
leaders at a NATO meeting in Lisbon that they, not the U.S., do more about the
situation.29 General Colin Powell had made it clear since early Spring 1992 that
Americans would not be involved in any military action without the UN’s authority
behind it, and stuck to that position. Unfortunately, the U.S. media did not offer thorough
coverage of UNPREDEP.
The other Great Powers, the UN, and EC member states were concerned that, if
they took a broader, more militarily forceful role in Bosnia, the risk of reprisal attacks by
Serbs against their peacekeeping soldiers in Bosnia would skyrocket. That objection was
mooted when, in early May, Bosnia requested the removal of some 9,000 UN
peacekeepers in order to suspend the arms embargo sanctions, and permit potential
NATO air strikes. Still, there were huge concerns there would be spillover from the
conflict into neighboring states, or that Kosovo, still troubled, would flare up.30 The
eventual decision for establishment of safe haven areas in Bosnia proved completely
disastrous, as has been well documented.31 There was no chance to return to the status
quo ante and its relative stability.
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Taken together, these facts indicate that realism, while offering meaningful
insights, does not provide the sole explanatory theory by which to find an answer to
“Why no more preventive deployments?” If neither realism nor its variations alone lend
sufficient explanatory power regarding why no more preventive deployments have been
undertaken in seeking to avoid conflict and to support peace, then perhaps an approach
that includes constructivism and its variants would be more beneficial.
Constructivism and Social Constructivism
A constructivist approach may be utilized to help explain and understand the
international management of crises. Constructivism does not deny the importance of
material factors incorporated in the realist approach; additionally, this theoretical
viewpoint permits reflection on how social forces, such as ideas, communications,
culture, language, values and norms, can influence behaviors.32 Constructivism blurs
what divisions there may be between the field, headquarters and even other
organizations—if all entities are communicating with one another. It is thus conceivable
that entities and actors are not as separate as one might initially envision. If a common
inter-organizational learning framework results, it can be scrutinized. Greater
comprehension of the relationships of learning activities under constructivism would be
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an important contribution to how inter-organizational affairs and connections are
understood, especially in international relations.33
Barnett and Finnemore applied social constructivism in their examination and
explanation of international organizations’ behavioral dysfunctions and bureaucratic
pathologies.34 As noted, they argue that IGOs’ dysfunctions can be traced to either
internal or external (environment) material forces, or to internal or external
(environment) cultural forces.35 These factors and their potential effects are considered in
this research, particularly at UN headquarters, in the field, and among the IGO and
security communities. This suggests that those aspects of social constructivism,
especially those which overlap with organizational learning theory (discussed below),
may be of particular value in explaining why preventive deployment appears to have
been sidelined as a UN mission option.36
The underlying assumptions of constructivism are that internal and external
material factors along with internal and external cultural forces are shaped and created,
and in return, shape and create. The role of socialization is crucial. As explained by
Alexander Wendt in “Constructing International Politics”, what unites constructivism and
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other theories is “a concern with how world politics is socially constructed, which
involves two basic claims: that the fundamental structures of international politics are
social rather than strictly material (a claim that opposes materialism), and that these
structures shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just their behavior (a claim
that opposes rationalism).”37 Furthermore, “to analyze the social construction of
international politics is to analyze how processes of interaction produce and reproduce
the social structures—cooperative or conflictual—that shape actors’ identities and
interests and the significance of their material contexts.” 38
These can be important in evaluating the factors that may have contributed to
preventive deployment’s non-recurrence. It includes behaviors (or absence of behaviors)
through the second assumption regarding the power of “cultural forces”: ideas, culture,
traditions, language and norms, and the consideration of how such cultural forces shape
behaviors. Norms and rules are mutually constitutive: they connect people and society in
an interactive process, and impact how states conceive their identity and interests. These
identities and interests arise from how people use language and behavior to construct
their social environment. More than other shaping influences, complex cultures and
cultural traits shape every state’s identification of its international security situation and
military forces.
The constructivist approach thus points to the following: if (and this is a
significant qualifier, given research and evidence from this case study) all entities are
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communicating with one another, it is conceivable that all units are not as separate as one
might initially envision. If (again, a crucial “if”, given case study and research
indications) a common inter-organizational learning (constructive and constructing)
framework exists, that framework can be scrutinized.39 Neither of the requisite
explanatory features appear to be present in this case, because not all of the entities were
communicating (at least, apparently less than-effectively), and no inter-organizational
learning construct (even between the field and HQ) appeared extant.
Norms are another distinctive characteristic of the constructivist approach.
Normative elements may matter as beliefs and values are internalized by an organization,
which then gains stability from them. Norms are tied, therefore, to organizations and
actors.40 Shared understandings about identity and activities, combined with regulating
elements, lead to behavior conforming to the organization’s rational interests.
Internalized norms then lead to an institutional logic, comprised of sanctions and
constraints, shared cognitive meanings, and other normative elements that then lead to
expressed behaviors.41
Björkdahl examined UNPREDEP as a “norms promotion” case of peacekeeping:
as a successful effort at conflict prevention, it thereby promoted “growing acceptance of
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the international norm of early intervention in conflict management.” 42 If so, why has
more than a decade passed without such a pre-bloodshed, early intervention effort being
repeated? It is apparent that promoting a norm is not the same as institutionalizing it—or
even ensuring that the most appropriate and effective learning has led to its development
and transmission. The promotion and institutionalization of norms also may take a
significant amount of time, with repeated tests of a norm, such as preventive
deployments’ acceptability and efficacy. That, of course, did not occur post-UNPREDEP.
Further, it is possible that the norm or principle promoted (and which potentially
could have been institutionalized) was not, “Let’s proactively engage in preventive
deployment again,” but rather, “Let’s avoid such an endeavor in the future,” particularly
in the IGO and security communities, although the reason the latter may have occurred is
not immediately evident. Since there was no accessible, reliable evidence one way or the
other in the Archives, the UNDPKO office, or in the media, it is a challenge to resolve
this puzzle.
It is possible that organizational theory with its associated organizational learning
and knowledge theory will enrich explanatory power with constructivism and social
constructivism when included as a companion approach to the question of, “Why no
further preventive deployments?”
Organizational Learning Theory
Organizational theory arose from several scholarly fields in their parallel attempts
to understand more or less formalized collections of individuals, with special emphasis
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on business firms. The open system of organizations and the perspectives related to their
structures tended to dominate organization theory until the mid-1970s: organizations,
especially business organizations, were considered to be open to, highly aware of, and
reliant on their external environment in particular. To survive, they had to adapt
effectively and efficiently to that environment and to the feedback they received from it.43
They were required to learn and change in order to continue to exist, to serve the interests
of constituents, and to achieve goals. To serve and to achieve selected goals,
organizations had a tendency to grow and expand, to accept (at least to some extent)
equifinality, and to perform both maintenance and adaptive activities. 44 Certainly, this
seems applicable to international governmental organizations and to peacekeeping
missions.
Organizational theory framework addressing knowledge as power evolved in the
early 1990s, largely from the path-breaking work of Ernst B. Haas’s When Knowledge is
Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations. Organizational actions,
systems, and structures are dependent upon contingent, ever-changing tactical
interactions and alliances. These are negotiated and renegotiated as power mechanisms,
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which in turn result from knowledge acquisition, learning and adaptation. They enable
organizations to carry forward knowledge and skills in multilateral relationships to
achieve various goals.45
Ernest Haas addresses “turbulence” and “turbulent nongrowth”: in situations of
social complexity, and sometimes in incidents of crisis, actors cannot agree on how they
got into a particular condition nor see a clear a way out of it. This is so even if the actors
know one another, and even if the organization is still technically growing, with
increasing budgets, staffs, tasks, operations, and offices. Turbulence often arises when
there are large amounts of knowledge that add certainty to parts of an issue’s
manifestation, but that confuse or undermine sureness about the whole (emphasis
added).46
Interestingly, Haas proposes that turbulence may arise “because previous patterns
of adaptive, incremental behavior were so successful” (emphasis added).47 Because of
those successes, specific responses have become entrenched in the organization and its
culture. Turbulence that conflicts with previous specific responses based on earlier
successes makes learning more difficult, especially regarding problem identification and
change. Was Haas speaking directly to peace missions, particularly preventive ones?
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Organization and its related learning theory have not been much applied in
international politics and relations; notable exceptions to this are the works of Michael
Barnett and Martha Finnemore, examining pathologies and dysfunctions in organizational
bureaucracies. Barnett and Finnemore combined organizational theory approaches with
constructivism for greater explanatory power; the present research follows in that
model.48
Learning theory is utilized specifically here as part of this case study of
UNPREDEP to seek an answer to the question as to why preventive deployment (a
success) has not recurred in international efforts since then: what has led to such a
seemingly surprising outcome? Aspects that explain an organization’s adaptation and
learning (leading—or not—to change) are of particular importance.49 Organizations
“rarely change in a way that fulfills the intentions of a particular group of actors,” and
sometimes adapt in ways “not intended by their creators.”50 It may be fairly argued they
do not necessarily learn in expected ways either, or alternatively, do not learn what they
would be expected to learn. Nor do they necessarily change in anticipated ways.
Ernst Haas describes change in organizations as “the change in the definition of
the problem to be solved.”51 The driving forces for change will be what the organizations
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view as problems and how they define those problems. The definitions of those perceived
problems then impel change—within constraints in the environment that affect power,
capabilities and capacities. Some environmental factors influencing change can include
perceptions of the organization’s legitimacy and authority, along with related material,
cultural, and structural limitations. According to Barnett and Finnemore, change in
organizations tends to be path dependent, and bureaucracies enlarge in both size and
scope of responsibilities for various reasons, including the demands of members.52 This
can lead to the previously described turbulence in international organizations impacting
learning and adaptation capacities from knowledge, particularly if that knowledge
appears to contain contradictory elements.53
Furthermore, the most discernible changes are usually brought about by crisis—
rapid global change—or by unsettled states.54 From one such unsettled state (some would
say also a rapid global change), the Cold War’s end and subsequent rising nationalist
tensions in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, the UN began to realize that its former
interstate peacekeeping practices largely ignored the root causes for conflict, and were far
too often too little, too late. Their more traditional former peacekeeping practices thus
were not appropriate or effective in managing or resolving certain types of conflicts,
including intrastate ones, with their underlying issues and driving forces.
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Examples of missions the UN community and others saw as such failures
included UNISOM I and II, UNPROFOR, ONUC and MONUC, and Rwanda’s
UNAMIR.55 Two UN documents, 1992’s Agenda for Peace and the 1995 Supplement to
it, arguably represented selected learning outcomes and recommendations for change as a
result of this organizational awareness; the results included important reports from the
Secretary-General and a proactive attempt to address conflict prior to bloodshed (as in
UNPREDEP) rather than during or post-conflagration.
Stewart Clegg argues that knowledge-as-power theories tend to adopt a view of
organizations as “the condensation of local cultures of values, power, rules, discretion
and paradox”.56 This marks the importance of the social constructivist factors in
knowledge-as-power theories, which may be significant when examining and contrasting
learning in the field organization and the UN headquarters’ organization to help explain
the non-reproduction of preventive deployment.
Benner and Rotmann’s work explored organizations that are aimed at obtaining
peace and security in the world. They examined the challenges in creating an effective
post-conflict peacebuilding organization that must “learn to learn,” but they do not
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examine pre-conflict oriented organizations in the field. Their work on learning in the UN
itself clearly supported that the HQ must “learn to learn” from peacekeeping. 57
Wolfgang Biermann and Martin Vadset edited a volume regarding learning from
the UN mission failures in the former Yugoslavia, but the works included in it do not
fully take a learning approach focused on organizations. They are instead post mortems
on operations and events, mainly (and quite usefully) examining field organizations, but
largely omitting the HQ as an organization, independent or otherwise, thus differentiating
this research and analysis from that scholarship.58 There is little exploration of the
learning process itself as experienced by various entities, nor of what may have shaped it.
Thus, in this present analysis, it may be first concluded that all of these theoretical
approaches contribute to the nexus of explanation for the absence of a repeat by the UN
of its UNPREDEP success, each approach providing an essential analytical tool: realism,
constructivism, organizational learning, and organizational knowledge. What are closely
examined, in particular, are the learning processes and outcomes before, during and
following pre-conflict intervention and management, both in the field mission itself, at
the HQ organization (the United Nations), by states, via highly-ranked international
governmental organizations other than the UN, and in non-governmental organizations.
Secondly, this enhanced theoretical approach, building on the major international
relations theories, but adding a deeper look at organizational learning theory and the
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interaction (and different learning methods and results) of headquarters with the field,
could provide a fuller, perhaps more adequate, explanation of why preventive
deployment has not been repeated since UNPREDEP’s success.
Table 1. Expectations of Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Preventive
Deployment’s Non-Recurrence
Theory

Terms

Expectation

Initial
Rationale

Realism &
Variants

Facts given meaning
through reason;

Neither realism,
neorealism nor
offensive realism
will explain why
no further
preventive
deployments as
fully as another
theory or theories.

Great Powers
had no real
national interest
in Eastern
Europe, and
economic and
military power
were not at
stake; projection
of power may
have been
somewhat of a
concern (Russia
vs. the U.S.).
Stability was a
concern, too, but
it does not
appear any of
these explain
why there have
been no more
preventive
deployments.

Constructivism
will assist in
explaining why no
more such
deployments, but
needs additional
evidence and/or

Ideas,
communications,
language and
norms can
influence
behaviors,
identities and

Anarchy is the state of
the world;
Interest defined as
power;
States act in national
interest;
Power usually defined
as military and/or
economic;
Projection of power
important, as is
stability.

Constructivism

Material factors
matter, but so do
social forces;
Ideas,
communications,
language and norms
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Theory

Terms

Expectation

Initial
Rationale

can influence
behaviors, identities
and interests
(socialization is
crucial);

support. Most of
its explanatory
value will come
from its emphasis
on social forces,
norms, rules, and
institutions that act
in formation and
promotion of rules,
norms, beliefs and
values which then
lead to an
institutional logic.
Ideas,
communications,
language and
norms can
influence
behaviors,
identities and
interests
(socialization is
crucial).

interests
(socialization is
crucial).
Preventive
deployment
represents
change on all
fronts: in the
field, at
headquarters,
within and
outside of states,
regarding norms,
values and
beliefs. No
common
learning or
communication
construct was
immediately
apparent. This
may support an
explanation of
why no more
such missions.

This will add
explanatory value
to understanding
why no further
preventive
deployments due
to HQ difficulties
in adapting and
changing, perhaps
lack of clarity
surrounding
selected goals.

Organization
theory, with its
learning and
knowledge subfields, appears to
be of particular
value in
explaining
dearth of
preventive
deployments
when combined
with

Norms and rules are
mutually constitutive;
Institutions matter in
formation and
promotion of rules,
norms, beliefs and
values which then lead
to an institutional
logic;
Entities must
communicate;
There must be a
common learning
framework or
construct.

Organization
Theory and
Learning

Organizations must
learn, change and
adapt to environment
and feedback from it
in order continue to
exist;
Serve and achieve
selected goals,
maintain self and
engage in adaptive
activities.
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Theory

Terms

Expectation

Initial
Rationale
constructivist
features.

Organizational
Knowledge

Addresses turbulence
and turbulent nongrowth; organizations
depend on contingent
tactical interactions or
alliances renegotiated
as power mechanisms;
success may lead to
entrenched
organizational
responses rather than
adaptation or change.

Explanatory value:
lack of appropriate
response to
success; theoretical
claim that
organizations
rarely change in
ways that a
particular group of
actors wants and
sometimes, indeed,
do the opposite.
This leads to same
concept regarding
learning:
unexpected
outcomes.
Crisis/unexpected
change can be
accommodated
within these
organizational
theory terms.

Knowledge
theories examine
organizations as
“local cultures
of values,
power, rules,
discretion and
paradox”
(Clegg, 1994),
important
characteristics
that may help
explain change
or lack thereof
resulting
unexpected
learning or
change. These
have led to no
further
preventive
deployments.

CHAPTER III
RESEARCHING THE SINGULAR CASE OF
UNITED NATIONS PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT
This study addresses the unique preventive deployment mission, UNPREDEP,
authorized and created by the United Nations at the request of the Macedonian President,
with the approval of the UN Security Council, to prevent the fragile country from
becoming pulled into the rapidly evolving Yugoslav pattern of violence.
The case study method was applied to examine the complexity of the
UNPREDEP mission and its achievements more deeply.
The Case Study: Methodological Considerations
The scope of case studies is, according to Robert Yin, empirical inquiries that
investigate a contemporary phenomenon or event within its real-life context, using
multiple sources of evidence. This is because “the boundaries between phenomenon and
context are not clearly evident.”1 Case study inquiry, because of its complexity




copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more
variables of interest than data points, and as one result
Relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a
triangulating fashion, and as another result
Benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data
collection” and analyses. 2

1

Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research Design and Methods, 4th ed. (CA: SAGE Publications, 2009), 18. Cf.
Robert E. Stake, “Qualitative Case Studies”, in The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research, 3rd ed.
(2005), edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, (CA: SAGE Publications, 2005), 443-466.
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Yin, Case Study Research, 2009, 18.
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Case studies “get as close to the subject of interest as they possibly can, partly by
means of direct observation in natural settings, and partly by their access to subjective
factors…thoughts, feelings, and desires”.3 “Case study research is remarkably hard, even
though case studies have traditionally been considered “soft” research…”4 Developing a
workable and effective case study research model for this endeavor supported the
accuracy of this statement.
There are conceivably exceptional circumstances when a single case is so unique
or important (as in the UNPREDEP mission) that a case study investigator cannot
necessarily generalize to any other cases. These are sometimes termed “intrinsic” case
studies or “portraits.”5
The central research phenomenon explored and examined in this case study is
why a specific type of UN peace mission, preventive deployment, has not been attempted
again after the UN Preventive Deployment in Macedonia, the sole such mission (1995 –
1999), even in the face of repeated failures of other mission types, and even though world
circumstances have arisen in which preventive deployment could plausibly have had a
major role. UNPREDEP was judged by others as generally very successful, less costly
than other forms of peace operations, and overall, expectations were that more such
missions would follow, given appropriate circumstances. These would be part of

3

D.B. Bromley, The case-study method in psychology and related disciplines (NY: Wiley Publishing,
1986), 23.
4
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Yin, Case Study Research, 21.

Yin, 22, Note 2. See also Robert E. Stake, The Art of Case Study Research (CA: SAGE Publications
1995), for “intrinsic” and particularistic cases.
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preventive diplomacy efforts. 6 Moreover, it aligned very well with positive conflict
prevention, intervention, and conflict management and resolution principles and
practices.7
This study relies heavily upon data obtained from interviews with key military
and political elites affiliated with UNPREDEP in the field and at the United Nations
headquarters in NY, first-hand observations, and mission and other documents. This
analysis seeks to provide insights into why it was not utilized again, and to affirm or
disconfirm potential theoretical lenses through which the mission itself could be viewed
to more deeply understand UNPREDEP itself and why it has not been reproduced. It
offers the means to examine the case in context, and by getting as “close to the subject of
interest” as is feasible.
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Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 2003; Abiodun Williams, Preventing War: The United Nations and
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Conflict in Divided Societies, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1996),
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Primary Sources: Subjects and Documents
This study encompasses two primary groups most relevant to this case: (1) the
United Nations and its structures, notably the U.N. Security Council and the Department
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); and (2) the peacekeeping category, which
encompasses the United Nations Protective Forces, UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP’s
specific participants, including military and political elites, and other public figures who
were influential due to their positions and reputations, such as the Special Representative
for the Secretary-General of the UN (the SRSG). In this case study, the positional
approach was helpful in identifying the following individuals who, by the nature of their
official position or office, were recognized as having influence.8 Subjects were also
identified by means of the “reputational” technique: all participants were asked to name
persons or groups/organizations they felt had influence or knowledge in the field. This
led to several key actors with such attributes who might have been missed using
“positional” techniques alone.9
Additionally, important individuals and organizations (NGOs, in particular) were
identified during fieldwork through referrals from initial interview subjects.

8

Robert A. Dahl and Bruce Stinebrickner, Modern Political Analysis, 6th ed. (NJ: Pearson 2002).

9

Dahl and Stinebrickner, 2002.
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Table 2. Sources and Subjects 2009-201010
Organization

Peacekeeping/Security Community

Elites/Public Figures

United Nations
and DPKO

United Nations

UNPROFOR/M,
UNPREDEP,
UNDPKO, DPET;
Interviews with
Brigadier Generals (4)
and other military
members; Special
Representative of the
Secretary General to
UNPREDEP, SRSG
Aide

UNARMS (UN
Archives and
Record
Management
Services)

United Nations

As documented in
records

International
Organizations
(Non-UN)

ICFY, OECD, OSCE and NATO

As documented in
UNARMS records and
in literature; from BGs’
personal materials;
Interview: Military
leader from
NATO/KFOR

Analysis of the Singular Case of Macedonia
Following is a synthesis of the various phases of data collection and analysis. To
achieve a deeper understanding of this case, several research methods were utilized.
These included qualitative case study, data collection and analysis, methods composed of

10

Note: It is recognized that some subjects could be included in more than one category.
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literature reviews, assessments of primary documents in the UN Archives on
UNPREDEP and on-line, documents provided by individuals, and face-to-face, semistructured interviews. Those interviews included elite military and political leaders, as
well as others closely involved in UNPREDEP, its precursor operation United Nations
Protective Forces/Macedonia, and the successor Kosovo Forces (KFOR) operation under
NATO’s aegis. Interviews were conducted in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and
Poland in 2009 and 2010. Data analysis occurred across all three data collection methods
on a comprehensive and recurring basis.
Preliminary Fieldwork: Macedonia 2006
The purpose of the preliminary fieldwork was two-fold: to determine whether
similar field research had been conducted within a fairly recent time period (2000-2006),
and whether those in Macedonia favored or did not favor a more intense study of
UNPREDEP and associated operations. Those interviewed ranged from the National
Security Advisor to Macedonia’s then-president Branko Crvenkovski, to various media
members and authors, and the two Generals charged with rebuilding the Army of the
Republic of Macedonia (ARM) and its Air Force after the Yugoslav National Army’s
withdrawal in February through March, 1992. Additionally, ethnically Albanian and
Macedonian scholars and faculty members at various universities, including Saints Cyril
and Methodius as the major state university, and South Eastern European University
(SEEU) in Tetovo, a number of leaders of Macedonian NGOs, and several candidates for
political office in the upcoming election were contacted for semi-structured discussions.
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Every expert felt strongly that, for various reasons, this would be an important,
meaningful study; almost all referred the researcher to other influential, reputable and
positionally significant individuals. Many private meetings were held in 2006 with the
future (now current) President of Macedonia, Gjorge Ivanov, who holds a PhD in
political theory and philosophy from Saints Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje,
and was Law Faculty there. All felt the research question was well worth pursuing for
diverse reasons, including that an extensive literature review indicated no scholarly
studies had investigated questions similar to this analysis regarding UNPREDEP’s nonreproduction.
What this preliminary work in 2006 accomplished was to establish contacts and
rapport with a sizeable number of subject-matter experts, academicians, political and
media figures, and others who in turn, as mentioned, were instrumental in identification
and referrals to other contacts and influential individuals.
Focused Fieldwork: May through July 2009 and June-July 2010
The bulk of fieldwork focused on military and political elite interviews. The
purpose of these was to obtain the fullest possible set of experiences, knowledge,
perceptions and insights into UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP, with the heaviest
emphasis on UNPREDEP. The interviews featured some direct questions in order to
focus the interviewee on the subject matter. Direct questions, “although they are not
‘leading’ in character, force subjects to focus their attention on items and issues to which
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they might not have responded on their own initiative.”11 This also helped with flexibility
during interviews, and in analyzing information and data thereafter, as it permitted the
respondent to include relevant issues or raise questions the researcher might not have
otherwise considered. Therefore, both focused and open-ended questions were used.
Overall, as indicated, the interviews concentrated on guiding the researcher and the
informants to illuminate relevant issues about UNPREDEP that might signal why it has
not been reproduced.
In 2009, interviews were organized in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark
with proposed interview subjects. These interviews, done in person, included
observations of the interviewee, and some featured immediate document review when the
opportunity was offered.
In 2010, the interview schedule featured two done in-person with UNPREDEP’s
longest-serving former Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Henryk J.
Sokalski, in Warsaw, Poland, and a return visit with Brigadier General Bent Sohnemann
of Denmark, UNPREDEP’s longest-term Field Commander.
Ending Fieldwork: 2009 and 2010
There were several criteria involved in decisions to end the fieldwork effort at
various points: that it appeared all information of value to the research question had been
imparted to the interviewer; that the interview subject became markedly less cooperative
or appeared to engage in misdirection, showed signs of promoting their own agenda, or
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R.K. Merton, M. Fiske and P. Kendell, The focused interview (IL: Free Press, 1956).
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used other techniques so that speaking with them no longer benefitted the research
efforts; that interviewee(s) showed signs of irritation, impatience, or physical exhaustion,
or simply did not have the information being sought; or that available time with the
interviewee was expended.12 No respondent requested that discussions be brought to a
close that was in any sense premature.
Archival and Other Document Examination
Physical documents were broadly defined for the purpose of this research, and
included public newspapers and the Internet, and non-public records. The latter included
the United Nations’ Archives and Records Management Services (UNARMS) files on
UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP, personal or private papers and records provided to the
researcher, and highly personalized mission books such as those developed by
SWECOY, the Swedish Company’s mission participants, as examples. As George and
Bennett recommend, specific attention was paid to the reason such documents—
especially archival and news/internet materials—may have been developed, and to
consider them as possible “purposive communication.”13 Purposive communications have
a raison d’etre; they may not reveal that reason in flashing lights or clear prose, but the
intention is there, and can often be discerned.
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Mr. Sokalski, for example, was interviewed into two sessions about a week apart.
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Public and Archival United Nations Documents
Primary UNPREDEP documents available to the general public from the UN
number about fifty. These consist of UN Mandates for the mission, Secretary-General
Reports, draft and final Security Council resolutions, and some financial statements, a
very limited resource set for the purposes of these analytical efforts. These reports,
however, offer at least some indication of what Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld label the
“sensemaking process and its outcomes”, discussed below. 14 These readily-available
primary documents also reflect, to some extent, information processed at the Skopje
offices and the UN from the field organization, the UNPREDEP mission itself, and by its
leadership (the SRSG and the military in particular). But because they are intended for
specific purposes, and are heavily edited (as such reports likely must be, given the
requirements of the United Nations Security Council), they do not contain all of the
information upon which they are based.
Since the balance of UNPREDEP documentation at the United Nations is less
than twenty years old, they were not publicly available.15 This researcher therefore sought
special access, which was granted on October 8, 2010. This was the first time some sixty
linear feet of mission documents, minus access to an unknown percentage adjudged by
UN staff to still be classified, were made available for research, and most were analyzed
immediately at the time of review. This markedly enriched the stock of primary

Karl E. Weick, K.M. Sutcliffe and D. Obstfeld, “Organizing and the Process of Sensemaking,”
Organization Science 16 (2005): 409-421.
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UN Secretariat Administrative Instruction ST/AI/326 of 28 December 1984, especially Sec. 4.b and 4.c,
plus others.
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resources. The primary UNARMS collection was supplemented with printed mission
books, news/media reports, and a limited set of communications with UNPREDEP
civilian support staff.
There were tantalizing hints of interactions between various IGO and NGO
entities and UNPREDEP within the sixty linear feet of files – but not fuller details or
support materials for those references. There were few documents of import from the
field commanders, nor were there any available regarding the military observers
(UNMOs), police trainers, and others, civilians especially, who were associated with
UNPREDEP. Chiefs of Staff (U.S. military leaders) records were not present.
Unfortunately, there were a great many lengthy “date gaps”, particularly in the SRSG’s
official papers, and no files from Sokalski’s main aides (e.g., Abiodun Williams or Dr.
Vera Mehta). Moreover, there was little in the Archives on the actual withdrawal or its
process details.
Note that gaining special permission to access UNPREDEP files prior to general
availability was a privilege accepted with much gratitude. The researcher hopes to revisit
UNARMS in 2019 or as soon as the UPREDEP files are made fully and publicly
available to explore an even fuller understanding of UNPREDEP and UN HQ as discrete
learning organizations during this mission.
In these and other documents, explicit and implicit information was sought that
could be particularly important to understanding UNPREDEP as a preventive
deployment, the involvement of various states, the influential individuals in this mission,
key and major events with potential explanatory value regarding UNPREDEP and its
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non-duplication, important economic information and indicators, and information
regarding factors that may have affected the mission and understandings or perceptions
about it, both during its active phase and afterward.
Maintaining Documents, Recordings and Notes
Recordings were maintained on a dedicated, portable computer drive under
password protection and encryption. Other notes, such as during UNARMS research,
were maintained in electronic files on a dedicated portable computer drive under
password protection and encryption. More general documents were placed into files (if
physical; otherwise, onto same dedicated computer drive. To encompass all these
materials, indices were developed and kept in electronic files.
This body of research materials comprised the case record, which was then
subject to analyses with the goal of data reduction in line with the research question:
analyzing the raw, field notes so that “final” conclusions can be developed and verified;
data display (organized assembly of information so as to draw conclusions and arrive at
an action plan); and conclusion drawing and verification, wherein “meanings emerging
from data [are] tested for…plausibility, sturdiness, confirmability—that is, their validity”.
Weaving these three actions together during and after data collection generated
“analysis”.
Observational notes relevant to the research question were initially categorized as
uninterpreted statements and/or observations; theoretical notes were considered
contextual interpretations of one or more observational notes. Methodological
memoranda were recorded as operations directions pertaining to completed fieldwork
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procedures. More analytically-oriented memos, written or tape-recorded, brought
together theoretical notes, and in some specific instances, noted new thinking on the
issues.16
Additional post-fieldwork analyses of field notes and associated recordings
(along with other information) were undertaken to identify recurrent patterns of “themes,
accounts, explanations, perceptions, facts and the like, in order to generate…and to
establish an evidentiary warrant for the assertions one wishes to make.” 17
Public Figure and Elite Interviews
As indicated, significant explanatory value arose from elite interviews, because
these offered internal information, insights and experiences about the UNPREDEP field
organization and its precursor UNPROFOR/Macedonia (UNPROFOR/M), and about the
UN headquarters organization. Interviews with the top field leadership highlight
potentially unforeseen variables or processes that may not be clear in archival research,
and could enable confirmation or disconfirmation of findings from the literature and
archives. Semi-structured interviews also offered the opportunity to acquire information
that might well be missing from written documentation but is essential to the processes of
organization learning.
In most cases, written records and archives could not offer this internal
organization focus and perspective. Instead, in this case, written materials and archives

16
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provided a body of work against which to compare interview results, making interviews
even more crucial to the discrete “field organization and learning vs. headquarters
organization and learning” approaches associated with this research thesis regarding
preventive deployment's non-reproduction.
Semi-structured Elite (Military and Political) Interviews: Selection
In 2009, it was most feasible and practical to focus on military elites associated
with the Nordic Battalions, specifically the Field Operations Commanders. These
constituted the highest-ranking UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP officers, those in
control of the field organization, all of whom were from Finland, Denmark, Norway and
Sweden. The strongest reason for beginning with these interviews is that communication
and contact with both active duty and retired military is not highly restricted in these
countries, as it now is in the United States. Furthermore, the Nordic countries have a
lengthy history of peace operations and conflict management involvement, giving rise to
the great depth of experience each country and its leadership brought to Macedonian
operations.
Military leaders from these four countries offered rich sources of information
about the learning processes of the precursor UNPROFOR/M, and of UNPREDEP as
field organizations, and about their commands (which included Danish, Finnish,
Norwegian, Swedish, and U.S. troops, along with a lesser number of individuals from
other troop-contributing states). For a variety of reasons, some adaptive behaviors and
decisions during the course of UNPREDEP were taken by individuals who have asked to
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remain unnamed.18 Two individuals who led UNPROFOR/M (the mission preceding
UNPREDEP) were also interviewed, as was a NATO Kosovo Forces Danish general
(KFOR based in Skopje, post-UNPREDEP), to complete the temporal expansion of this
analysis. Interviews were focused, semi-structured, and confidentiality and/or anonymity
was protected based on requests for such.
Table 3. Interview Participants
Name19

Title

Country of
Origin

Dates of
Service

Dates of
Interviews

Place of
Interview

Juha
Engstrom

Brigadier General
(Ret.)

Finland

February 1995
to February
1996

June 17,
2009

Mäntsälä,
Finland
(residence)

Bo Lennart
Wranker

Brigadier General

Sweden

March 1996
through May
1997

June 24,
2009

Swedish
National
Military
Academy,
Stockholm
Barracks

Bent
Sohnemann

Brigadier General
(Ret.)

Denmark

June 1997
through
September 1998

July 8-10,
2009 and
July, 2010

Varde,
Denmark
(residence)

Ove Johnny
Strömberg

Brigadier General
(Ret.)

Norway

September 1998
to end of
Mandate,
February 28,
1999

July 4, 2009

Oslo,
Norway

1996 – 1997

June 16,
2009

Paavo
Kalevi
Kiljunen

Nordic Battalion
Commander, now
Major General

Finland

(Grand
Hotel)
Tampere,
Finland
(Ministry of
Defense
Offices)

Sokalski, 2003; Howard Kuenning, “Come Over to Macedonia and Help Us (Acts 16:9),” strategic
research project (Report No. A135902) (Carlisle PA: U.S. Army War College, April 1996), available at
www.stormingmedia.com.
18

19

There were several informants who requested anonymity and confidentiality protections; these
individuals do not appear in the table.
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Name19

Title

Country of
Origin

Dates of
Service

Dates of
Interviews

Place of
Interview

Finn
SærmarkThomsen

Brigadier General
(Ret.)

Denmark

UNPROFOR/M
(1993 – 1995)

July 6, 2009

Danish
Military
Academy,
Svanemǿlle
Barracks,
Copenhagen

Kalle
Liesinen

Colonel (Ret.) –
Nordic Battalion
Commander

Finland

April 1995
through June
1996

June 12-14,
2009

Kuovola
(summer
residence)
and in
Helsinki

Gunnar
Lange

Major General,
NATO/KFOR/IFOR
(now ret.)

Denmark

April 3, 2001
through March
15, 2002

July 10,
2009

Blåvand at
residence

Per Iko

Major

Sweden

September 1998
to end of
Mandate,
February 28,
1999

June 25,
2009

Swedish
National
Defense
Academy,
Stockholm

Jan-Gunnar
Isberg

Brigadier General
(Ret.)

Sweden

UNPROFOR/M
(1993-1995)

June 23,
2009

Swedish
National
Defense
Academy,
Stockholm

Henryk J.
Sokalski

Special
Representative of
the Secretary
General of the
United Nations to
UNPREDEP

Poland

July 9th and
14th, 2010

Warsaw,
Poland at
Sokalski
residence

Abiodun
Williams

United States
Institute of Peace;
Aide to SRSG
Henryk J. Sokalski
in UNPREDEP,
Macedonia

United
States

October 6,
2010

Telephone
to
Washington,
D.C./USIP
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To address the political side of UNPREDEP and the United Nations headquarters’
representation in the field, as noted above, similar semi-structured interviews were
conducted in person with the first Special Representative of the Secretary General
(SRSG) to UNPREDEP, Henryk Sokalski, on the 9th and 14th of July, 2010, in Warsaw,
Poland, and by telephone with Abiodun Williams, a key civilian aide in Sokalski’s
offices in Macedonia during UNPREDEP, on 06 October 2010.
Summary
The research incorporated primary materials and methods not extensively utilized
or available for previous work. First, it included information from interviews directly
with Force Commanders, Chiefs of Staff, battalion commanders and others closely
related to UNPREDEP; with the political leader and diplomat of UNPREDEP who served
as the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General throughout most of
its operations; and with UN officials at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO). Several of the military leaders of UNPREDEP confidentially provided select
personal papers and records from the mission, along with various reports they transmitted
during the course of UNPREDEP to the United Nations and other entities, mainly OSCE
and NATO. These documents and interviews offered a unique opportunity to gain
insights into field learning and, for comparative explanatory purposes, into HQ learning
at the UN.
Second, as a result, UN documentation from UNPREDEP other than that
previously utilized or presently publicly available, and therefore exclusive to this research
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and analysis, offered rich potential for more significant analysis than any previously
undertaken.
Finally, in order to ascertain more information about American military, political
and public attitudes toward UNPREDEP, media coverage was examined, and interviews
with selected individuals offering expert information, insights, and evidence were
undertaken. Document-based methods were incorporated to explore the potential
interconnection between IGOs relevant to UNPREDEP, including the UN, CoE, OSCE,
EU and NATO.

CHAPTER IV
THE BALKANS, THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND
PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY/DEPLOYMENT IN MACEDONIA:
THE CASE OF UNPREDEP
UNPREDEP remains the UN’s only peacekeeping mission to date authorized and
established in a state prior to the commencement of actual hostilities within or against
it—a preventive deployment.1 It offers the sole UN case permitting examination of the
organizations and learning of key actors most closely associated with a preventive
deployment mission and its mandate(s), implementation and assessment. In order to add
context to this case, a review of the history of the region, subjective aspects, Macedonia’s
geo-strategic location, and other factors are included.
Yugoslavia: 1918 - 1991
With the death of Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980), initially Prime Minister and later
President of Yugoslavia, the state lost the leader with an “unassailable power base” who
was able to unite six disparate nations for nearly three decades from 1953 until his death
in 1980. These constituent republics were Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Slovenia, and Serbia with its two semi-autonomous provinces of Kosovo

1

Henryk J. Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy
(Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003).
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and Vojvodina. For much of the world, “the very words Tito and Yugoslavia were
indelibly linked.”2
Yet there was a Yugoslavia prior to Tito. For over 700 years, Macedonia and the
region had been part of the Ottoman Empire. The “First Yugoslavia” was formed postWorld War I from the remains of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires. Between 1918 and
1929, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was a monarchy that transitioned to
dictatorship in 1929 under “hegemonic Serbian dynastic leadership.”3 This interwar
kingdom fell apart as Serbian leaders resisted political compromise; armed nationalistic,
xenophobic militias rose up; various non-Serb national groups objected to Serb
leadership, and institutional, political and economic corruption proliferated.
Notwithstanding efforts to inculcate “democratic culture,” growing nationalistic feelings
among the various ethnic groups stimulated constant crises. 4
Due at least in part to these factors, three embodiments of Yugoslavia existed
during the interwar years. First was “Greater Serbia, with Serbian identity and leadership
paramount, and with non-Serbs discriminated against to a significant extent. A second
follow-on effort was made to establish and solidify an artificial Yugoslav identity on all
of the nations and peoples in Yugoslavia. King Aleksandar, as royal dictator of the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, imposed this from above. The King abolished

Christopher Bennet, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences (London, UK:
Hurst & Company, 1996), 56.
2

3

Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (NY: TV Books/Penguin, 1995), 28.

Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918 – 2005 (Washington
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, and Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2006), 1-2.
4
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Parliament and the 1921 Constitution.5 The third incarnation of Yugoslavia during the
interwar period was one formed during attempts to cut deals with the Croats, the nascent
Kingdom’s “most vociferous opponents.”6
The first option alienated everyone but the Serbs, and the second essentially
estranged all parties including Serbians. A highly centralized state, further, was quite
possibly the least appropriate choice given the “various constituent peoples of
Yugoslavia.”7 The research conducted for this study indicated, however, that this was
precisely Tito’s solution, which he made work quite well.
Tito’s own background was extensively intertwined with the rise of Stalin and the
Communist Party in the USSR, and was a survivor of Stalin’s multiple purges. His roles
included serving in the Communist International (Comintern, 1919-1943) and its
successor, the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform, 1947-1956).8 Yet he was the
sole Eastern European leader not appointed by Moscow and not put into power by their
occupying forces: “From Moscow’s point of view, he was dangerously independent, and
too ambitious.” Yugoslavia was expelled from the Eastern Bloc in 1948.9
Once again, Yugoslavia went through a governmental transformation to a
socialist, communist, centrally controlled entity. Tito created what was essentially a one-

5

John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a country (NY and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 160.
6

Bennet, Bloody Collapse, 33.

7

Ibid., 34.

8

Ibid., 57-58.

9

Silber and Little, Death of a Nation, 28.
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man state, despite several constitutional revisions that appeared to indicate ostensible
moves toward democracy. Under Tito’s leadership, Yugoslavia was able to maintain a
tenuous balancing act addressing both Eastern and Western interests along with the
country’s own. He was largely able to defuse or control ethnic nationalism through
economic apportionment, repression, deportations, and other means such as manipulation
of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and its draftees, and he strongly emphasized a
unified “Yugoslav” identity (emphasis added).10 Further, he co-founded the Non-Aligned
Movement in 1961, which improved diplomatic and other relations with many countries.
At one time, possession of a Yugoslav passport with its travel privileges was highly
prized.11
Tito most certainly is not forgotten: a bronze bust of him was erected in Bitola,
Macedonia, on its main pedestrian concourse, within the past decade. Skopje, the
Macedonian capital, has “Broz” coffee shops, akin to Starbucks.12 As recently as late
November of 2013, a large, bronze statue of Tito mysteriously appeared in front of Tito
High School in Skopje.13 These may well be signals of “Yugo-nostalgia” or Titonostalgia in the general populace.14

10

John R. Lampe, Balkans into Southeastern Europe: A Century of War and Transition. NY: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2006.
11

Lampe, War and Transition, 2006.

12

Stevo Pendarovski, interview with author, Skopje, Macedonia, 16 May, 2006; Dr. Goce Georgievski,
interview with author, Skopje, Macedonia, 22 May, 2006; personal observations, Summer 2006; Abiodun
Williams, telephone interview with author, 06 Oct, 2010.
Sinisa Jakov Marusic, “Mysterious Tito Statue Rises over Macedonia”, 03 December 2013,
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/tito-s-monument-catches-macedonians-by-surprise.
13

14

A. Williams, interview with author, 06 October 2010.
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Prior to his death in May of 1980, Tito made a serious strategic error: he failed to
name or appoint a specific successor. An eight-way presidency, ineffective and especially
unpopular, was instituted after his demise. Unrest proliferated throughout the constituent
republics, a good part of it based on formerly repressed ethnic identities and the resultant
rising nationalism. The Yugoslav Communist Party also lost favor with the constituent
peoples in the republics because of suspicions of favoritism, infighting, ineffectiveness,
economic downturns, corruption and overall inefficiencies. By the late 1980s, Yugoslavia
had become distinct republics, awaiting next steps in the tensions.15
The Run-Up to UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP
During the 1980s, the situation in Yugoslavia deteriorated even more in terms of
economic distress; growing nationalist sentiments in the republics that had been mostly
neutralized or controlled by Tito during his tenure; increasingly absent and/or ineffective
leaders and in-fighting among them; blatant ethnic favoritism; rising corruption, and
declining institutions. Few of the constituent republics anticipated the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia would survive intact (except possibly Serbia): all had plans either
for independence or a different version of confederation. For example, Serbia and
Montenegro, two former republics, became the “rump Yugoslavia”. The ensuing
independence declarations of several former Yugoslav republics contributed to actual and
perceived tensions, and to conflicts among and within the former republics and their
citizenries. Slovenian and Croatian voters approved independence in late June, 1991;

15

Lampe, War and Transition, 2006.
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Macedonia ratified its independence on 08 September of 1991 following failed
confederation discussions; and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared freedom from the rump
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on 01 March 1992.16 A Third Balkan War seemed
nearly inevitable, most directly due to Serbia’s aggressive actions under then-President
Slobodan Milosevic (1989-1997), specifically his hostilities against Bosnia-Herzegovina.
On or about 05 January 1992, roughly six months prior to the definitive outbreak
of war involving Bosnia-Herzegovina (mere weeks before UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace of 31 January 1992, which outlined preventive
diplomacy, including preventive peacekeeping efforts), Bosnia’s Muslim President Alija
Izetbegovic asked the UN, via Cyrus Vance who was in Bosnia at the time, for 2,000 to
3,000 preventive peacekeeping troops. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s
response was “equivocal” in his report to the Security Council S/23363 (05 January
1992).17When the Bosnian Foreign Minister asked again in April of 1992 for preventive
troops from the UN, the Secretary-General responded more particularly, emphasizing,
“…the division of labour between the United Nations, whose peace-keeping mandate was
limited to the situation in Croatia…and the peace-making role of the European

16

Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers (NY, NY: Times Books,
1996); Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1995); Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation
(NY: TV Books, 1996); Sabrina Ramet, Balkan Babel: the Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of
Tito to the Fall of Milosevic, 4th ed. (CO: Westview Press, 2002); Ian Oliver, War and Peace in the
Balkans: The Diplomacy of Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia (International Library of War Studies,
London: I.B. Tauris, 2005); Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War. 3d ed. (NY:
Penguin Books, 1996), and others.
17

His predecessor, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, might have reacted differently based on his
experience when in that role, but this is conjecture, as he had just left office.
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Community (EC) as a whole. Concerning his specific request, I observed it might be
more appropriate for EC to expand its presence and activities in Bosnia-Hercegovina.”18
In mid-April 1992, Vance again went to Bosnia, but even though Izetbegovic
reiterated his request for preventive forces, Boutros-Ghali stood by his earlier position:
“…the present conditions in Bosnia-Hercegovina make it impossible to define a workable
concept for a United Nations peace-keeping operation.” Vance stressed UN resource
limitations; it was finally agreed that forty-one UN military observers would serve four
areas of Bosnia. Meanwhile, Izetbegovic had increased his request for UN forces to
10,000 to 15,000 with air support, “to restore order” as conditions in the area deteriorated
swiftly and dramatically. No matter what Izetbegovic requested, less or more, including
UN protection of aid convoys, he finally was forced to agree with Sir Marrack Goulding
and Lieutenant-General Satish Nambiar, commander of UNPROFOR: that without some
kind of agreement between the conflicting parties, his appeals could not be answered
positively.
To make matters worse, the forty-one UN military observers in Bosnia, after a
mere two weeks, were redeployed to Croatia when conditions in Bosnia grew too risky to
ensure their safety. Roughly 60% of UNPROFOR’s Sarajevo headquarters personnel
were also relocated to Belgrade, Serbia, a few days thereafter (mid-May, 1992, which
many found ludicrous, given Serbia’s role in the conflict). Only about 100 remained in
Sarajevo to support humanitarian activities.

Vincent Rigby, Government of Canada, Political and Social Affairs Division, “Bosnia-Hercegovina: the
International Response”, January 1994, at http://publications.gc.ca/collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp384-e.htm.
18
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No matter how many “reminders” and resolutions the UN sent to Belgrade and
the Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA) to cease interference in Bosnia, Serbia remained
intransigent. Not even arms and others sanctions cut the link between Belgrade and
Bosnian Serbs. Izetbegovic and Radovan Karadzic, political leader of Bosnian Serbs and
military strategist there, along with Ratko Mladic, continued to act as blocks to any
significant agreements, even those regarding humanitarian aid delivered via the Sarajevo
airport and then to areas in need.19 Nothing the UN formally authorized would stop the
war itself, in which the international rules of war were ignored and routinely violated.
Even the Security Council’s Resolution 776 in September of 1992, authorizing
UN troops to follow rules of engagement and use force in self-defense (including when
armed groups tried to stop them for carrying out their humanitarian assistance tasks), had
little to no effect mostly because the number of UN troops was so small: approximately
7,700, authorized to grow to 21,000 in the former Yugoslavia as part of UNPROFOR II
(a separate Bosnian command). No one was totally innocent in this “brutal war”, except
civilians, but “few believed the Serbs were not the worst offenders.”20
Sokalski observed, “[T]he UN ignored the [Izetbegovic] request[s], citing a
procedure banning the dispatch of peacekeepers before an outbreak of hostilities

19

Radovan Karadzic, after 13 years in hiding, was brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia in 2008, accused of a multitude of war crimes including genocide, ethnic cleansing
and forced relocations against Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Croats. He was specifically charged with
the genocide of Srebrenica. His military commander, Ratko Mladic, was also indicted on the same charges.
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(emphases added).”21 Sokalski, Williams and others understood this to refer to
completely exhausting unnamed additional diplomatic efforts (likely including other
types of preventive diplomacy) prior to the potential dispatch of peacekeepers, but this
may not have been accurate, given other information as described above. 22 Had it been
argued that this conflict not reached all those touchstones by late summer of 1992, one
would have been in utter denial, given failed agreements between the warring parties,
futile threats from the Great Powers, cease-fires broken within hours of their inceptions,
ineffective sanctions, and, at that time, still no full agreement on use of military force.
Boutros-Ghali, just beginning his tenure as Secretary-General of the UN, may well have
rightly refused to send UN forces to Bosnia during the first five months of 1992: without
a valid truce, peacekeepers were little more than human targets, even if armed.23 There
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was truly no peace to keep under such circumstances, although the siege of Sarajevo had
to be broken. Yes, there were peace making duties and peace enforcement to be done, but
those were yet outside the mandates.
Strained UN resources were a given, although no one quite anticipated a turf war
at UN HQ between UN senior civilian and military officials, or the effects of the “chaotic
[UN] bureaucracy.” Nor is there evidence that full consideration was given that the
former Yugoslavia would fall so far, so fast.24
Furthermore, none of the UN Resolutions had “teeth” regarding this conflict so
close to Macedonia, making the situation even more menacing. The Serbs continued to
ignore the UN statements with impunity, even UN threats of a war tribunal. There was no
committed military force behind the resolutions through most of 1992, although the
subject was raised at various times and conferences. The UN (and others) felt the EC had
to step up to the plate on this conflict; the EC felt that the UN (and perhaps NATO)
needed to become more directly involved in Bosnia and the Balkans.
By winter, there was rapidly escalating violence between Serbia, Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and significant signs of ever-increasing turbulence and clashes in
Kosovo, then an autonomous Serb province with undefined boundaries between southern
Kosovo and northern Macedonia, along with increasingly frequent Serb incursions into
Macedonian territory. On 11 November 1992, Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov
contacted UN Secretary-Genera1 Boutros-Ghali to formally request that a UN contingent
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be dispatched to Macedonia to protect the small, unarmed and mostly defenseless state
from being drawn into the bloody battles raging on its northern and western borders.
Gligorov’s request met with more success than had the Bosnian President’s
eleven months prior. Supported by strong recommendations from the International
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), especially those of former U.S. Secretary
of State Cyrus Vance and former British Foreign Secretary Lord David Owen, the
Secretary-General first gained approval for a fact-finding mission to visit Macedonia for
a brief period from late November 1992 to early December 1992. Shortly thereafter,
based on those findings, the Secretary-General endorsed a 700-person military force,
supported by other technical, monitoring and administrative personnel, both military and
civilian. The Security Council approved that recommendation on 11 December 1992.25
Almost exactly six months later (18 June 1993), the U.S. committed to providing about
300 troops to UNPROFOR within Macedonia’s borders (UNPROFOR/M), despite its
earlier refusal to put boots on the ground in the Bosnian conflict (UNPROFOR).
The first U.S. contingent arrived in July of 1993 to augment a battalion from
Norway along with Canadian and Danish units already there. That was the initial
NORBAT, later without Canadians but expanded with troops from Finland and Sweden
as the Nordic Battalion or NORDBAT. This became the UNPROFOR Macedonia
Command (UNPROFOR/M) affiliated with UNPROFOR, and recognized as early as
February 1993 as the “first preventive deployment operation in the history of United
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From UNSC Resolution 795 (1992), at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,LEGAL,,,MKD,
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Nations peace-keeping.”26 Because it was not completely independent of UNPROFOR
and UN Peace Forces-HQ (UNPF-HQ then in Belgrade, Serbia) until February 1996, was
not fully equipped to deal with its mandated duties, did not have a completely
independent Field Commander, and moreover, did not stress preventive deployment in its
UN-assigned mission title, this assessment seemed premature.27
An earlier mentioned document must be re-emphasized at this point, without
which this mission may not have occurred. The United Nations Preventive Deployment
Mission in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) was the successor mission to the United Nations
Protection Force/Macedonia operation (UNPROFOR/M), a preventive diplomacy effort
based, at least in part, on Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992’s An Agenda
for Peace.28 Preventive deployment is a form of peace-keeping; that is, protecting an
extant peace, an early-intervention approach under the rubric of preventive diplomacy. In
the Agenda, Boutros-Ghali devoted five full paragraphs to it in Section III, paragraphs
28-32. Publicly recognizing that UN crisis area operations are often “too little, too late”,
the Secretary-General recommended earlier UN mission presence in carefully considered

In the Secretary-General’s Report on UNPROFOR to the UNSC of 10 February 1993, in which he
requested an extension of the one-year old UNPROFOR mandate. Multiple Security Council Resolutions
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and circumscribed circumstances respectful of state sovereignty as specified in the 1945
UN Charter. UNPREDEP was authorized when UNPROFOR was formally divided into
separate, independent operations in February 1996, and was specifically based on Section
III of the Agenda, as the following describes:
In cases where one nation fears a cross-border attack, if the Security
Council concludes that a United Nations presence on one side of the
border, with the consent only of the requesting country, would serve to
deter conflict, I recommend that preventive deployment take place. Here
again, the specific nature of the situation would determine the mandate
and the personnel required to fulfil [sic] it (Agenda for Peace, Sec. III,
paragraph 32).29
Henryk J. Sokalski had more than twenty-five years’ of distinguished experience
in the Polish Foreign Service, and thirteen years at the United Nations, his last UN HQ
position as an Assistant Secretary-General.30 From July 1995, four months after
UNPROFOR/M was spun off as UNPREDEP, to September 1998, Sokalski led the
political and civilian side of the UN Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia as the
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG). The UN essentially was
engaged in a grand experiment, arising from preventive diplomacy principles initially
suggested by Dag Hammarskjöld, but more fully developed under UN SecretariesGeneral Javier Peréz de Cuéllar and Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s tenures, and continued by
Secretary-General Kofi Annan.31

Agenda for Peace, 1992. This makes the earlier UN denial of the Bosnian President’s request in December
of 1991 for UN peacekeepers all the more puzzling.
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The OSCE, the Council of Europe (CoE), the OECD, NATO and the EU actively
participated in political and domestic aspects of the operation. There was significant
international support for each of the former Yugoslav republics’ desire to achieve
independence, and by contrast, particular condemnation of Serbia’s then-President
Slobodan Milosevic’s openly nationalist-based fervor to form not a “new Yugoslavia”
but rather a “Greater Serbia”.32 These five international organizations were genuinely
convinced of Milosevic’s “Greater Serbia” aspirations, and publicly concerned that the
newly independent states’ survival be assured. Furthermore, they were aware of other
critical, entirely conceivable outside destabilizing factors in the region: for example,
might Albanians act in support of their ethnic kin in Kosovo and Macedonia? Greece,
publicly and vociferously opposed to the Macedonian state under that name,33 might
plausibly become more actively involved if an opportunity presented itself. Greek
intervention could, without a great stretch of imagination, bring Turkey, which was

budgetary increase from 1988’s $230 million to 1994’s nearly $4 billion. A Supplement to the Agenda for
Peace of 1992 followed in January 1995, a few months prior to the Resolution authorizing UNPROFOR.
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Mark Mazower, A Short History of the Balkans (NY: The Modern Library 2002), 141; Sasho Ripiloski,
Conflict in Macedonia: Exploring a Paradox in the Former Yugoslavia (CO: FirstForumPress 2011), 7798.
Greece objected to the state’s constitutional name, Republic of Macedonia, certain terms of its
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engaged in friendly overtures toward Macedonia, into the mix as the Hellenic Republic’s
historic rival.
Bulgaria to Macedonia’s east was the only nearby country not a significant threat
to the institutionally weak, economically disadvantaged, ethnically fragmented and
democratically fragile new state, even though it had public complaints regarding the
linguistic roots of the Macedonian language and about the state’s Macedonian Orthodox
Church (MOC). Furthermore, the international community was keenly aware of growing
tensions along Macedonia’s mostly undetermined north border with the then Serbian
province of Kosovo, around 90% ethnically Albanian.34
UNPREDEP Mandates and Mission Expanded:
Consolidating Peace
UNPREDEP mandates, beginning in 1995 and taken on by up to 42 contributing
states, were interpreted to include certain state-building efforts aimed at improved interethnic relations and support for domestic institutions and for infrastructure projects,
largely under UNSC Resolution 908 (1994), regarding utilization of “good offices” by
the SRSG and UNPREDEP forces. That the UN claimed the capability to state-build as
part of peace-building was evident (if frequently criticized by UN HQ) during
UNPREDEP’s operations; this ability was initially considered when the endeavor was
authorized and during its entire course.35
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Sokalski particularly emphasized his role on the civilian and political sides of the
mission as consolidating peace, a perceived existing domestic peace (as opposed to
restoring peace). He described it as backing the “human dimension” to which he was
especially dedicated, through his outreach efforts to the Republic’s citizens, social and
economic activities, inter-ethnic relations attention, fundraising efforts, and other means.
All of these were, in his view, crucial to UNPREDEP’s overall mission and to reinforcing
civil society in Macedonia, even if, as indicated, he came under significant criticism from
UN HQ.36
Therefore, this mission provided an appropriate case, given its mandates and
practices, through which to examine field organization learning and adaptation. It further
offered clear connections to HQ organizational learning and decisions (UN HQ in NY as
issuer of those mandates and as author of subsequent reports that reflect problem
identification, understandings and responsive change; and to the field UN HQ in
Belgrade). This linkage was especially evident in the Secretaries-General reports to the
Security Council of 1993 through early 1999.37
Understanding gained through the case study method can be crucial to the
identification and understanding of explanatory variables in greater detail. 38 One of the
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greatest benefits of a case study is interpretation and clarification of potential factors
leading to a particular outcome. Case studies are appropriate for research like this,
wherein the goal is, through examination of various aspects, to gain a fuller
understanding of how and why a specific outcome occurred (i.e, a widely acknowledged
successful preventive deployment), and why this particular undertaking (preventive
deployment) has not been repeated.39
Taking UNPREDEP as a case study also allows an examination of a third relevant
set of actors: epistemic communities and other international organizations involved, such
as the EU, the OECD and the OSCE, along with NATO, separately and in the aggregate.
Was their learning affected by field experiences and via what others at HQ
organization(s) learned? If so, how and why? What were the positions of powerful states
on preventive deployment? And how might this have affected the interpretations of others
about this type of mission?
UNPREDEP, as noted above, has almost unanimously been found to be a success
as a preventive deployment.40 Given that UN peacekeeping operations have been judged
near-universally as deeply problematic or failures,41 and that ongoing and increasing

Alexander George, “Case Studies and Theory Development,” in P.G. Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New
Approaches in History, Theory and Policy (NY: The Free Press, 1979), 43-68. See also Robert K. Yin,
Case Study Research Design and Methods, 4th ed. (CA: SAGE Publications, 2009) on case study research.
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Ripiloski, Conflict in Macedonia: Exploring a Paradox in the Former Yugoslavia. CO: (FirstForumPress
(Div. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2011) and others.
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numbers of conflicts exist worldwide, particularly intra-state and inter-ethnic conflicts, an
examination of why a successful UN approach to early conflict intervention when key
elements of such pending conflict are present (i.e., preventive deployment, along with the
means of addressing inter-ethnic/nationalist elements) has not been attempted again is of
signal importance to peacekeeping and conflict prevention, management and resolution
learning and application.
After the mission ended in 1999, Macedonia continued to search for stability and
recognition in the Balkans and outside it. Learning from it has both contemporary and
future value, particularly in the face of the ever-growing numbers and sites of conflict
worldwide. As Michael Lund persuasively argues, “…peacekeeping missions may find
themselves handling more complex and destructive conflicts.” 42
Therefore, it is well worth exploring learning from this lower cost, “less troubled
alternative” to more traditional missions.43 This may assist in comprehending why
preventive deployment for conflict prevention apparently was a one-off, even during a
decade-plus of rising conflict types that conceivably were and/or are well-suited to early
intervention through preventive deployment.44 It may also help explain why this

Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension (3rd ed. Update) (NY: Longman
Publishing/Pearson Education, 2008); and others.
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successful approach to early conflict intervention and prevention has not been undertaken
since Macedonia’s mission.
UNPREDEP and Preventive Deployment in the Literature
Although there have been relatively few dedicated studies of UNPREDEP as a
preventive deployment mission, at least four scholarly books examine it to date. What do
these books contribute to the problem of the non-replication of preventive deployment
and to the theory of organizational learning as is advanced in this dissertation?
Alice Ackermann wrote one of them, Making Peace Prevail in 2000, as did
Abiodun Williams in the same year (Preventing War: The United Nations and
Macedonia); the latter was directly involved in UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP as
political and humanitarian affairs officer in Macedonia from 1994 through 1998. A third
publication, titled An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in
Preventive Diplomacy, authored by Henryk J. Sokalski, the SRSG for UNPREDEP (1995
through 1998), was written approximately four years after mission’s end, in 2003. A later
volume (2011) examining the mission in part is Sasho Ripiloski’s Conflict in Macedonia:
Exploring a Paradox in the Former Yugoslavia. Therefore, two of the four works were
written by those who were part of UNPREDEP for all or most of its existence, offering
valuable first-person insights into the mission’s implementation, course and
development.45
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In his volume, Abiodun Williams raised the issue of implementation in the efforts
at conflict prevention. He also questioned success’s metrics and measurement. Williams
examined UNPREDEP as a test case for the efficacy of preventive deployment, following
it across time from pre-inception to its close. He focused on “the crucial nexus between
theory and practice of international peacekeeping” to attempt to determine “the limits and
possibilities of preventive deployment in general and UNPREDEP in particular.”46
Williams found great promise in preventive deployment and UNPREDEP, and was
convinced there would be more such missions.
Williams presented a detailed recounting of UNPREDEP and aspects of its
implementation, thus offering important information for this research. He set out
conclusions at the end of each chronologically-based chapter, yet offered no inclusive
analysis of another critical interconnection: that between peacekeeping and learning,
particularly in the field, and relevant outcomes of such learning, particularly in and to the
HQ organization (the UN in NY). He also does not fully develop a preventive
deployment model for possible future use.
Alice Ackermann’s 2000 book, Making Peace Prevail, was a study of “the art of
conflict prevention.”47 She asked why the Yugoslav wars did not spread into Macedonia,
given its multi-ethnic society, in an effort to better understand effective conflict
prevention. Ackermann engaged in considerable analysis of the role of Macedonian
political elites, in concert with international actors such as UNPREDEP, the OSCE and
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the EU, in making peace prevail. Ackermann’s work is of value as it took a forwardlooking approach to consideration of how preventive diplomacy (including preventive
deployment) might be utilized in the future. While some of Ackermann’s conclusions
may be criticized because of the ensuing destabilization of Macedonia and the conflict(s)
that occurred less than two years after UNPREDEP withdrew, this study featured a
balanced approach to UNPREDEP and its efforts to maintain peace in a state surrounded
by vicious conflict. She examined the mission period from ethno-political, cultural,
sociological and psychological points of view, took the environment into specific
consideration and adopted some explicitly and implicitly constructivist standpoints.
Henryk J. Sokalski, a career diplomat and SRSG of UNPREDEP from 05 July
1995 through 18 September 1998, wrote his book on the mission in 2003, two years after
the 2001 internal conflict in Macedonia, and some four years post-UNPREDEP. There is
selected discussion of in-the-field learning as expressed in implementation and at the
mission’s political headquarters, but it is more a humanitarian and political operation
description than a theoretical analysis of the mission.
He attempted to sum up what was learned, but not necessarily how it was learned
either on the ground or at in-country headquarters, or from interactions between the two
with the international peacekeeping and security communities. He also did not treat the
outcomes of learning in any detail—as a model for future preventive deployments, for
example.48 Furthermore, he and his office transmitted much of the information about the
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field/military mission to UN HQ. This suggests that those reports conceivably were not
quite those originally written or presented by the military leadership; examination of
documents at the UN Archives about this mission sustained this supposition, as did
interviews with Mr. Sokalski in the summer of 2010. This flaw may also have permeated
his book.
All of the above works were written so close to the termination of UNPREDEP
that none attempted to explain why another such endeavor was not undertaken, which is
understandable. Without exception, these three authors indicated they expected usage of
preventive deployment missions in the future. These were also, with the exclusion of
Sokalski’s volume, written prior to the 2001 conflict in Macedonia that led to the Ohrid
Framework Agreement (OFA) of that year.49 Thus, conflict did occur in Macedonia after
all.
Still, the general opinion was that UNPREDEP, ending in 1999, some 20 months
prior to 2001’s inter-ethnic conflict, was nonetheless a successful preventive deployment
with a positive outcome. Given the specific and limited terms of the mission’s mandate,
UNPREDEP did satisfy it positively: to prevent the spillover of area conflicts into
Macedonia, especially from Serbia, Kosovo, Albania, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also
engaged in as much good offices outreach and institution building as it genuinely could.
It thus fulfilled its mandates virtually completely, with few or no cavils possible.

Mary Frances Lebamoff and Zoran Ilievsi, “Ethnic Conflict Resolution or Settlement? The Ohrid
Framework Agreement and Macedonia,” in Human Security Report Project /Human Security Research, at
http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/ISA_Ohridframework.pdf (Simon Fraser University,
Vancouver, BC, Canada, 2008).
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Although there are scholarly articles specifically addressing UNPREDEP,
including those by Alice Ackermann, Bilyana Vankovska-Cvetkovska, Annika
Björkdahl, Clive Archer, Howard Kuenning and others, these articles neither investigate
nor analyze UNPROFOR/M or UNPREDEP using theoretical lenses. Further, they do not
address questions related to organizational learning from these missions at UN HQ or the
regional UN HQs, nor do they examine why preventive deployment has not been
attempted since.50 They offer valuable information, however, about the mission itself,
how it was perceived and some events during it, along with matters of conflict
management and resolution. Part of the analytical process in this research included
culling relevant information from these scholarly articles.
Summary
The approach of this study differs markedly from any taken in the body of
literature reviewed and from the small amount of prior research into organizations and
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learning. The next chapter further highlights how and what was learned in the missions
and from them, and in what ways that learning (or lack thereof) may relate to the
discontinuation of UN preventive efforts, given that UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP
apparently were effective, i.e., successful in terms of the mandate. It incorporates a broad
assortment of primary information gained through interviews with elites and others, and
through examination of the UNPREDEP archives at the UN.
This work further examines the conduct, processes and outcome, i.e. no further
preventive deployments post-UNPREDEP, in an attempt to explain its sole use, and to
seek an explanatory theory that may assist in better understanding both preventive
deployment and its non-recurrence.

CHAPTER V
EVIDENCE AND VOICES:
EXPERTS’ KEY POINTS IN UNPREDEP ANALYSES
Danish Brigadier General Finn Særmark-Thomsen of UNPROFOR/Macedonia
neatly summed up a key issue specified by all military leaders of that mission and later of
UNPREDEP, when he stated, “The United Nations will not regularly succeed in its
peacekeeping and related missions if it persists in limited-to-no learning from prior
efforts, and continues to act according to previous conflicts.”
This problematic situation, he posited, would lead within the near future to a
growing lack of support for UN-sanctioned peace, monitoring, and/or conflict missions;
diminished political will by member states to commit vital resources (troops and funding,
along with armaments and other equipment), and critically reduced respect for the UN’s
credibility, reputation, legitimacy, and overarching commitment to peace in a conflictridden world.1
While his statements were both an assessment of present issues and of potential
future risks to the United Nations and its peace missions, General Særmark-Thomsen
brought to bear his decades of experience in peacekeeping to arrive at such conclusions.
Furthermore, his evaluations aligned with the majority of the other former, deeply
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experienced military Field Commanders and members of UNPREDEP and its precursor
mission, UNPROFOR/M.
Certainly, his three points would be a fitting epitaph were one considering the
central UNPROFOR operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic (Serbia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina), along with other previously mentioned failed UN missions. But instead of
failed UN operations, here we examine UNPREDEP, a success, a particular type of
success at which a second attempt has never formally been made: a preventive
deployment mandate and mission.
As data analysis was undertaken regarding interviews and documents, it became
evident that several specific themes were consistent among the military elites, and often
repeated multiple times, albeit in slightly different ways, by particular individuals. Those
specifics were then examined by their prevalence among the military leadership group as
a whole, with twin goals of data reduction and explanatory influence assessment for
preventive deployment’s singularity. Thus, it became even clearer after this analysis that
there are areas of both broad and specific agreement on certain key points concerning the
UN HQ organization, and about the field organization (UNPREDEP military and political
operations). There were also unique and significant observations, particularly regarding
UNPREDEP’s mandate and its efficacy.
Principles and Preconditions of a Successful Preventive Deployment
General Juha Engstrom, the first UNPREDEP Field Commander, who had
previously served for twenty years as Aide de Camp to President Urho Kaleva Kekkonen
of Finland and possessed decades of peacekeeping experience, outlined the principles and
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preconditions he believed were vital to the start of a preventive deployment and that
would help ensure its success:
First, the three overarching UN principles of peacekeeping were required to be
adopted and enforced by all mission members. These would lend any such mission the
credibility, UN Charter legality, and gravitas necessary for successful implementation in
carrying out any mandate:
1. Consent of the involved parties;
2. Impartiality and neutrality of peacekeepers toward involved parties and others;
3. No use of force “except in self-defence and the defence of the mission and mandate.” 2
Second, the vital preconditions BG Engstrom specified were:
1. The alleged threat to a state had to be validated by international organizations and the
international security community;
2. Political will and commitment were required to be consistently resolute among
countries about to become involved;
3. The UN Security Council had to be convinced that there would be nearly-assured (or
at the very least, highly likely and meaningful) contributions of resources from
member states;
4. A convincing draft budget, at minimum, needed to be developed and available so that
those committing their troops and other material involvement knew that there would
be equally assured, available and ongoing financial resources for a mission;
From UN Capstone document, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines”
(2008), accessed at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf, on January 4, 2011;
outlined by BG Juha Engstrom in interview with author on 17 June 2009 at his residence near Mäntsälä,
Finland.
2
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5. There had to be manifest dedication and assurances that member states would act
quickly to put adequate boots and materiel on the ground in the threatened state;
6. The Security Council then had to pass a resolution specifically addressing a
preventive deployment mission and an appropriately developed mandate.3
The table below (4) indicates the levels of support and expectations that persist
and are vital to preventive deployments’ success. This was developed as a summary of
Engstrom’s conversations and points made regarding requirements and understandings in
the international and security communities, along with states (often members of such
communities or organizations), and their commitment to preventive deployment’s main
functions.
Table 4. Variances in International and Security Communities’ Support and Expectation
Levels for Preventive Deployments
Support & Expectation Levels in
International and Security Communities
High Degree
Level of Support

Traditional
Peacekeeping
Tasks

Humanitarian
Tasks





Moderate Degree


Reduced Degree
High Degree
Levels of
Expectations

Moderate Degree
Reduced Degree

3

Enforcement
Tasks





Interview (notes and recording) with BG Juha Engstrom on 17 June 2009 at his residence near Mäntsälä,
Finland.
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Command and Control of U.S. Troops in UNPREDEP
Every UNPREDEP and UNPROFOR/M Brigadier General indicated “command
and control” issues as key challenges to be handled within and outside of UNPREDEP.
Howard Kuenning, a former U.S. military Chief of Staff for UNPROFOR/M, explained it
in his research project on UNPREDEP: the U.S. Battalion’s limitations, under U.S. law,
were many, and appeared focused on risk-avoidance rather than effective, balanced
sharing of responsibilities with the Norwegian, Finnish, Danish and Swedish troops
(collectively, the Nordic Battalion) and others, and field orderliness.4 While there was
certainly a degree of field command and control over the U.S. troops, the soldiers were in
reality and in all critical matters led from a distance by the U.S. European Command
(EUCOMM), and via U.S. military members in the UN Peace Forces and Operations
offices in Zagreb, Belgrade, and Sarajevo, and thus by those not in the field themselves.5
Every general and former Chief of Staff or other officer interviewed indicated that
this led to circumstances that had to be overcome for mission success. Particular national
military companies were assigned to each monitoring position along the borders, so these
limitations on the troops and foreign commanders created unique challenges. Additional
time had to be spent on training the U.S. troops; this affected both the American troops

Howard K. Kuenning, “Come Over to Macedonia and Help Us (Acts 16:9),” strategic research project
(Report No. A135902, April 1996) (Carlisle PA: U.S. Army War College, 1996), at
www.stormingmedia.com; Stephen Ostrowski, “Preventive Deployment of Troops as Preventive Measures:
Macedonia and Beyond,” Journal of International Law and Politics 30, no. 3-4 (Spring/Summer 1999),
793-880.
4
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June, 2009 at Swedish National Defense Academy in Stockholm, Sweden (Notes). See also Henryk J.
Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy,
Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 131-132; and Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 25 of 03 May 1994 by President William J. Clinton.
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and the Nordics. Training materials sometimes had to be developed, another
unanticipated burden. The generals and other military leaders stressed especially the
following:
1. American troops were required to be assigned to the lowest-risk Observation Posts
(OPs) and Temporary Observation Posts (OPTs). They could not be assigned OP
Hilltop 1703 specifically (the Čupino Brdo peak), even though it was within their
patrol area.6 While “low-risk assignments” had some positive aspects, they created
other issues, since U.S. troops were led by a foreign commander for a specified time
and particular mission. An operation’s needs in toto could not always accommodate
lowered risk to certain troops; that UNPREDEP’s field organization and leadership
did is actually quite remarkable.

Kuenning, “Preventive Peacekeeping as a Model for the Prevention of War”, in UN Peacekeeping in
Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia: Peacekeepers’ Views on the Limits and
Possibilities of the United Nations in a Civil War-like Conflict, eds. Wolfgang Biermann, and Martin
Vadset (Burlington VT: Ashgate Press, 1999), 238-252. Ripiloski, Conflict in Macedonia, 83-84. A nearviolent Serbian military-Macedonian Special Forces confrontation occurred in 1994 at the Čupino Brdo
mountaintop, considered strategically and culturally important to both Serbs and Macedonians. A Nordic
company staffed this OP, although it was within the U.S. Battalion’s border observation area. BG F.
Særmark-Thomsen was field commander, and successfully shuttle-negotiated the highly volatile situation
directly between Belgrade and Skopje. Macedonia was about to send troops to Čupino Brdo, while Nordic
peacekeepers were deployed there as a buffer between the two states’ military elements during
negotiations. As a result of BG Særmark-Thomsen’s intensive efforts, the Serbs agreed to withdraw. BG F.
Særmark-Thomsen, interview with author on 06 July 2009; Sokalski, interview with author on July 14,
2010.
6
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The foreign commander’s authority over U.S. troops is limited to that necessary to
organize, coordinate, and direct the mission-related tasks of those units provided
to him, in order to accomplish the assigned mission. In addition a variety of
safeguards are recognized as needed to protect the U.S. troops…In particular the
United States participates actively in the policymaking bodies that oversee the
military operations, seeks the clear delineation of operational missions in
governmental agreements, and limits the authority of foreign commanders. 7
2. As the generals and others explained, specific national military companies were
assigned to each monitoring position along the borders, usually contiguously per
company, so these limitations on the U.S. troops created unique challenges in the
field for foreign Commanders. They stressed especially the following:
a. Unevenness of duties and responsibilities between the U.S. Battalion and the
Nordic one, somewhat adversely affected organizational field learning.8
b. The least-experienced UNPREDEP Battalion, the U.S. one, was less likely to
gain significant peacekeeping experience in the field. Their one-month
peacekeeping training for UNPREDEP, prior to service in the field itself was
not supplemented with immediate and meaningful involvement in preventive
deployment activities themselves.
c. Once U.S. troops were in the field, and were trained even more extensively by
Nordic forces, they could not fully utilize this training in real-mission

Edward Brunner and Nina M. Serafino, “Peacekeeping: Military Command and Control Issues,” CRS
Report for Congress, updated 01 November 2001, Congressional Research Service, accessed at
http://congressionalresearch.com /RL31120/document.php, on April 22, 2011. “Command and Control”
specifics were clearly outlined in President William Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive NSC-25
(PDD-25) of 03 May 1994, which set forth restrictions for U.S military when in UN operations.
7
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BG J. Engstrom (17 June 2009), BG B. Wranker (24 June 2009); BG B. Sohnemann (08-10 July 2009);
and Major P. Iko, 26 June, 2009 at Swedish National Defense Academy in Stockholm, Sweden, all
interviews with author (notes and recordings).
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operations, negatively impacting all troops’ morale to some extent, and the
field organization’s cohesiveness and learning. 9
3. The U.S. troops could not patrol within 300 meters (about 1,000 feet) of any border or
patrol line, and could do no night patrols. These restrictions made it impossible for
them to form relations with Albanian, Serbian and other border guards for mutual
benefits. This further negatively affected the field organization operationally,
structurally, and regarding organizational learning.
4. U.S. military leaders, including Chiefs of Staff, were not permitted to cross borders
out of Macedonia, even for meetings with other states’ military leaders when Field
Commanders and Nordic Chiefs of Staff visited or negotiated with them.10
5. U.S. troops were often the target of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Army
complaints, and specifically mentioned whenever the FRY threatened, hinted at or
otherwise addressed problems of which they themselves were a part.11
6. U.S. troops did perform a specific support function: they maintained a thirty-person,
non-patrolling unit as a “quick reaction force (QRF).” Were they to patrol, “this
would result…in a decrease in the response time should there be a need for the QRF.”
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BG J. Isberg, 23 June, 2009 at Swedish National Defense Academy in Stockholm, Sweden; MG Paavo
Kalevi Kiljunen, 16 June 2009, at Finnish Military Logistics Headquarters in Tampere, Finland; BG Bo
Wranker, 24 June 2009, Stockholm, Sweden, all in interviews with author (notes and recordings).
10

BG Wranker (24 June 2009), BG Sohnemann (5-7 July 2010 and 08-10 July 2009), BG Engstrom (17
June 2009), and Col. Kalle Liesinen (12-14 June 2009), all interviews with author.
UNARMS UNPREDEP File 17, Box 4 (SRSG’s Office) 01/01/97 - 31 Dec 1997, code cables 04 June
1997, 18 June 1997, Julian Harston Outgoing CB-116, 26 June 1997, to Sokalski “Most Immediate”:
Subject: “FRY VIEW of FYROM and UNPREDEP”, especially numbered points 4, 6 and 7.
11
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Yet crucially, in contrast to the challenges of having U.S. troops in UNPREDEP,
there were obviously marked benefits to having U.S. commitment with forces on the
ground in the mission, even those with constrained functions. These troops represented a
projection of American power in the post-Yugoslav conflict area, based on international
and Washington D.C.’s political and diplomatic understanding of what was occurring
there:
…the Yugoslav wars were provoked by an aggressive Serbia seeking to annex Serbdominated lands in… territorial aggrandizement…the Clinton administration’s
decision to contribute troops to the UN preventive peacekeeping operation in
Macedonia were…borne of this interpretation. For Washington, Serbian military
expansion into Kosovo and Macedonia was a distinct possibility, one that, by
potentially setting off a larger regional war, would likely impact American security
interests. Containment (emphasis added), therefore, was key. …this deployment
validated—and represented a concrete American commitment toward—Macedonia’s
existence and territorial integrity. 12
Containment, for American policy at that time, meant that the fighting in BosniaHerzegovina would be stopped from spreading south into Macedonia. The deterrent and
containment values of U.S. on-the-ground involvement in UNPREDEP were unusually
high for three reasons: first, it was verifiably a complete turn-around from previous U.S.
political attitudes toward UN peacekeeping and from the U.S.’s absolute refusals (to
Europe) to contribute peacekeepers to UNPROFOR or to the Bosnia-Herzegovina
conflict in some other fashion. This leads to the second, the symbolic value, if nothing
else, of having U.S. soldiers in Macedonia, as part of a UN mission (one which was the
first of its kind besides, a preventive deployment): its significance, when there were no

Ripiloski, Conflict in Macedonia, 88-89. See also National Archives Library, “Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Administration of William J. Clinton, 1995” (Washington D.C.: United
States Government Printing Office), 791.
12
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U.S. troops on the ground engaged militarily or in U.N. peace missions elsewhere in the
Balkans, cannot be overstated.
Third, this gave UNPREDEP greater military credibility and legitimacy, and
added an unwritten threat: if the Serbs engaged in aggression toward Macedonia, there
would very likely be retaliatory American action. “Put simply, the American presence
served as insurance against Serb incursions into Macedonian territory. …The American
deployment signaled a stronger and more unequivocal statement to Milosevic than OSCE
monitors, who pre-dated UNPREDEP, or…Nordic peacekeepers, could ever deliver.” 13
Even though, under American law, U.S. Command in Europe (EUCOMM) held
primacy over UN Command and as a result, the U.S. Battalion came under limited
operational control of UNPREDEP field commanders, that did not deter those field
commanders from incorporating the U.S. Battalion to its fullest strength and effect within
the constraints as set forth. Consequently, as the field commanders agreed, despite the
constraints and certain drawbacks of having U.S. troops as part of UNPREDEP, the
benefits immeasurably outweighed the disadvantages. Furthermore, insightful and
creative military leadership by experienced peacekeepers as Field Commanders, and by
U.S. Chiefs of Staff in the field organization, some of which were described to the author,
were crucial to overcoming such perceived issues.
All parties – and others in the international and security communities – fully
understood the political significance of having the U.S. troops patrol the Macedonian

13

Ripiloski, Conflict in Macedonia, 89. Ripiloski stresses that the potential of American retaliation against
Serbia for aggression was a critical element that had been missing at the start in the Bosnia-Herzegovina
conflict arena.
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border with Serbia, for example, rather than elsewhere.14 They were very aware that the
inclusion of U.S. military members in UNPREDEP in Macedonia, was a unique response
for the U.S. to the need for a first-time, multidimensional prevention effort prior to
violence, rather than a strictly in-conflict or post-conflict military-type approach.15 After
all, UN troops (field organizations) elsewhere in the Balkans were flailing because they
were entangled in active, high-risk, extremely violent conflicts.
Importantly, it appeared the UN and others in the international security
community were largely unresponsive to early warnings, and arrived too late to engage in
meaningful, multifaceted preventive efforts in other parts of the Balkans. Those missions,
it should be stressed, did not have a meaningful U.S. military “boots on the ground”
presence (they acted in air support and in medical contingents) with that boots on the
ground concomitant projection of American power.
The map on the following page (Figure 1) shows the approximate placement of
key Observation Posts (OPs) and Temporary Observation Posts (OPTs). Those numbers
preceded with “U” were U.S.-manned; those with “F” by the Finnish companies, “N”
indicates Norwegian troop-held posts, and “D” means the Danish Company peacekeepers
handled those posts.

14

An action which the Macedonian Government had suggested and strongly approved (Ripiloski, Conflict
in Macedonia, 89-90); Stevo Pendarovski, National Security Advisor to the President, interview with
author on 16 May 2006, Skopje, Macedonia.
15

BG O. J. Strömberg (04 July 2009), BG B. Sohnemann (08-10 July 2009), MG Paavo Kiljunen (16 June
2009), and BG J. Engstrom (17 June 2009), all interviews with author; Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention,
132.
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Note that the US troops, at most times numbering roughly half of UNPREDEP’s
soldiers, were posted on only about one-third of the border; the troops from Sweden,
Denmark, Finland and Norway, the other half of UNPREDEP’s total, were responsible
for a little more than two-thirds of it. This changed as drawdowns affected the mission
and other factors were taken into consideration, but this map reflects the most prevalent
configuration of OPs and OPTs. The OPTs (temporary Observation Posts) by their very
nature were in various locations during the mission, too.
Figure 1. UNPREDEP Deployment Areas on Borders (June 1998)

UNPREDEP: An Economical Operation
It has already been noted that the cost of UNPREDEP was strikingly competitive
when compared to other UN peacekeeping missions. Part of this was due to its smaller
size, but also that it was pre-conflict, and thus did not include the far higher costs of a
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conflict-laden mission (such as the major endeavor in the Balkans, UNPROFOR in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.) As a mission independent of UNPROFOR, UNPREDEP incurred
average costs of about $60 million annually, with a closing transition budget of $21.1
million allocated for 01 July 1998 through 30 June 1999, once the mission ended 28
February 1999. To put this in perspective, the total cost at the end of 1996 of
UNPREDEP was $204 million, and at the end of June 1997, $234 million (or $29 million
per each six months). Note most numbers below are written with “,” instead of “.” for
tenths.
On 29 April 1998 (A/51/508/Add.3), the Secretary-General submitted to the
General Assembly the budget for the maintenance of UNPREDEP from 1 July
1997 to 30 June 1998, amounting to $49,4 million gross ($47,9 million net).
Expenditures for UNPREDEP covering the period 1 July 1996 through 30 June
1997 amounted to $50,4 million gross ($49,5 million net) [A/52/768]. On 26 June
1998, the Assembly appropriated $21,1 million to maintain the Force from 1 July
1998 to 30 June 1999. … The Assembly, in resolution 53/20 of 2 November
1998, appropriated an amount of $29 million (gross) for the maintenance of
UNPREDEP for the period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999, in addition to the
amount of $21 million (gross) already appropriated for this period under its
resolution 52/245 of 26 June 1998. The assessment of $16,6 million (gross) for
the period from 1 March to 30 June 1999 at a monthly rate of $4,1 million (gross)
was subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the
Force. The Council, on 25 February 1999, however, did not extend UNPREDEP
beyond 28 February 1999 under SC/6648. As at 31 January 1999, unpaid assessed
contributions to the UNPREDEP special account amounted to $20.3 million.
Covering preceding budget requirements, $51,6 million gross ($50,1 million net)
were appropriated by the General Assembly for UNPREDEP for the period 1 July
1996 to 39 June 1997 (report A/52/768 of 16 January 1998). By adopting
resolution 51/154 B on 13 June 1997, the General Assembly decided to
appropriate $46,506,700 gross ($44,969,500 net) for maintaining UNPREDEP
during the period 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998. By adopting resolution 51/154 B
on 13 June 1997, the General Assembly decided to appropriate $46,506,700 gross
($44,969,500 net) for maintaining UNPREDEP during the period 1 July 1997 to
30 June 1998.The General Assembly, on 16 December 1996, appropriated a total
of $25,373,400 gross ($24,615,600 net) for maintaining UNPREDEP during the
period 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997, inclusive of $632,400 for the support account
for peacekeeping operations (resolution 51/154). In so doing, the Assembly took
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into account the amount of $26,296,200 gross ($26,296,200 net) already
appropriated for UNPREDEP for the period 1 July through 31 December 1996 in
resolution 50/243 of 7 June 1996.16
The Bosnian conflict mission (UNPROFOR), by comparison, cost a total of $44 billion,
other damages nearly beyond estimation, and still-to-be-determined death numbers.17
Four individuals associated with UNPREDEP lost their lives in incidents unrelated to the
actual operation (three Finnish soldiers and one Canadian civilian).18
Thayer projects that had the Macedonian situation deteriorated to the point of
belligerence between Macedonia and a single country, for example, Albania or Bulgaria,
and had there been a two-year duration (thus, a mid-size and mid-length conflict), total
costs (military, humanitarian, direct and opportunity economic costs, plus those to
individual states) would be reasonably forecast at about $15 billion.19
Had it become a one year, large-scale conflict involving multiple countries
(perhaps Macedonia, Serbia, Albania, Greece, Turkey and the U.S.A.), forecasted costs
reach about $143.94 billion. Thayer’s estimate metric is the cost of the first Gulf War. He
makes certain adjustments, assuming the Balkans have no valuable resources (like oil)) to
make them attractive to other countries, relatively small national economies, and do little
trade with the U.S., the more western part of Europe, or Japan. Too, some Gulf War

16

Finance amounts from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unpred_b.htm, accessed on 13
April 2012.
Bradley Thayer, “Macedonia,” in The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena,
Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance, eds. (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 131-146.
17

18

Fatality data from the United Nations at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents
/stats_5a.pdf, document accessed from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistic/
fatalities.shtml, on 07 July 2009.
19

Thayer, “Macedonia”, 1999.
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donor-states (such as Japan) would not likely support conflict-ending efforts on the same
scale as the first Gulf War, if at all, because they have no direct interests in the southern
Balkans. The human costs of a mid-sized or large scale conflict cannot be calculated “but
would be great.”20 Thayer makes no predictions regarding costs of a civil conflict in
Macedonia.
To put these dollar amounts into more familiar terms, compare annual
UNPREDEP costs to the cost to the U.S. Air Force of F-15E fighter jets in 1998 (the
model used most in Balkan bombing and close support operations during UNPROFOR):
$31.1 million apiece fly-away cost.21 Thus, UNPREDEP’s annual costs, 1995 through
1999, were equivalent to the cost of slightly less than two F-15 E fighter jets at fly-away
cost (1998). The total cost of one U.S. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (“drone”), the MQ-9
Reaper, equals nearly $17 million (2013 dollars) with ground control but without initial
development expenses. According to a U.S. Air Force fact sheet, costs were “$56.5
million (includes four air craft with sensors, ground control station and Predator Primary
satellite link) (fiscal 2011 dollars).”22

Thayer, “Macedonia”, 138-142: see Tables 7.1 (at 139) and 7.2 (at 141) especially. Thayer is forecasting
costs based on available mission economic data to mid-1997, as he explains.
20

21

F-15E fighter jet costs from https://archive.today/20121212030041/http://www.af.mil/information/
factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=102; accessed January 31, 2009; see also Steve Davies, F-15E Strike Eagle
Units in Combat 1990–2005. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing Limited, 2005. 236 of these fighter jets were
built between 1985 and 2001. These are the aircraft utilized in Balkan UNPROFOR operations on request
from the UN and NATO to enforce no-fly zones and to undertake bombing missions during NATO-led
Operations Deny Flight, Deliberate Force, and Allied Force between August 1993 and March of 1999. F15E pilots and weapons officers conducted both patrol and combat missions during this period. They
averaged in-flight times of 7.5 hours (including two in-air refuelings), and carried both air-to-air and air-toground weapons and munitions. They also engaged in close air support missions, a newer tactic in the ‘90s
that has since gained immense popularity with the U.S. Air Force.
“MQ-9 Reaper”, August 18, 2010 Fact Sheet, accessed on June 18, 2011, at http://www.af.mil/
AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper.aspx. Per U.S. Department of Defense
22
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One must note that should peacekeepers enter into a mission where there is an
active conflict (such as those in Africa, or UNPROFOR while it was in place, as
examples), costs cannot be fully determined nor will they impact the type of mission
chosen—nor can an end date for the mission necessarily be set. Consequently, cost
factors and lack of firm, predictable ending date cannot fully explain why there have been
no further preventive deployments by the UN. Also, as noted earlier, there are many UN
operations that have been going on for more than twenty years, and are still active.
Funding to the Field Organization: “Inadequate”
UNPREDEP’s funding was considered inadequate by all parties interviewed, and
by several authors on this subject, even while conceding praise for its low cost. There
was never a budget line for the exercise of “good offices”, for outreach efforts to area
communities and sometimes not for materials for such efforts, nor for required
maintenance programs and infrastructure, professional conferences, certain travel and the
like, even though “good offices” were specified as part of UNPREDEP’s mandate.
Indeed, the UN HQ, rather than being supportive to the field organization, appears to
have made such peace- and state-building endeavors more difficult for the SRSG and the
Field Commanders.23 Often, they had to expend significant time and effort to obtain
funds from other sources than United Nations headquarters.

coding, “M” indicates a multi-functional asset, and “Q” designates a remotely-piloted air craft. The number
“9” marks it as the ninth iteration in a series of remotely-piloted unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
23

From UNARMS, Box 2, 1999/0116 Accession Date, Subject files of SRSG, SRSG Special Assistant and
Public Information Officer; specific cables between multiple parties 13 March (Fax 151-3130/157-8053);10
April 1996; 12 April 1996; 23 May 1996 (from Steinar Bjornsson to H. Sokalski) re “U.S. Contracted
Construction Project” and reimbursement from UN HQ will not occur per Bjornsson; 03 July 1996 from
Sokalski to K. Annan referencing funds for road repairs ($280,000 needed immediately; UN HQ told of
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The UN was often not responsive to or, perhaps, frequently less than forthcoming
regarding expenses and funds requests related to this mission. Timeliness of UN HQ
responses was an ongoing difficulty. One typical example was a critical request for
$280,000, primarily to repair, renovate and maintain access roads for the OPs and OPTs.
UNPREDEP further was burdened by outmoded equipment vital to these road jobs:
several pieces had been out of service for some time, and parts were not available, either
locally or from elsewhere.24
The field organization had learned on the ground that in the mainly mountainous
and rugged terrain, access and other critical roads did not hold up through winters and
wet springs. Access maintenance and repairs could only be done seasonally because of
weather and other factors, they knew; therefore, it was a highly time-sensitive request and
crucial to both OP accessibility and troops’ safety and security. The military sent the cost
breakdown to SRSG Sokalski and to the UN on March 13 and May 2, 1996, but there
was no response from HQ in NY over the next nearly three months other than to demand
further details in July (which, as noted, had been submitted three months earlier). 25 Local
gravel and other contractors demanded payment up-front, due to the weak Macedonian

this at HQ on 02 May 1996); 17 July 1996 fax from H. Sokalski to Mr. Medili, UN NY with cc to K.
Annan and Major General Franklin Van Kappen (no. UNPREDEP 051).
24

UNARMS 1996 Files, Box 2 (1999/0116) with cable and fax correspondence between Kofi Annan of the
DPKO and UNPREDEP SRSG H. Sokalski 31 March – 17 July 1996. BG O. J. Strömberg (04 July 2009);
BG B. Sohnemann (08-10 July 2009) and BG B. Wranker (24 June 2009), in interviews with author (notes
and recordings).
25

UNARMS 1996 Files, Box 2 (1999/0116) with cable and fax correspondence between Kofi Annan of the
DPKO and UNPREDEP SRSG H. Sokalski 31 March – 17 July 1996.
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economy, so this was not a situation where a trustworthy letter of credit could have
resolved the issue.
Eventually, UN HQ suggested that UNPREDEP arrange for equipment from the
UN Transition Office in the former Yugoslavia (UNTOFY) in Zagreb and from Camp
Polom (at United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation, UNCRO) in Croatia, and
from Tuzla in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 26 Additional engineering support had been
requested in April 1996, too, and was anticipated from the UN Transitional
Administration in Eastern Slavonia on a rotational basis. The Indonesian engineering
group of fifteen persons was operational, however, only through the end of May 1996. 27
As noted, UN HQ and UNPREDEP arranged for some machinery trade-offs between
Balkan regional operations, but in fact, this replacement equipment mainly arrived too
late and indeed, some key units never reached UNPREDEP at all.28
The situation was further complicated because helicopters could not fill the road
access voids to OPs and OPTs, primarily since they were irregularly available for this
purpose. Besides, several of the U.S.-supplied UH-60 Blackhawks (painted white for

26

From UNARMS, Box 2, 1999/0116 Accession Date, Subject files of SRSG, SRSG Special Assistant and
Public Information Officer; specific cables between multiple parties 13 March (Fax 151-3130/157-8053);10
April 1996; 12 April 1996; a seemingly angry message, all in capital letters, 23 May 1996 from Steinar
Bjornsson to H. Sokalski re unauthorized “U.S. Contracted Construction Project” ($3.2 million contract
with US Army Europe?) and reimbursement from UN HQ that will not occur per Bjornsson, who states
actual budget 01 January through 30 June is $504,000; 03 July 1996 from Sokalski to K. Annan referencing
funds for road repairs ($280,000 needed immediately; UN HQ told of this at HQ on May 2); 17 July fax
from H. Sokalski to Mr. Medili, UN HQ with cc to K. Annan and Major General Franklin Van Kappen
(UN HQ), no. UNPREDEP 051.
27

UNARMS 1996 Files, Box 2 (1999/0116 accession date), fax from Kofi Annan of 19 April 1996 to field
commanders and Sokalski.
28

BG Bent Sohnemann (8-10 July 2009), interview with author (notes and recordings).
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U.N. use, so known as Whitehawks) were withdrawn from UNPREDEP by the U.S. in
1997, to be green-hatted (redone in U.S. military colors and retained by the U.S. military)
for use in NATO missions in the region. This exacerbated transport alternatives. 29
In another instance, described by BG Sohnemann, he requested ten snow-mobiles
in order to get to several crucial OPs via literal “goat and sheep paths”. They were not
accessible on foot or by other means during later Autumn, Winter and early Spring, but
were key to observations of critical security and passage points. HQ denied the request;
they argued that UNPREDEP already had “snow-cats”, huge tracked trucks that never fit
on many rural roads, and certainly not a goat path. This forced him to order the use of far
more costly helicopters, when available, for access to these OPs and for troop safety.30
Was this mission truly under-funded since it was successful? The best answers to
that question came from several of the Brigadier Generals and others: it was successful
despite under-funding, mainly because of exceptional and creative efforts on the part of
leadership, troops and the generosity of resources other than the UN. Troops and officers
devised ingenious ways to address resource needs wherever and whenever they could.
Further, one could ask if it could not have even more successful with appropriate funding,
especially in outreach and “good offices”/human dimension efforts and results.
Indeed, another answer was directed at the “good offices” work of the SRSG:
there was no budget line for his outreach efforts, and a great deal of time was expended
by many parties to obtain the needed resources. Time has monetary value, too, as a Major

29

UNARMS 1996 Files, Box 2 (1999/0116 accession date), memo to field commanders and Sokalski,
April 1996 (not further dated; no identification of author).
30

BG Bent Sohnemann (8-10 July 2009), interviews with author (notes and recordings).
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correctly noted. Military leaders were incredulous that no funding for outreach and statebuilding efforts were included in the budget when those roles were clearly indicated in
the mandate for the SRSG. 31
Overall, generalized “success” is not necessarily the correct measure when
assessing appropriate funding, one BG added, especially when success was achieved “in
spite of.” If one or two variables had changed (such as more limited creativity, lessexperienced leadership, or less generous donors), this may well have resulted in an
unsuccessful or less successful mission. Which direction a causal arrow points is a matter
of some debate.32 Since the mission raised about $8 million in funding and in-kind
donations, particularly for state-building and human dimension endeavors, that would
probably be a logical starting point when discussing how much more funding was needed
for UNPREDEP to more thoroughly address its mandate and for other purposes such as
additional training of U.S. troops, necessary travel, public relations, conferences and the
like.33
Do other UN missions find themselves short on funds? Yes, but not to this extent,
and not in areas that were vital parts of the mandate, such as maintenance and good
offices work, especially the human dimension, according to knowledgeable sources.

31

Major Per Iko, interview with author on 26 June 2009 at Swedish National Defense Academy (notes);
others who asked for anonymity on this topic.
32

BG Ove J. Strömberg, 04 July 2009, interview with author on 04 July 2009, Oslo, Norway (notes,
recordings and documents from BG Strömberg).
33

Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 147-203.
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Demarcation of Borders: UNPREDEP’s Never-Ending Challenge
The borders situation at the end of the mission was nearly the same as when it
started, with a few small exceptions (about 20% total remained in doubt): not entirely
demarcated between Macedonia and Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia or Macedonia and
Albania. Despite UNPREDEP’s military leadership and others addressing border
identification for patrol purposes near-constantly with leaders in Macedonia and in
surrounding states, there were no lasting, firm conclusions. Establishing temporary
agreements was sometimes more fruitful, but none were respected for very long if at all
by the states, their militaries or national police forces. In April of 1997, Serbian military
officials were still insisting they would patrol “cadastral” borders (meaning
administrative borders previously mapped when Macedonia was a constituent Republic
of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia).34
Without agreed-upon borders, multiple challenges arose for UNPREDEP patrols
that included unexpected confrontations with militaries and militias from surrounding
states and ongoing arguments among various parties about where the lines could, would,
or should be. Some off these incidents came perilously close to violent exchanges, such
as the one on the Macedonian-Albanian border in late May of 1997, when UNPREDEP
troops could not visit two villages, Susevo and Petrovici. Armed Macedonian soldiers
maneuvered in and around OP-F12 (a Finnish OP), “placing the OP in the direct line of
fire between Army of the Republic of Macedonia [ARM] soldiers and the Albanians who

UNARMS UNPREDEP file “United Nations Patrol Line”, 03 Sept 1996 to 14 July 1997, series S1822/Box 20/File #2 from Accession 1999/0116, Outgoing Code Cable from UN HQ on 14 April 1997.
34
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were shooting at the ARM soldiers, further highlighted the need for our engineers to
accomplish force-protection activities.”35
Most of the border issues were predicated on several factors: first, no state
willingly abdicates territory; second, borders in nearly all the Balkans had business and
cultural impacts (including, for example, traditional grazing lands, or access to towns
near border but potentially on the opposite side of it) and historically had been somewhat
fluid or blurred; third, unforgiving terrain dominated much of the area not demarcated,
making surveying and related undertakings extremely difficult if not impossible; fourth,
physical changes were always possible (rock-slides, severe erosion and the like) which
would impact border identification; fifth, any border markers were considered labile by at
least one party to discussions; sixth, Serbia was generally uncompromising in patrol-line
setting attempts, and seventh, Kosovo was highly unstable during most of the bordersetting efforts.
Furthermore, UNPREDEP sought an agreeable patrol line, not to set political
borders permanently, which some parties did not appear to fully comprehend. Serbia, for
example, demanded that the line be the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslav
administrative border (cadastral border) for the then-constituent Macedonia. Serbia
became more insistent on this and more aggressive on border issues as time passed.
Add to this some intense disagreements over what maps would be acceptable to
all parties (Serbian ones? Macedonian? Albanian? Some other publishing source like the

35

UNARMS UNPREDEP File S-1823, Box 6, File #9 (23 December 1996 to 15 March 1999):
“Government of the Republic of Macedonia Ministry of Defense”, dated 29 May 1997.
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UN?), along with the overall lack of maps at the appropriate scale, despite multiple
requests from the field to UN Liaison Offices in Zagreb and Sarajevo and to UN HQ in
NY City—and UNPREDEP’s border delineation challenges multiplied. It was noted that
at least 20,000 to 25,000 copies of whatever maps were used would be required: locating
and purchasing so many copies, or having copies made and laminated in Zagreb, Croatia,
would be cost-prohibitive and very slow. 36
Because of the lack of consensus on the patrol lines and borders, incursions crossborders became more marked in March of 1997 and thereafter, Sokalski and BG Bo
Wranker informed the UN HQ that the FRY increased border-area patrols
…coinciding with the exchange of FRY’s and FYROM’s cartographic positions
on the border line37… It should not be excluded that the patrol pattern is
politicalized [sic] and that FRY is using the patrols to put pressure on FYROM in
connection with their border negotiations. …when FYROM’s internal situation
threatens the stability of the country, any external pressure could prove
dangerous. Today, for the first time in many months, we have seen a FYROM
patrol cross the UNPL [UN Patrol Line] to the north…in the same area where
several FRY patrols have crossed the line during recent weeks. …An increase
in…FRY patrols crossing the UNPL is expected later in [S]pring; an increase has
already been seen, and the high frequency is expected to go on.” UNPREDEP’s
military and political leadership concluded that there was “a significant change in
the FRY activity near the future border line”…38
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UNARMS UNPREDEP File #S-1823, Box 6, File 5 Accession 1999-0119 Field Commander
Conferences 04 January 1995 through 17 October 1996, from Commander’s Conference 18 January 1996.
BG J. Engstrom, 17 June 2009, FC at this Conference, interview with author (notes).
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In this particular UN document, the Republic of Macedonia is referred to by its UN-developed name, the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or FYROM. FRY is the acronym for the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, established in 1992, and lasting until 2003 as a union,
until Montenegro declared its independence in the latter year.
38

UNARMS UNPREDEP File No. 17, Box 4, outgoing code cable no. UNPREDEP 204/207 (parts 1 and
2), dated 12/13 March 1997 to Major General F. Van Kappen, UN HQ, from H. Sokalski and BG B.
Wranker, accessed on 15 November 2010.
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In early 1994, during UNPROFOR/M, the cadastral border already had proved
problematic, since it might or might not have become the final “international” border, and
it too suffered many of the drawbacks associated with setting a patrol line. To address
this, a military administrative boundary (the Northern Limitation of the Area of
Operation, or NLAOO) was negotiated and accepted by both FYROM and FRY military
authorities. After several months, UNPROFOR/M (and later, UNPREDEP) found the
NLAOO unmanageable due to difficulty consistently and accurately locating it on maps,
the harsh terrain, and patrolling impediments.
A revision to that line was undertaken, using more permanent and more easily
recognizable physical features of the area; it was then drawn on a 1:50,000 Serbian map.
All parties (the UN, UNPREDEP, FRY and Macedonia) were provided copies, and on 08
December 1995, BG Juha Engstrom as Field Commander of UNPREDEP, formalized the
revised UN line by signing a cover letter to the FRY Ministry of Defense and FYROM’s
General Staff.
When BG Juha Engstrom handed a copy of the map and cover letter to Lieutenant
General Blagoje Kovacevic (Deputy Chief of Staff for FRY General Staff), Engstrom
stated, “A UN line is very important to answer practical questions — to ensure our
patrols are on the right side and to avoid incidents. …let me emphasize this is not to
delineate a new official border, but a UN-line for practical purposes.” Kovacevic
responded, “Your mission is one of peace. … I hope…we can immediately meet again. I
expect no problems.”
In late January of 1997, the two verbally agreed in person to the new line,
Kovacevic on behalf of the FRY and Engstrom for the UN. Engstrom then presented the
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UN-line, drawn on another map, to FYROM military authorities, with written
descriptions attached; FYROM also verbally agreed to it. Engstrom then signed an order
that the UN-line would be effective 15 March 1995. Two months after that, the UN-line
was renamed the UN Patrol Line (UNPL). 39
All went relatively well, with a decreased number of incursions cross-line from
the entities who had agreed to the UNPL, until late Winter and early Spring of 1997. The
UNPREDEP Force Commander reported he informed FRY interlocutors “as to the
impropriety of disregarding the UNPL - especially the past 2 months. The response was
evasive… there was no unified position on the FRY side and the military represents a
harder line than the civilian counterparts.”40
In late March 1997, FRY Lieutenant Colonel Lukic informed UNPREDEP’s
Eastern Sector Battalion Commander, U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Niedringhaus, that the
UNPL was rescinded and there was to be no UN presence in the FRY. There were further
incidents on 29 March 1997 that involved U.S. and FRY troops in a 30-minute stand-off
at OP-U51B. Thereafter, the FRY accused UNPREDEP of eight more violations (five on
land; three airspace), and then insisted the FRY had never recognized the UNPL. FRY
representatives seemed especially disconcerted by UNPREDEP members entering a

UNARMS UNPREDEP File No. 17, Box 4, (SRSG’s Office File) 01/01/97 – 31 Dec 1997), outgoing
code cable No. 207 (4 pages total); accessed on 15 November 2010, NY City.
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UNARMS UNPREDEP File No. 17, Box 4 (SRSG’s Office File 01/01/97 – 31 Dec 1997), outgoing code
cable No. 213 from H. Sokalski to Bernard Miyet (2 pages total with attachment of letter from the Office of
the Force Commander, Bo Wranker, regarding unarmed UN Military Observers stopped and harassed by an
armed FRY patrol); accessed on 15 November 2010, NY City.
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number of villages. They insisted that the FRY and FYROM would decide the border
(note the UN or UNPREDEP were omitted).
On 11 April 1997, Sokalski reported incursions south of the UNPL to UN HQ,
stating incisively, “These are not sporadic incidents any more.” He requested a demarche
at HQ through the Permanent Representative, adding that “the matter may soon be
brought to…the Security Council.”41 The demarche was then issued.
In examining official UN maps offered by BG Bent Sohnemann and those in
Military Liaison Officers’ (MILO) tubes at UNARMS, it was immediately apparent how
crucial and difficult border determinations were.42 Much of the terrain was generally
unfriendly to mechanized ground or on-foot patrolling, a vital element of UNPREDEP’s
work, and key to the set-up of OPs and OPTs with clear lines of sight for observation and
reporting. Utilizing natural markers seemed most practical: rocks, trees, creeks/streams
and ridges, along with goat, sheep and horse tracks.43 BG Sohnemann applied an
eminently workable, creative “field” solution: painting boulders and other markers white

UNARMS UNPREDEP File No. 17, Box 4 (SRSG’s Office File 01/01/97 – 31 Dec 1997), outgoing code
cable No. 207 from H. Sokalski to Bernard Miyet at UN HQ (4 pages total); accessed on 15 November
2010, NY City.
41
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UNARMS UNPREDEP MILO (Military Liaison Office) Maps Tube, File 65 (undated, assessed as
1997); examined on 16 November 2010, NY City. BG B. Sohnemann (8-10 July 2009), interview with
detailed maps (notes, photographs and recordings).
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BG J. Engstrom (17 June 2009), BG B. Wranker (24 June 2009), Col. Kalle Liesinen (12-14 June 2009),
interviews with author (notes and recordings); UNARMS, 16 November 2009, Maps in Military Liaison
Office tube, File 65 (1997), Maps at scale 1:50,000 from UN Series 1005/Sheet 683-1, Sheet 730-1 and 2,
Sheets 682-1 through 4, Sheets 681-1 through 4, Sheet 680-4 with OPs marked (Finnish, U.S., Norwegian,
Swedish); unlaminated/undated map setting UN Patrol line and marking former administrative lines with
comments on OPs, patrol lines, villages, etc.; unlaminated 1948 map of area from General Manesieski of
Macedonia to Field Commanders.
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along the UNPL. Of course, boulders could be moved but they rarely were, although
nonetheless much too often ignored by other militaries, paramilitaries, and militias. 44
Still, according to OSCE and other reports, internal and external, there were
“clear signs of the Federal Republic [FRY] seeking to assert its claims by proxy of the
UN, through the Yugoslav military pressurising UN patrols on or near the border, and
especially those of the battalion of the United States.”45 Another communication
indicated quite the opposite, from Julian Harston at the UN Liaison Office in Belgrade to
Sokalski, quoting Colonel Dragan Vuksic, Head of Department for Cooperation with
International Organizations and Foreign Ministry Representatives of the FRY Army
(abbreviated from the Serbian alphabet as the VJ) General Staff:
…relations with UNPREDEP are affected by wider decisions by the U.S. to
increase pressure on Yugoslavia…the dispatch of UN soldiers to Macedonia was
based on the assumption that the FRY was the potential aggressor. …relations
with UNPREDEP would never be on an equal footing. UNPREDEP was – as a
preventive deployment – not neutral in the way that UN forces are normally
neutral. It was in Macedonia to give support to Skopje and as a force multiplier to
the woefully inadequate Macedonian armed forces. (In this context, Vuksic noted
he could not recall a single recent “incident” involving the VJ and Macedonian
forces.)46
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Harston further commented, his point 9, on a deeply significant intercultural matter:
Precision in discussion and in interpreting the results of such discussion is not a
natural phenomena [sic] here [in the Balkans]. It needs to be forced. We strongly
recommend that at a meeting with the Yugoslavs [sic] a written understanding is
reached over the precise nature of the UN patrol line and its implication, if any,
for the deployment of VJ forces in the border area.47
But a written understanding had been reached, it was believed, and for what? A
short time later, on 04 June 1997, BG Bent Sohnemann sent a message to FRY
Lieutenant General Dragoljub Ojdanic to inform him of multiple incidents between the
FRY, UNPREDEP troops, and UN Military Observers (UNMOs), mainly at Orljak Hill.
This was the seventh such site confrontation since 17 April 1997, and 04 June was only
about three weeks past a 26 May 1997 meeting between military leaders at which it was
reconfirmed “we had an agreement.” Ojdanic, unimpressed, indicated in his response that
he “really does agree with the core principles of the “gentlemen’s agreement.””48
Harston’s response to Sokalski to the latter was sent in 26 June 1997.
The FRY military…believe that the understandings between them and
UNPREDEP were reached by negotiation and discussion between the military –
no formal “political agreement” was ever made and, of course, there is no
Security Council mandate which allows UNPREDEP to operate inside the
FRY…the FRY military [say] that any problems would be sorted out by the
military at as low a level as possible…The repeated raising of this issue by the US
ambassador here, and in very blunt terms by his military attaché and…references
to it by Mrs. [Madeline] Albright to President [Slobodan] Milosevic…have left
the military in a resentful and perplexed mood (emphases added).49
UNARMS UNPREDEP File No. 17, Box 4 (SRSG’s Office File 01/01/97 – 31 Dec 1997), Incoming
message from Julian Harston of UN Liaison Office, Belgrade, to H. Sokalski CBV-083, 14 April 1997
accessed at UNARMS on 16 Nov 2010.
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D. Ojdanic, 04 June 1997, accessed at UNARMS on 16 Nov 2010.
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Finally, it is true that UNPREDEP members had multiple unplanned and
unanticipated encounters with other states’ military, paramilitary, and militia members.
These were usually not fruitful because such incidents were often generated by those
who, accidentally or otherwise, crossed the UNPL or threatened UNPREDEP’s OPs or
OPTs and their personnel in some obvious manner (shots fired, aggressive behavior,
refusal to respond to questions, irregular forces rather than regular military, as
examples.)50
Abduction and extortion attempts against UNPREDEP members, especially
versus the U.S. component of the mission and the unarmed UN military observers,
mainly by Serbian forces while on Macedonian soil, were well-known, and both U.S.
President Clinton and the U.S. Congress were aware of such attempts (which were
occasionally minimally successful, although rarely were individuals held any significant
length of time).51
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BG B. Sohnemann (07 July 2010), BG Bo Wranker (24 June 2009), BG J. Engstrom (17 June 2009),
Major Per Iko (25 June 2009), BG O. Strömberg (04 July 2009), and Col. Kalle Liesinen (12-14 June
2009), interviews with author, notes, photographs, and recordings; UNARMS UNPREDEP Files (accessed
15 Nov 2010) Box 4 (SRSG’s Office Files), File #17, outgoing code cable to MG Franklin Van Kappen
and Bernard Miyet, UN HQ (UNPREDEP Cable No. 207, 4 pages total) from BG B. Wranker and U.S.
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the News, May 10, 1999, accessed https://www.questia.co/read/1G2-54574825 on 09 March 2011. BG B.
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Haarinen, Ph.D. (15 June 2009), interviews with author (notes and recordings).
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In an outbound cable on 30 June 1997, Sokalski and BG Bent Sohnemann
describe many of these incidents as situations where “we do seem to be entangled in a
Balkan syndrome of credibility and responsibility for the spoken word. Yet, we can also
clearly see that there is a difference of interpretation and assessment not only between
UNPREDEP and FRY, but also between you and us (emphasis added).” Sokalski and
Sohnemann summarized the troop security situation as follows:
Our paramount consideration is the safety and security of our troops. We can illafford FRY snipers overseeing our patrols from hill tops, “orders” to UN
patrolling teams to leave border areas, or undisciplined troops of dubious morality
demanding money from our UN troops and searching their vehicle. Unfortunately,
all of these actions have occurred in a number of incidents since end-March of
this year... It is clear to us that FRY’s change of mind on UNPL has been directly
linked to the process of negotiations on the demarcation of the border.52
Peacekeeping Force Experience Varied:
98% of Finns versus “0%” of U.S. Troops
According to statistics from BG Gunnar Isberg of Sweden, 40% of Swedes had
previous UN mission experience, as did 60% of Norwegians and Danes, and 98% of
Finns. But US troops had “next to none or none”.53 These differences created significant
inequalities in knowledge: 98% of Finns with previous peacekeeping experience and
100% of U.S. military without it illustrates this gap. The peacekeeping experience

UNARMS UNPREDEP Files (accessed 15 Nov 2010) Box 4 (SRSG’s Office Files), File #17 re UN
Patrol line, outgoing code cable UNPREDEP #268, dated 30 June 1997, from Sokalski and BG B.
Sohnemann to Julian Harston, UN Liaison Officer, Belgrade in reference to Harston’s Zagreb cable CBV116 of 26 June 1997. Cf. particularly point 3.
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BG G. Isberg (23 June 2009), interview with author in Stockholm, Sweden (notes).

121

shortfall of the U.S. troops gave rise to additional training requirements and for revisions
to planned company locations and duties.54
The U.S. experience deficit placed greater encumbrances on the Nordics as they
covered areas the U.S. could not (legally, or due to command or experience constraints).
Therefore, the Nordic Battalion bore additional patrolling burdens, along with coverage
of OPs not contiguous to others they manned. Morale of U.S. and Nordic troops was not
strengthened by any of these circumstances, and military leadership had to exert extra
efforts to improve it.55 The restrictions on the US troops were especially galling to those
soldiers. One American soldier told his Chief of Staff and the BG, “I’m a proud member
of one of the finest militaries in the world – and I can’t even do my job to its fullest.”56
This was an often-expressed frustration for the American military in UNPREDEP. The
Brigadier Generals all discussed various approaches they took to this U.S. troop issue,
including ensuring the U.S. troops had constant interactions with more-experienced
peacekeepers, and with OP and OPT area peoples and communities.
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Communications and Feedback: An Ongoing Challenge
Between Field and HQ Organizations
Within Macedonia, there were fairly open channels of communication between
the field and the Mission HQ in Skopje, and vice versa. Frequent meetings between
military and political leadership and those in Skopje HQ helped support these.
Communications with the Macedonian government were also as open as could
reasonably be expected between all entities.57
There were also supposed to be conduits, as described, through which to
communicate with UN HQ and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).
However, based on available records, it seems few visitors to the field from the UN HQ
or from DPKO spent any meaningful amount of time with the field organization to gain
more comprehensive knowledge of UNPREDEP, its implementation, challenges it faced
(including topography, encounters with other militaries and militias, smuggling, finances,
and so on), what its ongoing needs were, and what day-to-day operations were like – in
other words, to learn directly from the boots on the ground by putting their own there.
Kofi Annan, for example, visited UNPREDEP 10-11 January 1996 as UnderSecretary-General and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for a total of 1.5
days (arriving 10 a.m. on 10 January 1996 and departing 11 January 1996 at 3 p.m.),
spending nearly all that time in press conferences and meetings with the Macedonian
Government.58 He released a single press statement that included UNPREDEP: “As for
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UNPREDEP, I am proud of those in the military and civilian ranks of the mission.
UNPREDEP has been a success for the United Nations. Our mission here demonstrates
that preventative diplomacy can flourish where there is a sound mandate, a clear purpose,
and above all, goodwill.”59
Mr. Behrooz Sadry, UN HQ Assistant Secretary-General, visited for about two
days in late March, 1996, in his role as Assistant Secretary-General for Management and
Coordination in the United Nations Peace Forces in the former Yugoslavia, a position to
which he was appointed in August 1995.60
Bernard Miyet, newly appointed Under-Secretary-General of UN Peacekeeping
Operations, was in Macedonia to visit UNPREDEP 06-07 May 1997; he met for lengthy
periods with Macedonia’s President Kiro Gligorov (recovering from an assassination
attempt) and Gligorov’s Minister of Defense, Blagoy Handziski. Miyet seems, judging
from his written report, to have gained some understanding of the UNPREDEP mission
and its importance (if not its realities), even if more from the Macedonian Government’s
side than directly from the field organization and its members.61
This is not to claim that UNPREDEP was ignored at UN HQ, by other military
leaders (several U.S. Generals and Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Department of Defense
checked out UNPREDEP personally), by kings, by American and other politicians, nor
59
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by those in the diplomatic corps, all of whom visited for varying lengths of time. Nor is it
intended to suggest that that more visits from UN HQ, UN Field Offices, or DPKO were
possible, plausible, or perhaps even desirable. Some visits distracted from the mission
itself or claimed assets UNPREDEP could have used instead (helicopters chief among
them). Others were not from organizations or persons who could or would support
UNPREDEP in meaningful and significant ways.
The point here is, as Sokalski and BG B. Sohnemann said in a message to UN
Field HQ, Belgrade, at the end of June, 1997, and noted earlier, “…we can also clearly
see that there is a difference of interpretation and assessment … between you and us
(emphasis added).”62 This message was directly referring to the UN Patrol Line, but as
noted earlier, could easily have applied to many other areas of UNPREDEP in which the
communications and feedback loop between HQ and the field broke down or was
seriously frayed in one respect or another.
Specific examples of areas where these breakdowns occurred, according to files
and interviews, included funding appeals, “good offices” efforts and events, requests for
needed field equipment, discussion regarding necessary troop levels and requisite
specialized support (such as engineers), frequent UN demands and UNPREDEP field
responses regarding troop limits, cutbacks or planning for end of mission (these requests

UNARMS UNPREDEP Files Box 4 (SRSG’s Office Files), File #17, outgoing code cable UNPREDEP
#268, dated 30 June 1997, from Sokalski and BG B. Sohnemann to Julian Harston, UN Liaison Officer,
Belgrade. Accessed 15 Nov 2010.
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started barely a year after UNPREDEP’s formal inception, as a matter of fact, with
messages from UN HQ’s Ismet Kittani to Sokalski on 16 February 1996 and prior). 63
It may fairly be said that communications between the field and HQ appeared to
be too often needlessly difficult and negative. It seems the necessary complete feedback
loop was frayed and sometimes broken (as in the case of access road repairs, described
above, for example). At minimum, it too was in need of repair.
Communications Between Other
International Organizations and UNPREDEP
The OSCE and UNPREDEP seem, from all apparent evidence and interview
responses, to be the two organizations that communicated most strongly and consistently
across the board, especially on-site.64 Sokalski and UNPREDEP HQ and field staff met
regularly, sometimes as often as weekly, with their counterparts in the OSCE. Further,
written monthly OSCE reports were filled with information on critical topics, including:
a) border demarcation progress;
b) disputes at the various universities;

UNARMS UNPREDEP Accession 1999/0116, Box 2, “Reduction of the Military Component 01 January
through 31 December 1996”, Cable Z-256 (Sokalski to Kittani) and various responses to it through 02 April
1996 (UNPREDEP at approximately 14 months of existence), accessed 08 November 2010. BG B.
Wranker (24 June 2009), BG B. Sohnemann (08-10 July 2009), Maj. Per Iko (26 June 2009), MG Paavo
Kiljunen (16 June 2009), and Col. Kalle Liesinen (12-14 June 2009), interviews with author (notes and
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c) inter-ethnic relations, especially those addressed under the auspices of Maximilianus
“Max” van der Stoel, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, such as
“Building Harmonious Inter Ethnic Relations” in December of 1996;
d) important political and military visitors to Macedonia; regional military
relations/visitors
e) announcements about UNPREDEP, especially potential troop reductions;
f) the Tetovo University crisis and ensuing events; the “TAT Affair” (a massive,
collapsed pyramid scheme in Albania that also affected Macedonia profoundly,
politically, socially and economically); the “flag” issue regarding the Albanian flag
display in majority ethnic Albanian regions (July 1997); 65
g) the Greek unilateral embargo against Macedonia until its end on 15 October 1995;
and name talks between Greece and Macedonia (most of which were “swiftly
deferred”, although an Interim Accord was approved by the Macedonian Parliament,
Sobranie, in October 1995 that ended the Greek embargo); extensive border delays
when exiting Macedonia into Greece (reported to be 10-20 hours long at Gevgelia
and Evzoni);
h) the Royaumont Initiative;66

Christopher Jarvis, “The Rise and Fall of Albania’s Pyramid Schemes,” in Finance & Development
(Quarterly Magazine of the IMF), Vol. 37, no. 1 (March 2000), at http://www.imf.org/external/
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i) border patrol reports on smuggling and other incidents;
j) NATO exercises in the region;
k) Sobranie boycotts by ethnic Albanian political parties; changes to and mergers of
Albanian parties in opposition or unification with the Macedonian government;
ejections from the Sobranie (Arben Xhaferi, who had boycotted it for over two years
in political protest);
l) Bilateral relations reports on Macedonia and Albania in particular (“complicated and
tense” in July 1997);
m) Macedonia’s membership in OSCE as of 13 October 1995; Macedonian government
attitudes toward international organizations, especially those concerned about interethnic relations;
n) Political party reports for Macedonian and Albanian ethnicities; Macedonian
government reports; trade union issues, especially the police trade union;
o) When appropriate, refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) reports, especially
for Kosovo, and for Montenegro as a refugee-recipient nation (Summer 1998
particularly).
In October of 1997, in a letter to the United Nations regarding involvement of
various UN entities in Macedonia, Sokalski indicated that the following had been

The Royaumont Process constitutes an innovative, comprehensive approach to conflict alleviation
in a twofold way. First, it encourages democratisation by promoting a dialogue amongst citizens and the
modernisation of civic structures. Second, it fosters and extends new communication channels among
different groups across national boundaries, creating co-operation networks among non-governmental
organisations. It thus substantially supplements the existing instruments of preventive diplomacy and
conflict alleviation.” Excerpted from “The Royaumont Process: An Initiative for Stability and Good
Neighbourliness in South-Eastern Europe” by Dr. Panaghiotis Roumeliotis, Co-Coordinator of the
Royaumont Initiative, accessed on 16 September 2010 at http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/autumn98/
royaumont.html. Recent information on it was not available.
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engaged in “development-oriented interventions” for some time in concert with “the
peace-building component of the operation as an important value-added factor of
preventive deployment,” along with EU and other organizations’ activities there. Some
had ended their efforts in the country; others were ongoing. These entities included the
World Food Programme; the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Food and
Agricultural Organization of the UN; Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
(coordinated with EU-Phare and EUROCUSTOMS, and later with Interpol; the UN
Economic Commission for Europe, especially its subsidiary mission, the South East
European Initiative (SECI); the UN’s Industrial Development Organization and the
International Labor Office (ILO) for Central and Eastern European Team (CEET)
headquartered in Budapest, Hungary.
The World Health Organization began efforts in Macedonia, but “had to divert
assets to northern war-torn republics”; in contrast, the UN Development Programme
(UNDP) worked quite closely with UNPREDEP and was consistently active in
Macedonia in education, with the Ministry of Arts and Sciences regarding national
development strategies, in training on social services and in other projects “initiated by
UNPREDEP with UNDP’s financial support.”67
The World Bank (to 23 October 1997) loaned Macedonia $300 million in a
variety of loans for different purposes, while the IMF engaged in macroeconomic
stability efforts, and in an “extensive program of technical assistance,” aimed at “fiscal
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policy administration, tax and expenditure reform, banking supervision, monetary policy
reform and compilation of macroeconomic statistics,” mostly through its resident mission
in 1995.68
UN’s DESA (Department of Economic and Social Affairs) was involved in
development strategy for Macedonia from 1995-1997, and addressed social change in a
project entitled, “Action for Social Change: A New Facet for Preventive Peace-Keeping:
the Case of UNPREDEP,” completed in Finland in 1996.69 Sokalski had responded to
inquiries from UN DESA’s Nitin Desai regarding that study with a statement:
…in the absence of a resident representative of the UNDP or a humanitarian
coordinator in the host country, we at UNPREDEP have tried to advance the
peace-building component of the operation as an important value-added factor of
preventive peace-keeping. Consequently, based exclusively on extra-budgetary
resources from several governments and international organizations [emphasis
added], we have managed to pursue a number of developmental projects, which
has resulted in an impressive flow of external experience to the host Republic,
based on universally recognized practice and standards on social integration and
national capacity- and institution-building. (Emphasis added).70
Even the Universal Postal Union’s International Bureau consulted on Macedonian
postal law, and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) engaged in a
customs modernization project that consumed two years (1996 and 1997) regarding
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installation of an Automated System for Customs Data (known by its acronym
ASYCUDA).71
Without the involvement of and communications between these entities and at
least the political office of UNPREDEP (Mr. Sokalski and his staff), there is no question
the mandate would have been even more difficult and more expensive for UNPREDEP to
successfully fulfill.
NGOs were similarly involved in Macedonia, as has been described earlier. Some
were local, some international. The International Red Cross/Red Crescent, EuroBalkan,
Soros/Open Society, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières, Catholic Relief
Services, and a multitude of smaller ethnically-focused socio-political organizations,
including those for Roma, Albanian-Macedonians and others, maintained quite consistent
service to their constituencies.72 Often, UNPREDEP was able to offer neutral and
impartial services or support to these NGOs (such as soldiers and officers donating at
blood drives).
What the above indicates is the critical importance of IGOs and NGOs to
UNPREDEP’s success, and that communications between all entities were of similar
value in achieving mutually agreed upon endeavors and goals.
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The Mandates (UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP):
Impediments or Encouragement?
The United Nations offers key information regarding the mandates of both
UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP:















Established on 31 March 1995 by Security Council resolution 983 (1995) to
replace UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
UNPREDEP's mandate remained essentially the same:
to monitor and report any developments in the border areas which could
undermine confidence and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and threaten its territory.
Within the general framework of its mandate, UNPREDEP has:
served as an additional element of support for the international community's
efforts to promote a peaceful resolution of the overall situation in the former
Yugoslavia;
been a valuable early-warning source for the Security Council:
helped to strengthen mutual dialogue among political parties and assisted in
monitoring human rights as well as inter-ethnic relations, both at the national
level and in areas populated by ethnic minorities;
successfully mediated several tense border encounters and negotiated a military
administrative patrol line between the two parties that determined the northern
limit of the area of operation for its troops;
established mutually beneficial contacts with the military authorities of Albania
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and at the highest political level of
Albania;
evolved into a fully-fledged preventive operation along the lines spelled out in the
Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace and the Supplement thereto; and
developed a strong three-pronged approach to the implementation of its mandate,
covering political action and good offices, troop deployment, and the human
dimension.
Effective 1 February 1996, following the termination of the mandates of UNCRO,
UNPROFOR and UNPF-HQ, UNPREDEP became an independent mission,
reporting directly to United Nations Headquarters in NY. Despite its new status,
the operation has maintained basically the same mandate, strength and
composition of troops. By adopting resolution 1082 (1996) on 26 November
1996, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNPREDEP for a six-month
period through 31 May 1997 and decided on a reduction of its military component
by 300 all ranks by 30 April 1997.
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The mandate of UNPREDEP to contribute to the maintenance of peace and
stability in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia requires it to concern
itself with numerous aspects of the country's internal and external situation. Its
tasks include preventive deployment, good offices, measures to build confidence,
early warning, fact-finding, monitoring and reporting, as well as selected social
and development projects.73
However, military leadership of both UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP felt
unanimously that the two field organizations were rendered less effective than they
plausibly would have been because of the restrictive mandates’ terms as noted above:
essentially observe and report but no more (hands-off, in other words), and by personnel
drawdowns during UNPREDEP (impacting mandated preventive observation and
reporting). Nothing and no one could be intercepted, stopped, touched, examined, or
otherwise confirmed or disconfirmed at the operation’s various Observation Posts (OPs)
and Temporary Observation Posts (OPTs) along the borders between Macedonia/Serbia,
Macedonia/Kosovo, and Macedonia/Albania.
The clear majority of leaders, both political and military, along with the troops,
understood and admitted that there was, at the very least, small-arms, ammunition, and
cigarette smuggling going on cross-borders. Yet some would state for the record only that
they could “neither confirm nor deny” those incidents or others. Nevertheless, every
general and other military leader interviewed directly stated or implied exactly those
assessments, along with clear reasons they believed their concerns and beliefs were wellfounded. This led some to question just how effective “prevention” was supposed to be
enforced.

From “UNPREDEP Mandate”, in “UNPREDEP Mission Background” (n.p.), last updated 16 March
1999, at “http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred_b.htm#MANDATE.
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“Non-engagement/observe/report” proscriptions became even more detrimental as
pressures on Macedonia’s northern border with Kosovo over that territory’s relationship
with Serbia increased markedly over the final year of the mission (February 1998February 1999).74 There were definite signs of growing instability between Kosovo and
Macedonia, largely due to concerns about potential refugees of Kosovar-Albanian
ethnicity entering Macedonia in case of an actual Kosovo-Serbia violent conflict.75 In the
Macedonian government, there was simultaneously an obvious awareness that radicalized
Albanians and/or Kosovars within Macedonia (perhaps even Serbs) might begin some
kind of conflict with ethnic Macedonians over minority rights or related contentious,
unresolved minority issues. 76
Furthermore, this mandate restriction (do not engage/only observe and report) was
not well-aligned with the Macedonian government’s attitudes during UNPREDEP. That
government clearly signaled that it wanted the UN troops to, “Stop trouble at the border,
and close the border if necessary” (emphasis added).77 The government was focused on
crisis management: do not let the crisis materialize or, if it somehow did, then respond
forcefully and forcibly, as the Macedonian Government did regarding the Albanianlanguage “underground” Tetovo University situation in 1995 (it was not State-approved),
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to Albanian flag-flying incidents at municipal buildings in Tetovo and Gostivar in 1997,
and other similar incidents.78
Macedonian government officials were especially sensitive to any reporting done
by UNPREDEP or UN associates in Macedonia (to the UN Security Council or others at
HQ) that they felt was the least bit negative about internal domestic matters in the
country, specifically inter-ethnic relations or human rights disputes, and other “growing
pains” for the new democracy. 79 They felt this unduly and inappropriately
internationalized and unjustifiably publicized purely domestic issues. As mentioned
earlier, UNPREDEP’s relations with nearly all government entities were good. Still,
Macedonian government officials did not hesitate to let the UNPREDEP SRSG know of
their demurrals, especially regarding UNPREDEP reports to the UN.80
Troop reductions per mandates were also objectionable for the most part to the
participating countries, to Macedonia, and, as mentioned, to the field organization as a
whole. For example, Blagoy Handziski, Macedonian Minister of Defense, frequently
argued for an expanded UNPREDEP mandate and a review of current one, given changes
in circumstances in and around Macedonia. On 15 August 1995, when UNPREDEP had
been in Macedonia for barely seven months, Hanziski said, in an interview with Vecer, a
Macedonian newspaper:
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Viewing all these potential dangers that can cause the war to spill over into the
southern part of the Balkans...: Is it not time that UNPREDEP's mandate,
composition and number be reviewed? Even though UNPREDEP is successfully
executing its preventive mission with the current number and composition, in
cooperation of the Macedonian Army, still the question raised is: Shall we wait
for the events to escalate on our northern border and then react by involving
additional troops, or do we react now, at this very moment preventively and
thereby psychologically influence any idea of destabilizing Macedonia? . . .
However, considering the relations within the UN and the misunderstandings that
exist between the superpowers, it should not be surprising if one of the powers
decides to send a new contingent of troops to Macedonia under its own flag or
under the command of NATO. This possibility cannot be ruled out, because the
leader of the American Congress, Robert Dole, has said on several occasions that
their soldiers should join UN missions under the US flag. On the other hand,
depending on the agreement between the Western parties, there is a possibility
that NATO forces will be present on our borders.81
BG Bo Lennart Wranker, Field Commander UNPREDEP, was particularly direct
in his message to UN HQ of 02 April 1996. He was deeply dismayed by troop
drawdowns in the face of ever-growing inter-ethnic tensions, a crumbling economy in
Albania, unrest on the border with Kosovo, increased smuggling across all borders, and
confrontations with the FRY military. He stated bluntly, “If we reduce our posture, we
lose to a large extent the ability to flexibly execute a mandate widely recognized as a
model for preventive diplomacy.” 82 He also mentioned, in his interview, that he felt this
sent an entirely inappropriate message to the Macedonian peoples and the government.
BG Wranker was strongly opposed to troop reductions because of negative
impacts, highlighting them as “operationally damaging and politically harmful,

UNARMS UNPREDEP File S-1822-Box 13/File 6, Accession 1999/0116, “12 Aug 1995 - 30 April 1998
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particularly in view of the host country’s desire for an undiminished troop presence.” One
concern he specified was that the Quick Reaction Force size would be cut in half (from
107 to 56) and would then lack “flexibility and reinforcement capability necessary to
meet the diversity of potential emergencies along a 250 KM long patrol line on
extraordinarily inhospitable terrain…this degradation of QRF capability [is] most
serious…this is militarily essential in crisis situations.” 83
BG Wranker predicted in this message of early April 1996 that there would be
increased smuggling and ever-growing border tensions because of reductions in
UNPREDEP patrolling. He further informed the UN HQ that the UNPREDEP
compound’s guards would have to be replaced by contract guards under the drawdown as
then planned. “The fact that the UN is unable to guard its own HQ must, in a tense
situation, be looked upon from a force protection point of view” (troop security).84 He
further stressed that relinquishment to the Macedonian Border Guard of the U.S.-staffed
OP-U56, even if sensible due to ongoing access problems, “will send a false message to
our hosts… [A] decision to withdraw this OP shall be seen as an act of not being
impartial.” All of this describes the fallout BG Wranker anticipated from the drawdown
in April of 1996, regardless of Security Council instructions to do so.85 His concerns were
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validated as the mission went on, and as later drawdowns compounded those negative
effects.
BGs Sohnemann and O.J. Strömberg also held sharply critical views of the
harmful impact of troop drawdowns, and noted that the constant planning for mandate
non-renewal was deeply troubling and stressful to military leaders, their troops, civilian
staff, and Macedonia. It essentially added up to nearly losing three months of every sixmonth mandate renewal in terms of planning time and effort while waiting to see if the
mandate would be reissued for another six months, said Strömberg. During these sixmonth periods, troops rotated and other changes occurred, such as adding or closing OPs
and OPTs, training had to recur, especially for U.S. troops, and had to be accounted for in
any plans, adding even more complexity to the processes.86
Mandated Good Offices Efforts of the SRSG and Troops
The “good offices” directives in the mandate mitigated some of the more
restrictive terms of it. The accomplished Polish diplomat Henryk Sokalski, as
UNPREDEP Special Representative of the Secretary-General, was particularly adept at
developing relations and projects of high value in a broad swath of communities under
such auspices. These surely contributed to better relations between specific locales,
communities, and UNPREDEP, but not always between ethnicities, and sometimes not
with UN HQ.
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SRSG Sokalski was deeply committed to utilizing his “good offices” functions for
the benefit of Macedonia and its “human dimension”, particularly in cases of ethnic
issues and more open relations between the two dominant ethnicities, Macedonians and
Albanian-Macedonians. Based on 2002 census data, ethnic Macedonians comprise about
64% of the population, and Albanian-Macedonians are in the range of 23% to 28% (the
latter remains difficult to state with precision, since a great many ethnic AlbanianMacedonians have refused to participate in Government censuses since 1992.) The
remainder of the population is a variety of minorities, each less than 5%: Turks (3.9%),
Roma (2.7%), Vlachs, Torbesi/Pomaks/Gorani (ethnically Macedonian Muslims), Greeks
and others, as seen in the map below. The total population (July 2014 estimate) is 2.091
million.87
As indicated in the map, specific regions of Macedonia (total area: 9,927.85
square miles, slightly larger than the U.S. state of Vermont) are mainly one ethnic group
or another. Albanian-Macedonians predominantly follow Islam (non-denominational
Muslims dominate, although some claim adherence to either the Sunni or Bektashi Shi’ite
sects). Ethnic Macedonians are nearly all Christians, most affiliated with the State’s
Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC). This has certain impacts on “good office” efforts,
as cultural and religious distinctions are highly significant in the country.
Getting to know the communities within such ethnic areas was a critical facet of
UNPREDEP’s field operations. The more the troops and leaders could learn about a
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given village, town or region, the greater investment and engagement by both a given
community and the troops in keeping Macedonia secure. Positive relationships between
UNPREDEP and the public near the borders were essential to the success of spillover
prevention responsibilities. Every Brigadier General (and military and political leaders in
Macedonia with whom the author spoke in 2006) stressed that those good relations were
invaluable, and some recounted experiences they had while trying to establish those good
relations. Often troops would, when they had time off mandate and duty, would volunteer
to repair sanitary services, a community center or school “on their own time” with the
permission of their military leadership, for example.
Figure 2. Ethnic Population Distribution in Macedonia
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American troops ostensibly had a more difficult time forming these community
links since they were sometimes perceived by the Macedonian peoples (and, admittedly,
frequently appeared to understand themselves) as “U.S. military soldiers first,
peacekeepers second”.88 Some of this was undoubtedly due to their lack of experience in
a role where “there was no enemy,” where neutrality and impartiality were the rules of
engagement.89 Sokalski’s good offices and outreach, often with the support of the Field
Commanders or other officers, were particularly important in these instances. More than
one person, including anonymous informants, mentioned, “Albanian-Macedonians
thought the U.S. military personnel favored the ethnic Macedonians; the ethnic
Macedonians thought the reverse, mostly because there were many more Albanians in the
United States than there were Macedonians.”
One event that successfully linked up diverse groups for three consecutive years
was the Blossom Run, a 42 kilometer marathon (26.1 miles) between Tetovo
(traditionally ethnically mostly Albanian) and Skopje, in which individuals of various
ethnic identities, government and political party affiliations, and UNPREDEP members,
including civilian staff and some troops, took part.
Most such outreach efforts, as noted above, were completely unfunded by the UN;
therefore, Sokalski and others had to find the money to support professional conferences,
socially-oriented events, many meetings, community support and repairs, and the like.
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That Sokalski was a highly respected diplomat unquestionably helped open doors for
funding. Fortunately, the Scandinavian countries, Italy, Japan, Germany, and on
occasion, the UN (via small grants), along with the Macedonian government and others,
were supportive of fundraising efforts. UNPREDEP was able to raise about $8 million in
cash and in-kind support for notable efforts such as the “Living Together” interethnic
rapprochement program, and SOS Children’s Villages.90 The Macedonian Centre for
Ethnic Relations sponsored “Our Future Leaders: Catalysts of Tolerance” and
“Rainbow,” which focused on politically active youth. Both were partly funded by
Japan.91
The involvement and initiatives of various NGOs and IGOs such the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent, Open Society Institute of Macedonia/Soros,
Catholic Relief Services/Catholic Charities, Search for Common Ground, the
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), the International Research
and Exchanges Board (IREX), the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the OECD and OSCE,
SOS Children’s Villages, and multiple small domestic NGOs, among others, were
exceptionally supportive of UNPREDEP’s outreach and “good offices” programs, and
toward overall efforts to develop and enhance what Lipset termed cross-cutting cleavages
between ethnic groups.92 UNPREDEP and the OSCE worked particularly closely
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together to achieve a variety of initiatives on the political and domestic fronts, some of
which were more efficacious than others.93
Indeed, there is evidence that on more than one occasion, UN HQ actively
attempted to discourage much of Sokalski’s work as “out of the mandate terms.” Sir
Marrack Goulding at UN HQ’s Department of Political Affairs, and Kofi Annan, then
with the DPKO, engaged in a series of near-confrontational code cables with Sokalski for
about three months beginning 31 May 1996 through the end of August 1996, in which
they invited Sokalski to answer several questions about his “good offices” actions. These
queries occurred during a period of growing tensions within Macedonia; UN HQ
appeared to be concerned that Macedonia’s government might interpret Sokalski’s efforts
under his good offices mandate as focused on unintended and unapproved political
purposes or actions.94
Sokalski agreed to not actively pursue specific initiatives, as he too had noted a
growing trend in Macedonian political thinking that external mediators should have no
part in settling domestic affairs in the country, whether due to inter-ethnic tensions or
not.95 Still, as the first U.S. Ambassador to Macedonia, Christopher Hill accurately noted,
Macedonia is “on a very key location, truly a crossroads…UNPREDEP, I think, has
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made a historic contribution to the region. It has definitely created stability in the region.”
Macedonia, he added, “is in a tough neighborhood.” 96
Sokalski did not, however, back away from efforts he perceived as vital, which he
made clear in his correspondence with UN HQ, particularly with Mr. Yasushi Akashi in
UN Peace Forces (UNPF) HQ in Zagreb, and with Sir Marrack Goulding and Kofi Annan
at UN HQ, NY. In a cable from Mr. Akashi responding to good offices efforts by Mr.
Sokalski, Mr. Akashi wrote,
Security Council resolution 908 (1994) request the SRSG to "use his good
offices... to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability" in FYROM "in
cooperation with the authorities" of the country. However, this mandate does not
include issues such as Macedonian-Greek relations, FYROM's recognition by its
neighbouring states, or assistance to FYROM's efforts under Article 50 of the
Charter....development of good neighbourly relations among Balkan
States...UNPREDEP may be able to play a certain indirect role in these issues by
facilitating information flow or by transmitting messages when requested by
Macedonian authorities. But it would be difficult to go further than that.
... [A]n international symposium in early 1996 in Skopje on "Preventive
Diplomacy: Theory and Practice" is very interesting...it would serve not only to
promote UNPREDEP's activities... but also to further preventive diplomacy by the
United Nations in general...the symposium would be better hosted by an
independent (and preferably foreign) organization with an established reputation...
[and] for UNPREDEP to be a “facilitator” rather than an organizer. UNPF could
provide its assistance...97

96

UNARMS UNPREDEP Accession S-1822 of 1999/0116, Box 5, File 3; from an interview with U.S.
Ambassador Christopher Hill on 27 December 1997, question #9 as listed.
97

UNARMS UNPREDEP S-1822/Box 13/File #6 (Akashi/Sokalski Correspondence), accessed on 19 May
2011; File #10, Cable from Sokalski to K. Annan, and M. Goulding, #UNPREPED 056 and #UNPREDEP
060, dated 29 July 1996; #UNPREDEP 062 and 070, accessed on 10 November 2010; H. Sokalski 14 July
2010, interview with author in Warsaw, Poland.

144

The missive was clearly intended to discourage the fullest possible utilization of
good offices and “human dimension” efforts by Sokalski and other UNPREDEP
personnel.98
UNPREDEP, IGOs and NGOs: Valued Relationships
The low-profile diplomatic work of the International Conference in the Former
Yugoslavia (ICFY) was likely the most meaningful regarding minority and human rights
in Macedonia. UNPREDEP might well have had a somewhat more public profile, but the
ICFY, co-chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as the SRSG of the UN
Secretary-General and former British Foreign Secretary Lord David Owen, was
instrumental in facilitating Macedonia’s democratization and enhanced inclusiveness.
Geert Ahrens, a veteran German diplomat, chaired its Working Group, established to
promote and protect minority rights in all of the former Yugoslavia, from 1991 through
January of 1996.
Termination at that particular time was less than propitious for the future of
Macedonian human rights, democratic institutional development, and particularly for
interethnic relations.99 The absence of the ICFY rendered the “good offices” and
relationship-building portion of the mission more challenging, even with close
collaboration between UNPREDEP, the OSCE, various UN agencies and offices, and
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other NGO and IGO entities. While not addressed directly in UNPREDEP archives at the
UN, what much of this record points to is the complex and multifaceted character of this
preventive deployment mission: UNPREDEP and its members and staff, UNPREDEP
HQ in Skopje, the OSCE, a long list of UN and other agencies and offices, many political
and diplomatic figures, the international security community, and other NGOs and
IGOs.100
Sokalski held regular luncheons monthly with the representatives of domestic
NGOs and ethnic group representatives to establish the types of linkages with them that
ICFY formerly had. Some of these meetings were more fruitful than others. Among the
most successful were those involving UNPREDEP’s forces’ well-publicized participation
in blood drives, school support, and those leading to the “Living Together” event and the
three annual Blossom Runs.101
UNPREDEP troops in the field undertook engineering and maintenance efforts to
assist communities in ways that were need-dependent (repairing water supplies, wells and
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pipes, schools, community centers, and roads, even homes, as examples).102 In the field,
UNPREDEP troops also focused on objective and impartial discussions with local
leadership, regardless of ethnic identity or political affiliation, to ascertain needs, doing
what they could do themselves to provide help, given economic and other constraints,
and making referrals to domestic and local assistance agencies, and to NGOs such as the
Red Cross/Red Crescent and the like.103
Additionally, the troops and supporters headed school supply collections, visited
(and sometimes repaired) schools and community centers, and patronized local
businesses in efforts to build trust bridges spanning cross-cutting cleavages, especially
with minorities in Macedonia, but specifically not addressed toward any particular
ethnicity. With these activities, UNPREDEP leadership and troops undeniably had some
anticipation of gaining information and insights helpful to the mission, especially in
communities near OPs and OPTs, but their influence and presence were larger and more
constructive than merely “intelligence gathering”, important though that was.104
The direct contacts of UNPREDEP members primarily with ethnic Macedonian
and Albanian-Macedonian individuals and businesses, with organizations both
governmental and non-governmental, largely through its broadly-conceived “good
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offices” work proved to be of solid worth in the field. All military leaders interviewed
were certain these efforts paid off, particularly in information from and about
communities near borders and relationships with them, border crossings, smuggling,
small arms trafficking, and conditions in Kosovo and Albania.105 These efforts also made
for more positive relations in general for UNPREDEP within Macedonia.
On some occasions, concrete information was offered voluntarily regarding the
Serbian military or conditions in south Kosovo. “We were able to meet with Serbian and
Albanian military and some political leaders, for example, because there were those in
Macedonia and elsewhere willing to identify or introduce them, to sometimes act as
intermediaries, and to help us achieve our mandate terms on prevention of conflict spillover into Macedonia. You can learn about such people from other people there - when
you are “boots on the ground” in the field - but this takes constant investments of time
and energy, and the building of real and balanced relationships.”106
“UN headquarters in NY and other UN offices in Zagreb and Sarajevo were not
especially helpful when it came to identifying those who could be—might be—best to
interact with, and frankly, the UN sometimes seemed disapproving of our less than
formal efforts on these fronts, even with very good and positive outcomes for the mission
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B. Sohnemann (08-10 July 2009 and 5-7 July 2010) in Varde, Denmark with written documents
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and mandate.” These impressions were echoed by others closely involved in the
deployment, even civilians, as mission members worked hard to cultivate and enhance
supportive, important, and even quasi-traditional resources for the benefit of UNPREDEP
and the security of Macedonia within mandate constraints.107
Summary
When data analysis was performed regarding interviews and documents, several
specific themes were identified as consistently addressed by the military elites in toto,
and often stressed multiple times, albeit in slight different ways, in writing and in
interviews. These key points are based on those raised by the clear majority of those
interviewed for this research, and those topics that appeared consistently in the redacted
UNPREDEP file set at the United Nations Archives and Record Management Services
(UNARMS).108
The first major themes were largely focused on UN HQ and the Security Council,
in that they addressed the principles and preconditions of a successful preventive
deployment as articulated by BG Juha Engstrom. Given the vital preconditions, resulting
from learning in the field, BG Engstrom correctly recognized that “the Security Council
then had to pass a resolution specifically addressing a preventive deployment mission and
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an appropriately developed mandate (emphasis added).”109 He stressed the principles of
impartiality and neutrality in the field as fundamental to a peace-related mission of any
type, and certainly in a preventive deployment. Further, a table noting variations in
support and expectation levels for preventive deployments was developed by the author
from data collected from various parties.
Command and control in the field by Field Commanders, as a result of U.S.
involvement with specific restrictions, were particularly knotty issues. The presence of
U.S. troops as part of UNPREDEP, albeit without experience as UN peacekeepers, was
agreed to be quite beneficial overall, especially as a projection of U.S. power, but it
offered specific challenges to the Field Commanders operationally and structurally; some
of those were described in the “Command and Control” section. Georgie Anne Geyer
summed it up thusly, quoting U.S. Lieutenant Colonel John Baggott, then serving in
UNPREDEP, “…The problem is, you have no enemy here -- you’re not here to kill the
enemy, you’re peacekeepers. We spend a lot of time going over the rules of
engagement.” Geyer added, “…once these American troops leave here, they are put
through another “re-education” course -- to take them out of this new neutralist
peacekeeping mind-set and put them back into “kill-the-enemy” mode.”110
BG Bent Sohnemann spoke, too, of being approached by U.S. soldiers in an
incoming rotation: “One of them asked me, “Sir, where is the enemy, sir? Point us toward
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them, and we’ll take care of them.” I of course declined his good-faith offer, and then a
group of us [non-Americans] with the Americans, we had a very good talk about
peacekeeping, neutrality, impartiality, balance, and the absence of enemies per se.”111
U.S. military were, in reality, led from a distance by the U.S. EUCOMM
(European Command) and others, as communicated through U.S. Chiefs of Staff, rather
than directly by UN Field Commanders. Both the troops and the commanders, along with
U.S. support staff, faced ground-patrolling, border access, and other risk-control
constraints imposed both by American law and EUCOMM.
Budgetary shortfalls for UNPREDEP and for “good offices” efforts were
identified as additional major concerns. Certainly, this violates vital preconditions
outlined by BG Engstrom: adequate support from member states, and from the UN.
UNPREDEP was a low-cost mission, without question, but it suffered not only from
economic shortfalls, but also from communications issues from the field to UN HQ.
Responsiveness (especially in a timely manner) from UN HQ was a consistently cited
challenge. A variety of grave communications and feedback (responsiveness) concerns
were described above. Breakdowns did occur between the field and UN entities; levels of
actual knowledge of the field varied greatly at UN HQ. Field commanders went to UN
HQ in NY at various times for reporting and other responsibilities.
Undemarcated borders were unfailingly emphasized as challenging by military
and political leaders. The borders of Macedonia and Albania, Macedonia and Serbia, and
Macedonia and Kosovo were never fully agreed on during UNPREDEP’s four years, as
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previously discussed, although ineffectual agreements were reached from time to time
about an UNPREDEP Patrol Line.
That there were significant peacekeeping experience gaps between the various
contributing nations is inarguable: 98% of the Finns had it while essentially 0% of the
U.S. troops did. This placed a pronounced training and support burden on the Nordic
mission members; it also place a greater “learning” burden on American soldiers and
their leadership, to mention only two effects this gap had. In the field, adjustments had to
be made because of relative experience levels; these often impacted the Nordics more
than the Americans in taking up field responsibilities.
Communications between the field and UNPREDEP HQ in Skopje were generally
not problematic, nor were those with Macedonian government officials, although the
latter could be challenging.
UNPREDEP and the OSCE formed a particularly effective and positive
association; there were steady meetings between the members of each mission. The
OSCE’s monthly newsletters were very good at keeping both groups well-informed of
various important matters. There was inadequate information in the archive files to
accurately determine and analyze relations between UNPREDEP and other IOs and
NGOs more generally.
The mandates’ terms were seen on the whole as somewhat inhibitory to
preventive deployment (except for “good offices”), so that achieving success was more
taxing than it needed to be. The “Look from Afar, Don’t Touch, Do Report” restraints
were most often cited as obstructive to the mission of preventing regional violence from
spilling into Macedonia, especially that originating from the Serbs and FRY. Better
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identification of smugglers and what they were passing across borders would have been
very beneficial, particularly as tensions within Kosovo on Macedonia’s northern border
grew. Kosovo-Macedonia relations were also strained because of Macedonia’s concerns
about a potentially destabilizing influx of refugees from Kosovo should matters
deteriorate further there. Additionally, the loss of the ICTY was sharply felt; it terminated
shortly after UNPREDEP began.
Drawdowns of troops were also viewed as poorly aligned and ill-timed against the
“on-the-ground” field situation; the Brigadier Generals unanimously indicated this, even
to UN HQ in writing. Macedonia did not favor those cutbacks, either, especially as
security conditions deteriorated even more outside its borders, and to some extent, it
became more fragile inter-ethnically and economically within its borders.
In contrast, the “good offices” efforts related to UNPREDEP and its SRSG
received praise; the direct contacts of UNPREDEP and its broadly-conceived “outreach”
and human dimension (human security) work proved to be of value in the field. UN HQ
appeared less favorably inclined toward those, even though such endeavors were
authorized and specified in the mandates, and HQ wrote fairly frequently to SRSG
Sokalski about his work potentially being out of mandate terms. The fear in NY appeared
to be that the Macedonian government or others might view Sokalski’s “good offices”
projects as being for unintended and/or unapproved political purposes. Sokalski’s
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concerns were, however, for the “human dimension” of the mission, and he held firmly to
his convictions about that dimension.112
A long list of UN entities worked in Macedonia and the Balkans at various times
on development and other projects. Local NGOs were very small but active, as were a
considerable number of international ones. UNPREDEP also generally had very positive
relations with NGOs, within the constraints of impartiality and neutrality, and with other
UN field offices.
The multifaceted nature of UNPREDEP was crucial to its success. UNPREDEP
was able to capitalize on its own and others’ strengths. It was an intricate and
complicated inter-relationship, but it worked particularly well when executed in the field
by leaders who were professionals, highly motivated, bricoleurs at least to some extent,
and manifestly experienced militarily and politically, and by those under their direction
problem.
Some might question why one would even desire another preventive deployment,
as full of challenges as this one was. It is possible that the UN asked itself that question,
or UNPREDEP participants did, arriving at the conclusion of “no more”, rather than
attempting to make changes that would obviate the major difficulties that existed between
UN HQ and the field. Admittedly, engaging in such changes likely would have been
disruptive and somewhat difficult, especially for a highly bureaucratized, routinized
organization, one with existing and ongoing turbulence and turmoil within it. As noted,
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organizations can and do change, but sometimes in ways not intended by their makers or
constituents – and sometimes do not change at all. Awareness of certain factors does not
necessarily equate to learning from those factors or experiences. There is also the
possibility that the HQ focus, in particular, may have been on the negatives (the
challenges and difficulties of UNPREDEP), so they arrived at a learning outcome that
called for “something like but not preventive deployment” in the future.
Given these key aspects of UNPREDEP’s successes and challenges as presented
by military and other involved leaders, important questions still remain. The first is what
theoretical approach might best explain these findings: realism and its variants,
constructivism, or organizational learning theory? Perhaps none of these offers an
adequate explanation. Still, disconfirming certain theories as explanatory is valuable. The
second is, what would valid theoretical approaches mean to address and analyze further
the question posed herein: why has the international community and the security
community mounted no more preventive deployment missions since UNPREDEP’s
success in Macedonia?

CHAPTER VI
THE UNPREDEP STUDY AND IR THEORIES
Discrete Organizational Learning Conceptualized
For this dissertation, organizational learning is adapted by conceiving of the HQ
and field organizations as separate entities in separate environments, with different
constraints and capabilities. What is thought-provoking and important relative to learning
and organizational theory in this case is that what is requisite for change to occur in the
international organization headquarters (i.e., approval, permission or endorsement—or, at
a minimum, not specifically forbidding or vetoing—as a result of consensual knowledge)
may not be necessary in the field for local organizations actively engaged in operations.
This is often the case with peacekeeping missions. L.M. Howard, as noted earlier, claims
that successful field organization learning has four indicators: the abilities to “(1) gather
and analyze information; (2) coordinate among the different divisions of the
peacekeeping mission; (3) engage… with its… environment; and (4) exercise leadership
in such a way that the organization commands authority from all actors, even during
crises.”1
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Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (NY and London: Cambridge University Press,
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Additionally, Howard identifies four specific structural preconditions that affect
learning capacity and capability at both sites (in the field and at headquarters).2
Table 5. L.M. Howard’s Criteria Sets
Criteria for the Field
Organization
Field Organization Learning

Fulfilled by Field Org
of UNPREDEP?

1. Gather/analyze info

Yes

2. Coordinate different
peacekeeping divisions

Yes, excepting Command and Control
Constraints re US Troops

3. Engage with environment

Yes

4. Exercise authoritative
leadership

Yes

Structural Preconditions: Field
and HQ
5. Mechanisms to gather
information
6. Operation coordinating
International Organizations
7. Field Orgs largely controlling
day-to-day decision-making

Field or HQ or Both
Both
HQ perhaps more than Field (?)
Field, with constraints from HQ,
especially on “good offices” mandate
and state-building support
Field - Yes

8. Knowledgeable core leadership
on-site early

2

Howard, Peacekeeping,16-17.

From HQ – No, except for assessment
prior to UNPREDEP
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Effective learning at headquarters would lead to central organization changes, as
mentioned at the close of the prior chapter.3 When a central organization makes
significant changes in response to new knowledge and enhanced understanding of
problems and their causes, organizational learning has successfully occurred. Empirical
evidence of headquarters’ learning dysfunctions may include poor problem definition,
weak strategic implementation, marked difficulties in articulating and reaching goals, the
ignoring of (or lack of awareness of) contextual differences when programs transfer from
one mission to another, or the addition of new programs or bureaucracies without
questioning “the ultimate purpose of the collective endeavor,” and other incremental
maladaptations (“pathologies”, according to Barnett and Finnemore). Examples of these
pathologies are examined in Barnett and Finnemore’s case studies of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (specific to Burmese Muslim Rohingya refugees in
Bangladesh 1994 -95, and still an ongoing crisis in Burma), and of UNAMIR Rwanda.4
In any event, those organizations affiliated with HQ such as the field mission will
be affected. Through the differentiated, discrete terms of this research introduced herein,
one is able to compare learning and changes (or lack thereof) in the HQ of an
international organization to the learning and changes associated with the field mission.
Time Frames: Learning in and from UNPREDEP
This study expanded HQ and field organizational learning temporally to include
periods prior to, during and post-preventive mission. Post-mission debriefings and
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analyses, along with end of mission and end of tour reports, were incorporated where
available, since it is assumed learning at headquarters was practically impacted by the
outcomes of prior missions and by post-mission debriefings, along with learning during
the operations themselves. Therefore, information from UNPROFOR/M’s military
leaders were included, along with post-mission interviews with a variety of military
leaders and with the mission’s longest-serving political leader, Henryk Sokalski.5 Some
interview materials with high-profile Macedonians from 2006 are also cited for
explanatory purposes and context in this temporal expansion.
States also engage with a mission, including but not necessarily limited to troopcontributing states and the mission’s neighboring states. The host state learns by having
such a mission in its territory. Intergovernmental organizations and the security
community have opportunities to learn before, during and after a particular mission, too;
this learning may arise from interactions among those communities as well.
Table 6. Temporal Expansion of Research to Entities Involved in Preventive Deployment

Headquarters
Field Organization
States
Other IGOs and the
Security
Community

Learning Prior
to Mission





Learning During
Mission
?


?

Learning After
Mission
?




These constitute questions of substantial importance, and are particularly
significant regarding preventive deployment, since monitoring and early warning, in

5

UNPROFOR/M immediately preceded UNPREDEP, as noted earlier.
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addition to conflict prevention by early intervention, offer great promise as being highly
effective tools for peacekeeping and conflict management.6 There is also the notinconsiderable matter of favorable economics: Thayer’s 1999 analysis of UNPREDEP,
described previously, shows how cost-effective the preventive mission was, further
supporting future such deployments from an economic standpoint, which UNPREDEP’s
own financial summary supports.7
It should also be noted that a top-level officer in the DPKO at UN HQ in NY
stated he was unaware of any records in that office or its subsidiary offices (which then
included the new DPET) relating to UNPREDEP and/or “Lessons Learned” from it. He
thought they had “gone to Archives.” He said he further suspected that any persons
involved in that deployment would likely have gone on to other endeavors long ago,
although he offered no factual information on the latter, merely his “suspicions,” and did
not attempt to explore if any of those personnel remained.8 If this were indeed true, then
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Alice Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia (NY: Syracuse
University Press, 1999); Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict
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Conflict Resolution (NY: Routledge, 2000).
Bradley Thayer, “Macedonia,” in The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena, eds.
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where are the DPKO’s UNPREDEP records and those of the former Lessons Learned
department at the UN? These would be valuable to future research regarding preventive
deployment, in order to get an even fuller analytical set.
Thus, Which Theoretical Approaches Best Lead to Explanations
of the Non-Use of Preventive Missions post-UNPREDEP?
In a reexamination of the theory of realism and its variants (neorealism and
offensive realism), it was found it added some valuable understanding why there have
been no more UN-supported preventive deployments since the end of UNPREDEP in
February of 1999. Concerns for state preservation could feasibly contribute to
understanding why there have been no more such missions invited in by states, since
realism is a state-centric approach. This includes protection of state sovereignty and the
state national interests, which countries pursue rationally. Realism does contribute to one
area of explanation: any such missions deplete state resources, including the host state’s
(resources meaning power, considered as economic and military power), and thus would
not necessarily be favored by those most likely to contribute assets or resources. Realism
also hints that, given the ultimate veto power of the P-5 on the Security Council, there
would be no more preventive deployments until and if the Great Powers favored them.
Such support has evidently not occurred.
Why no more preventive deployments? Consider the lack of action from the UN
regarding Syria, Yemen, Georgia, Ukraine, and other crises since 1999, or the very
mixed-outcome Libyan operation that did occur (2011). This could be partly because
states do not have a formal communications structure for early warning or a formalized
learning structure but this is questionable; today’s media covers the world near-
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instantaneously, and most states have intelligence establishments. Under constructivism’s
approach, it seems the requisite set of “mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans,
organizational energies and financial commitments…accepted by a group of states” has
been insufficient to call forth change within institutional constraints. 9 It likely also
indicates that norms supporting preventive deployment, even if promoted by some, have
not been as deeply institutionalized so as to lead to further such deployments.
After reviewing the traditional IR theories—realism and constructivism, and
adapting organization theory and learning theory along with the history and structure of
UNPREDEP, it became evident that, in order to determine why preventive deployment
has not been utilized since 1999 by the UN or others, a modification of organizational
learning theory and the constructivist approach of Barnett and Finnemore is most fruitful
and appropriate. It is suggested that by combining aspects of both constructivism and
organizational learning theories, we may reach the best possible effect.10 The four field
learning criteria and four structural preconditions stated by L.M. Howard (see Table 6-1)
were also helpful in framing at least preliminary answers to the non-recurrence
question.11
Expanding the temporal framework to include pre- or post-mission learning was
not particularly significant in attempting to find answers, excepting inclusion of military
leadership in UNPROFOR/M, UNPREDEP’s precursor, and about the much later
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establishment of a UN department (DPET), along with a later approach to peacekeeping,
initially developed in Canada in the early 2000s, called the “Responsibility to Protect” or
R2P.12 It was also helpful for states’ post-mission perceptions (interviews in Macedonia,
2006). What was more productive for the purposes of this analysis of why there has not
been another preventive deployment was separating the “organization” into discrete
entities: UN HQ and the UNPREDEP field organization. Because of this, the research
and analysis focused on theoretical elements of constructivism, and organizational and
learning fundamentals.
Organization and Knowledge Theories
Organization and knowledge theories will be addressed first for their explanatory
power in answering the question regarding why there have been no further preventive
deployments beyond UNPREDEP. In considering the HQ organization, it is well-known
the UN is a massive bureaucracy, employing some 44,000 individuals world-wide.13 It is
assumed that Barnett and Finnemore’s statements about bureaucracies are accurate; they
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are also supported by E. Haas’s models.14 To briefly restate those findings regarding
bureaucracy, they found that it is “a distinct social form with its own internal logic that
generates certain behavioral tendencies…and proclivities” which “generates different
expectations”. They can be highly routinized, too. In other words, bureaucracy-based
organizations can act as good servants, a commonly acceptable norm, “but can also
produce undesirable and self-defeating outcomes.” They are, to put it bluntly, a “doubleedged sword.”15
Organizations routinely behave in ways unanticipated by their creators and not
formally sanctioned by their members. [Those] that start with one mission
routinely acquire others. Organizations adapt to changing circumstances in
unanticipated ways and adopt new routines and functions without getting approval
from their “stakeholders”. [They] are notoriously resistant to reform or
redirection because change threatens entrenched organizational culture and
interests. (Emphasis added)16
…Bureaucracies, by their nature, try to rationalize the world by defining it into
neat categories and mapping each task or category of problem onto a specified
solution set or set of standard rules for action. ...However, this rationalizing effort
is always fraught with tension because the world’s complexity and connections
defy the bureaucratic boxes. …much of organization change comes reactively
from the incremental alteration of the organizational rules in response to
shortcomings and new environmental circumstances.17
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Characteristics of organizations are they show “sensemaking” and creativity in
their efforts to alleviate, avoid or adapt to potential and actual contradictions and
tensions, both internal and external.18 Sensemaking means they figure out (construct),
accurately or inaccurately, the meanings of experiences, ideas, events, actions and
inactions, and respond accordingly. 19 They can do this because, at HQ especially, they
have bureaucratic power, legitimacy on the world stage, and they are constructed as
technocrats, morally upright, impartial and neutral by others. They also, importantly,
have time at HQ, a commodity which may be in short supply in the field.
In the field, actors are also officially impartial and neutral, according to the UN
principles set out earlier, but can be and often must be quite creative to resolve
exceptions, contradictions, and/or tensions, particularly when consent of all parties is
clear and evident (and sometimes, even if not), and if the mandate and funding are
supportive of these efforts (also sometimes, even if they are not fully supportive). The
field organization too engages actively in sensemaking, creativity and bricolage, and use
complex processes to shape decisions.20 The field also has legitimacy, conferred to it by
the HQ organization (the UN Security Council), by those states engaged in the field
mission, and by other IGOs, NGOs and similar communities with which they interact.
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Constructivism and Social Constructivism
Barnett and Finnemore applied social constructivism in their examination and
explanation of international organizations’ behavioral dysfunctions and bureaucratic
pathologies.21 As noted above, they argue that IGOs’ dysfunctions can be traced to either
material forces in the internal or external environment, or cultural forces in the internal
or external environment.22 Such a group of factors and their potential effects were
considered in this research, particularly at UN headquarters, in the field, and among the
IGO and security communities. This suggests that those aspects of organizational
learning theory which fall closest to social constructivism may be of particular value in
explaining why preventive deployment appears to have been sidelined as a UN peace
mission option.23
The Explanatory Importance of Norms
Normative elements may be significant as beliefs and values are internalized by
an organization, which then gains stability from them. Norms are tied, therefore, to both
actors and organizations.24 Shared cognitive meanings about identity and activities,
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Barnett and Finnemore, Rules, 2004; Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations
and Rwanda (NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
22

Barnett and Finnemore, Rules, 36-41.
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Vivien Burr, Social Constructionism 2nd ed. (PA: Psychology Press 2003); Barnett and Finnemore, Rules,
2004; Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? (MA: Harvard University Press 1999); John Searle,
The Construction of Social Reality (NY: Freedom Press 1995).
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,”
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998), 943-969; Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, “Norms, Identity,
and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security:
Norms and Identity in World Politics (NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), 451-497 at 452; Annika
Björkdahl, “Conflict Prevention from a Nordic Perspective: Putting Prevention into Practice,” International
Peacekeeping 6, no. 3 (1999): 54-72; and A. Björkdahl, “Promoting Norms through Peacekeeping:
UNPREDEP and Conflict Prevention,” International Peacekeeping 13, no. 2 (2006): 214-228.
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combined with regulative elements, lead to behavior that conforms to the organization’s
rational interests. Internalized norms lead to an institutional logic, comprised of sanctions
and constraints, shared cognitive meanings, and other normative elements that then are
realized as expressed behaviors.25
Promoting a norm is not the same as institutionalizing it—or even assuring that
the most appropriate and effective learning has been undertaken during its development
and transmission. It is possible that the norm or principle promoted (and possibly
institutionalized) was not, “Let’s proactively endeavor to engage in preventive
deployment again,” but rather “Let’s not do this again,” particularly in the IGO
community and in security organizations. It may also have guided the UN toward a norm
supportive of some other form of conflict intervention.
If a common inter-organizational learning framework results, it can be scrutinized.
Identification of such a shared structure would be an important contribution to how interorganizational affairs and connections are understood, especially in international
relations.26 Constructivism blurs what divisions there may be between the field,
headquarters and even other organizations if all entities are effectively and clearly
communicating with one another. Again, note the “if” in the preceding sentence; it is a
crucial condition for such blurred lines between entities.
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Table 7. Theories, Approaches and Substantiation
Theoretical
Approach

UN HQ
Organization

UNPREDEP

Substantiation

Field
Organization

Constructivism

Internalized Norms

Mainly but
inconsistent
on some
issues

Yes

Literature on UN;
interviews at UN; SRSG
interviews

Norms
Transmission

Inconsistent
or Absent

Within Field=
yes; Field to
others = yes

UNARMS files; BG
interviews; clear
interactions with
environment, other
organizations, domestic
actors

Socialization
Processes

Internally:
Yes

Yes, among
Units

BG Interviews; UNARMS
files; Military leaders’
personal files

Communications

Flawed to
Field; no
evidence of
internal
comms

Relatively
Consistent
with HQ and
OSCE, NATO

BG Interviews; UNARMS
files; Military leaders’
personal files

Evidence of
Awareness of
Ideas, Culture,
Language

Not entirely
between HQ
and Field
Orgs or
Domestic
actors; better
with other
IOs

Yes, with
some “gaps”
(limited by
impartiality/
neutrality)
with domestic
actors, other
IOs

UNARMS Files; Interviews
with BGs and SRSG, others
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Theoretical
Approach

UN HQ
Organization

Inter-Org Learning
Framework

Not evident at
HQ

Attempted in
and by Field
Organization

UNARMS Files; Interviews
with BGs and others

Yes

Size limited
by Mandate or
requests
rejected by
HQ

DPET; UNARMS files;
interview at UN

Growth/Expansion

UNPREDEP

Substantiation

Field
Organization

Org and Org
Learning Theory
SRSG Interview and use of
good offices; UN literature;
UNARMS files; BG
Interviews and with others

Evidence of
Change with
“Definition of
Problem” changes

Questionable

Yes

Environmental
Awareness

Irregularly re
UNPREDEP

Yes

SRSG Interview; BG
Interviews and with others;
use of good offices

Signs of
Turbulence (per
Haas)

Yes

Yes

UNARMS files; BG
Interviews and with SRSG

Turbulent Nongrowth (per Haas)

Yes

Yes

HQ inability to adapt due to
routinization and prior
successes

Flexibility and
Creativity

Rare

Yes

Many examples from Field
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Theoretical
Approach

UN HQ
Organization

UNPREDEP

Substantiation

Field
Organization
HQ: DPET;
Field: daily learning from
various sources, resources
(BG interviews; UNARMS
files; SRSG interviews);
UNPREDEP literature

Expected Learning

Rarely

Yes

Expected Change
from Learning

Rarely

Yes

See above; post-mission
formation of DPET at UN
HQ

Yes

Yes, during
course of
mission

UNARMS files; OSCE
reports; BG and SRSG
interviews

Yes

Command/Control re U.S.
troops; inter-ethnic conflict
in Macedonia; Field funding
rejections; budgetary
constraints and limitations
on UNPREDEP; Constant
troop rotations/re-training

Within
military
structure, yes

HQ’s resistance to expanded
definition/use of “good
offices”; in field within
military structural
constraints

Change: External
Perception of
Legitimacy,
Authority, Control

Change in cultural,
structural or
material
constraints

Indications of
Path-Dependent
Change

Not
significantly

Yes

Indications are then that fundamental aspects of organization and learning theory,
along with social constructivism (including L.M. Howard’s “Criteria Sets” against which
to test evidence, Table 6-1), hold somewhat more explanatory power than other
theoretical options to help understand why there have been no further preventive
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deployments since UNPREDEP. That the new conceptual framing of discrete
organizations (Field and HQ) was valuable for this research and its findings and
conclusions is clear, and expanding the temporal facet of the research was also helpful in
specified ways.
First, it is apparent that the UN and member states, along with international
organizations, the international and security communities, and non-governmental
organizations no longer include preventive deployment, no matter its success and
economic viability, in the preventive diplomacy options to which they turn when conflict
threatens. The question then becomes why? What may have changed or been learned?
Explanations include that, in retrospect, it was a highly complex mission and there
is some specific doubt that those complexities could be addressed in another preventive
deployment as efficiently and effectively as UNPREDEP did – especially by such a small
mission. Another possible reason is that there was growing awareness that without
intense attention to the “human aspect” (and state- and institution-building), often
addressed, to the UN’s chagrin, through the good offices endeavors of the UNPREDEP
SRSG, such a mission is likely to be less effective, especially longer-term.
This was the case in UNPREDEP: just under two years later, 22 January 2001,
Macedonia was embroiled in an internal violent inter-ethnic conflict. Simultaneously, it
was faced with Kosovo’s crisis, which quickly sent in excess of 360,000 Kosovar mostly
ethnic Albanian) refugees into Macedonia (equivalent to an increase of about 18% of
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Macedonia’s population).27 This could arguably indicate even more clearly that
UNPREDEP was quite a success: this did not occur while the Blue Helmets were on
Macedonian soil.
Some of the factors that concerned the UN regarding “state- and institutionbuilding” and the “human dimension” were related to state sovereignty. 28 Others were
viewed equally as political risks or as signaling a UN unwillingness to be involved in the
Balkans any longer than was necessary. This would be especially true given the highprofile failures of the United Nations Protective Forces (UNPROFOR and related
missions) in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict; memories of it remain fresh even now
among peacekeeping states, member states, at the UN and the Hague – and, of course, in
Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Those in the Balkans almost compulsively remember
history, even though they may promulgate differing versions of that history. 29

Sophia Clément, “Conflict Prevention in the Balkans: Case Studies of Kosovo and the Fyr of
Macedonia,” Chaillot Paper 30, European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 1997; Florian
Bieber and Zhidas Daskalovski, eds., Understanding the War in Kosovo (London England: Frank Cass
2003); Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Conflict (NY:
PublicAffairs (Division of Perseus Books) 2001); Zhidas Daskaloski, Walking on the Edge: Consolidating
Multiethnic Macedonia 1989-2004 (NC: Globic Press 2006); Global Security Organization, “Military:
Conflict in Macedonia”, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/macedonia.htm,; Denko
Maleski, “The Causes of a War: Ethnic Conflict in Macedonia in 2001,” New Balkan Politics 7/8
(unnumbered), at http://newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/, 2003.
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The concept of “conditional sovereignty” should be explored further. When a state fails to or cannot
provide for and protect its citizens, there are grave questions about its sovereignty. “States that are unable
or unwilling to protect their own citizens may no longer hide behind a wall of sovereignty.” From Council
on Foreign Relations, “The UN Panel Report and Conditional Sovereignty”, at http://www.cfr.org/world/
un-panel-report-conditional-sovereignty/p7954, reprint from American Society of International Law
Newsletter (January-February 2005).
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Interview: Lieutenant General Gunnar Lange (retd.) of NATO/KFOR, July 10, 2009, at his home,
Blåvand, Denmark.
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The field engaged in norms promotion and transmission via its “good offices”
efforts, interactions with other international, security, and non-governmental
organizations, and with the various involved states. The UN, on the other hand, was
apparently inconsistent in doing the same; had they been, that might have led to further
preventive deployments and further testing of the norm of prevention via Blue Berets.
It was assumed for this analysis that the UN is a bureaucracy-based organization,
and therefore highly routinized and largely resistant to change; those types of
organizations can be “good servants,” “but can also produce undesirable and selfdefeating outcomes”, the double-edged sword of risk.30 Given the lack of preventive
deployments since UNPREDEP, this appears to be one of the less desirable outcomes.
There was indeed some sense-making and creativity in addressing inherent or potential
tensions internally and externally, because HQ has bureaucratic power and legitimacy.
The field could do the same because of a transference of legitimacy via their mandate,
and in preventive deployments, because they have been invited into the state by the host
nation.
Impartiality and neutrality principles in both the UN HQ and the field may have
limited transmissions of some shared concepts regarding ideas, culture and language.
Like the UN HQ, the field had to rely on language translators; the official language of the
field was English, no matter that the troops were from Norway, Sweden, Finland and
Denmark and the U.S., and that the field commanders (the Brigadier Generals) were from
non-English speaking states. The SRSG was from Poland, and again, a non-native
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Barnett and Finnemore, Rules, viii-ix, 3.
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English speaker. The command of English by the Brigadier Generals was superb, as was
the SRSG’s, but informants said that some troops’ English was not consistently at the
same level, which affected not only domestic communications, but also cultural
understandings. See the earlier comment regarding Balkan communication styles from
Julian Harston as an example. Furthermore, only the civilian personnel associated with
UNPREDEP were native Macedonian, Albanian or Serbian speakers; translators carried
the burden of linguistic and language differences, sometimes along with cultural and
interpretive responsibilities.
The field evidenced remarkable adaptability and creativity, but only very
temporary growth or expansion (limited by mandate terms and by balancing of troop
numbers among the involved states; indeed, they suffered fairly extensive drawdowns).
The field showed strong evidence of learning and change associated with the definition of
problems encountered. This was less distinct at UN HQ; indeed, there appeared to be
significant resistance to defining or re-defining problems to be addressed, and to
responsive changes. An increase in growth/expansion at the UN HQ did occur, as the
number of worldwide peace operations requiring administrative and other HQ services
increased markedly during this period (the 1990s). Further, the field evidenced continual
awareness of the environment in Macedonia and surrounding states, physically,
militarily, politically, environmentally, socially and economically. UN HQ, by contrast,
seemed mostly content to ignore, discount or take less than seriously the “neighborhood”
(except for its failed UNPROFOR mission), and the various environments, behaviors, and
changes therein.
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Signs of E.B. Haas’ turbulent and non-turbulent growth were different at HQ than
in the field. Certainly, the UN HQ had those who did not adapt well due to routinization
and to prior successes and failures. Yet, the UN’s Security Council was evidently willing
to take on “something different” in responding to the Macedonian crisis and its
President’s request for assistance: the inception of the first and only preventive
deployment, in which the field made changes and engaged in bricolage to more
effectively respond to crises, too.
Some in the Macedonian government and private citizens showed concerns
regarding the legitimacy, authority and control of UNPREDEP, and a marked degree of
preference for a NATO-led mission instead. But generally these external perceptions,
while changing, were not outright rejections of legitimacy, authority or control. The other
states in the Balkan neighborhood, such as Serbia, Kosovo and Albania, by contrast,
challenged control, authority and legitimacy of UN missions and their members
regularly.
Perhaps had NATO been the mission organizer and sponsor, this would not have
occurred or occurred to a lesser extent. A preference for NATO organization was openly
stated by UNPREDEP’s host nation Macedonia as time went on. NATO was already
heavily enmeshed in subduing FRY conflicts—and about to be drawn in to Kosovo
operations. In other words, a different sponsoring and organizing international institution
might have had a different strategy set or outcome, and this must be carefully considered.
However, since there were no NATO undertakings in preventive deployment nor another
UN-authorized preventive deployment, little to no comparison can be made between how
either might undertake such a future deployment.
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NATO, however, was engaged in a high-profile Balkan peacekeeping mission,
SFOR (Stabilization Force) in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Bosnian war. The mandate
was that
The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) will deter hostilities and stabilise the peace,
contribute to a secure environment by providing a continued military presence in
the Area Of Responsibility (AOR), target and coordinate SFOR support to key
areas including primary civil implementation organisations, and progress towards
a lasting consolidation of peace, without further need for NATO-led forces in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.31
NATO subsequently became immersed in another notable post-UNPREDEP
mission, KFOR (Kosovo Forces) beginning in June 1999, headquartered in Skopje,
Macedonia, as a peacekeeping force (some NATO personnel still remain in Skopje and
Kosovo.) But two peace-related actions do not even begin to approach the UN experience
set, although both of NATO’s were considered broadly satisfactory. 32
The UNPREDEP field organization faced constant changes in structural and
material constraints via UN budgets, frequent field troop rotations, troop drawdowns, and
ongoing UN HQ demands to have an “end of mission plan” in place, to name only a few.
By comparison, there was not a measurable change in structural or material constraints at
UN HQ. As far as changes in cultural aspects or constraints of the mission, the field faced
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B.C., Canada: Douglas & MacIntyre, 1993); Wesley Clark’s Waging Modern War, 2001; Steven L. Burg
and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (NY:
M.E. Sharpe, 2000). Warren Zimmerman was the last U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, and authored
Origins of a Catastrophe, 2d ed. revised (NY: Random House, 1999) and “The Last Ambassador: A
Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia” in Foreign Affairs (March 1, 1995), at https://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/europe/1995-03-01/last-ambassador-memoir-collapse-yugoslavia. He passed away in 2004.
32

Interview: Lieutenant General Gunnar Lange (retd.) of NATO/KFOR, July 10, 2009, at his home,
Blåvand, Denmark.

176

repetitive UN HQ criticism of the mandates’ “good offices” use by the SRSG and the
troops in particular, and were constrained by impartiality and neutrality standards of the
mission. HQ did not seem responsive to cultural matters in and near Macedonia, and used
impartiality/neutrality constraints as a justification for actions that had a negative impact
in the field in some cases.33
Findings: Why No Reproduction of Preventive Deployment?
One of the important outcomes of this research is that the UN showed few signs
of responsive change to the challenges faced in the field. Had it done so, it would be a
sign (change) that learning was or had occurred, according to E.B. Haas.
The second most suggestive finding for non-reproduction is that of
communications: the feedback loops, language, communications channels, and other
processes between UN HQ and the field were conspicuously flawed, ambiguous, and
likely inhibited HQ learning and change to a significant extent. Yet, again, HQ did not act
to improve this situation in order to more effectively have a full opportunity to learn and
change. This was especially evident when the author visited the UN and no one seemed
to know how to find various records or individuals with whom to speak about
UNPREDEP. Admittedly, the UN was turbulent; it had made some fairly major internal
changes, with births of and reorganizations of departments between UNPREDEP’s
termination in February of 1999 and 2010-2011 when the author was there.
The UN HQ also apparently, and crucially, does not pay timely heed to
communications of early warning signs of conflict, especially intra-state conflicts.

33
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Instead, it remains far more dedicated to peacekeeping operations that follow the
traditional model, those which have been “far too little, too late”, very costly in many
ways, especially those which occur post-bloodshed.34 The UN seems to be tone-deaf to
early warnings to assess those situations, their volatility, and UN opportunities or needs
for intervention, particularly successful interventions for humanitarian reasons.
Third, this operation was generally assessed as under-funded. Given actual
experience in a preventive deployment, it is clear a future such mission would require
more financial support and a more generous budget. 35 Arguments regarding its costeffectiveness may not hold in the future, making the UN and member states wary of
undertaking another preventive deployment.
The fourth finding is that states and other organizations have made little or no
effort to recommend preventive deployment as part of preventive diplomacy. Further,
except in the case of South Sudan and the Libya engagement under R2P terms, states and
organizations have not openly rejected preventive deployments, but neither have they
made it a principal part of their conflict resolution arsenal.
Fifth, the United States has not publicly pushed for troop involvement in any other
UN mission, regardless of type, nor indicated its willingness to do so. As noted, the U.S.
involvement was vital to perceptions of UNPREDEP’s legitimacy and associated power.
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It also sent a clear message to those opposed to it that the U.S. was paying attention to the
Balkans, and that facing off with the U.S. on that field could well be inadvisable.
Possibly, were another P-5 state (a Great Power) to become involved in the way the U.S.
did in UNPREDEP, and push for its use with the Security Council, this could encourage
preventive deployment’s use in another mission.
As a sixth point, no mandate model or framework was developed for an improved
or expanded mandate for such missions that would allow fuller use of “good offices” and
other efforts on the part of the SRSG and others. Given mandates’ semiannual
reapproval, this could be accomplished. Without this, it is likely a very limited number of
states would hurry to be involved in such an operation again.
Even though the both the General Assembly and the Security Council of the UN
accepted the concept of “conditional sovereignty” in 2005 and 2006 as part of
Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P), it has not had appreciable real-world effect on
its actions, plans, missions or other interventions. Absolute sovereignty tenets appear to
rule, largely because of language in the UN Charter, even though there are multiple ways
to address this seeming roadblock. It has not been fully developed or implemented by the
UN or its states (consider today’s Syrian, Lebanese, South Sudanese, and Yemeni
situations, to name a few.) They did not call on R2P to motivate and legitimate
intervention in Syria’s crisis, for example, nor in Yemen’s. But R2P has apparently
incorporated some aspects of preventive deployment within its tenets.36
36
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See Appendix C for a comparison of Preventive Deployment’s terms and those of
R2P. The UN shows no signs of using preventive deployment in the interim until R2P’s
fuller development and implementation. Admittedly, R2P holds the potential to represent
a significant change in the UN’s attitudes toward peacekeeping and sovereignty, but this
potential has not yet been fully or accurately realized. R2P is not, it must be stressed,
preventive in its focus: something violent, such as genocide or verifiable threat of
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity must already be
occurring: blood has been spilled. Even though Gareth Evans argued in 2001 and later
that there were 3 “pillars” of R2P through which every mission would pass (first being
prevention, the second a reaction of military intervention, and the third, rebuilding the
conflict area), no mission, not even the one in Libya in 2011, came close to successfully
meeting all three R2P pillars (preventive, reactive, or restoration and rebuilding)37.
All of these being offered as potential explanations to consider regarding why
there have been no further preventive deployment missions: is it possible that alternatives
exist for actualizing all of the terms of preventive diplomacy, including preventive
deployment?
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
United Nations Headquarters and the Field
What is thought-provoking and significant relative to learning and organizational
theories in this case is that what is requisite for change to occur in the international
organization headquarters (i.e., approval, permission or endorsement—or, at a minimum,
not specifically forbidding or vetoing—as a result of consensual knowledge) may not be
necessary in the field for local organizations actively engaged in operations. This is often
the case with peacekeeping missions.
Learning at the UN HQ must be examined if we are to comprehend why another
such preventive deployment mission has not been undertaken. Hannan and Freeman’s
concepts regarding structural inertia in organizations and their bureaucracies are useful in
examining learning and the propensity for change in an IGO: organizations have routines
which produce both internal constraints and external constraints on organizational
change.1 These generally result in performance reliability on the one hand, as routines are
repeated and reproduced; on the other, inertia and resistance to change are generated. 2
Organizations and processes are likely to go on as they have gone in the

Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman, “Structural Inertia and Organizational Change,” American
Sociological Review 49 (1984), 149-164.
1

Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International
Organizations”, International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999), Rules for the World: International
Organizations in Global Politics (NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
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past, because routine leads to an internal structure and to a culture strongly resistant to
change. Furthermore, changes in routines linked to the external environment can
negatively affect links between the organization and that environment, and can lead to
erosion of an organization’s legitimacy or general perceptions of its successes, a risk
organizations guard against. 3
Interestingly, Rafael Biermann observes that it appears more lessons have been
learned at HQ from failures than from successes (emphasis added). Could this be true
regarding preventive deployment practices/success and potential for future successful
application?4 If so, the questions asked herein become all the more urgent: learning from
success realistically offers the opportunity to reduce the odds of future failures, especially
critical when the lives of peacekeepers and others may be at stake in any type of mission,
whether preventive deployment or more traditional yet multidimensional peacekeeping
ones.
There has been no critical attempt post-UNPREDEP to develop a “preventive
deployment model” or to perfect a preventive deployment mandate applicable to potential
missions of this type. Furthermore, research indicates that there have been no proactive
recommendations for preventive deployment in the past decade at the UN—this may
provide further evidence of flawed learning at headquarters. It is almost as if the UN is
moving quickly to another approach (perhaps R2P, although this too is questionable)
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without having first examined and learned more fully from UNPREDEP– “throwing the
infant out with the bathwater,” as one anonymous interviewee said.
In any event, those organizations affiliated with the central one will also be
impacted. Through the differentiated terms of this research, one is able to compare and
assess learning and changes (or lack thereof) in the central international organization to
the learning and changes in and from field organizations.
Discrete Field Organization and Learning
What further differentiates the research herein from previous analyses is that the
field operation of UNPREDEP is framed as a learning and decision-making organization
in and of itself. This field operation was clearly not engaged in the same system of
organizational learning as headquarters’ because peace operations face a multitude of
practical realities in their deployment and mandate that are very much apart from the HQ.
The field is the organization responsible for implementing the mandate within acceptable
parameters of peacekeeping. Implementation includes using past learning, new learning
and/or adaptation on-site that results in the standards, rules and daily operations of the
force in the field, parameters oftentimes constrained by structure, past learning,
economics, communications and other relevant internal constraints and experiences.
The field operation engages in various processes: it defines problems (including
changes in the perceived problem), gathers information and knowledge, and develops
solutions. Choices are made in the field, from the field, for the field.5 If one can more

5

Choo Chun Wei, The Knowing Organization: How Organizations Use Information to Construct Meaning,
Create Knowledge, and Make Decisions, 2d ed. (NY: Oxford University Press, 2006).
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fully understand the outcomes as field organizations learn and/or adapt in the field, and
the learning process they incorporate to arrive at decisions as an organization, the more
likely it becomes that future peacekeeping or preventive diplomacy operations will gain
the insights, implementation skills and resources necessary from such analyses to make
more durable progress toward success.
The mission in the field must adapt within a framework that has external
constraints, of course. These include headquarters’ politics and policies; the terms of the
mandate; previous peacekeeping mission design, implementation and experience; the
limits and status of international political will; availability of suitable troops, and of states
willing to contribute such troops and support personnel and equipment, along with
appropriate funding. In contrast to earlier work emphasizing such external factors, this
dissertation has looked at the complex field organization itself in the field, its internal
focus, along with relations with headquarters, local mission offices (political and
civilian), other intergovernmental bodies, and with NGOs, taking an approach that has
received little attention.
These two points constitute voids, particularly significant omissions regarding
preventive deployment, since monitoring and early warning, in addition to conflict
prevention by early intervention, offer great promise as being highly effective tools for
peacekeeping and conflict management.6 There is also the not-inconsiderable matter of
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favorable economics: Thayer’s prescient 1999 analysis of UNPREDEP shows how costeffective the preventive mission was, a further argument supporting future such
deployments from an economic standpoint.7
State Level Learning
States engage with the mission politically and militarily, including troopcontributing states and neighboring states. The host state learns by having such a mission
in its territory.8 Further, mission reports and interactions between states offer additional
opportunities for learning. Moreover, as members of intergovernmental bodies, many
states then bring that learning to a wider setting. States take into account their own
interests, dominant norms, values, and principles, culture and other factors when
examining outcomes for lessons learned—and the lessons themselves are shaped by these
influences, and ought to be accounted for and examined.
Temporal Expansion: Preventive Deployment Learning Processes
The present study expands the concept of learning temporally to include
immediate past and subsequent peacekeepers’ operations and leadership. Learning from
such experiences may be influential in any organization’s succeeding learning results

Stopping Wars before They Start, 2nd ed. (NY: Routledge, 2000); Oliver Ramsbotham, Peacekeeping and
Conflict Resolution (NY: Routledge, 2000).
Bradley Thayer, “Macedonia,” in The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena, eds.
Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance (MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 131-146. A related
analysis of mediation efforts/costs in Slovakia shows similar cost effectiveness compared to the use of a
higher level military/preventive force, but was not specifically a preventive deployment (Renée de Nevers,
"Conflict Prevention in Slovakia," in The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena, eds.
Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 147-172).
7

The host nation’s openly-stated preference by some for a NATO operation versus the UN one is a
potential example of learning and resultant change.
8
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during a mission such as UNPREDEP. It further broadens HQ and field organizational
learning temporally to include periods prior to, during and after preventive efforts. Postmission debriefings and analyses, along with available end of mission and end of tour
reports, are incorporated, since it is assumed learning at headquarters will have been
practically impacted by the outcomes of prior missions and by post-mission debriefings,
along with learning during the operations themselves.
States also engage with any mission, including troop-contributing states and the
mission’s neighboring states. The host state learns by having such a mission within its
borders. Post-mission reports and interactions between states, especially regarding
Macedonia’s “tough neighborhood,” and the fact that the country “is on a very key
location, truly a crossroads,” offer further opportunities for learning. 9 Intergovernmental
organizations and the security community have opportunities to learn before, during and
after a particular mission, too; this learning may arise from interactions among
themselves as well.
Summary
Several schools of thought in international relations, including realism, but most
particularly a blended approach of constructivism and organization and organization
learning theories, generate insights on the failure of the world community to repeat an
acknowledged success, preventive deployment. A potentially disastrous conflict was
avoided, lives saved, and peace in Macedonia prevailed by preventing surrounding

9

UNARMS UNPREDEP Accession S-1822 of 1999/0116, Box 5, File 3; from an interview with U.S.
Ambassador Christopher Hill on 27 December 1997, question #9 as listed.
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violence from flooding into it. By marshalling a theoretical array and presenting this case
study in more depth, we have seen how the various organizations involved—the United
Nations headquarters; the field operations organizations in Macedonia; Macedonia itself;
other states; non-governmental organizations, and intergovernmental organizations
learned – not – as organizations, and perhaps why there have been no further preventive
deployments.
Once we found if, how, and what they learned, we were able to draw conclusions
from those findings in order to posit why preventive deployment has not been replicated,
despite world circumstances which could have and perhaps should have called for more
pre-conflict, preventive diplomacy operations like it.
This Case Study’s Contributions to the Field
Alterations to organizational theory structure, developed and adopted by the
researcher, improved the ability to arrive at and assess the analytical outcomes: discrete
organizations (UN HQ and the field). Expanding the temporal framework to before,
during and after the preventive deployment was similarly productive. This researcher’s
modifications to a social constructivism framework, informed by Barnett and
Finnemore’s works, proved invaluable in exploring, understanding, and explaining
potential reasons for the absence of preventive deployment missions post-UNPREDEP.
Conceptualizing the field and HQ as separate organizations contributed to
assessment and exploration capacities, as did expanding the temporal framework of the
research.
First, accepting that the case study findings arising from the applications of
organizational learning theory and of social constructivism are most productive, the case
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study process constituted a meaningful exploratory approach. It was well able to
incorporate new primary materials, such as interviews and the UN Archives on this
mission, in order to enhance examinations and explanations. Second, the proposed
expected findings were mostly supported, that discrete yet interlinked organizations in the
field and at headquarters experienced learning in quite different ways, leading to
dysfunctions, pathologies, or “disconnects” between some (or all) learning sites
(powerful states discarded it as a viable option). The third (that the security community
and others promoted a norm of “no more such operations”) and fourth (that epistemic
communities had some influence in discarding it) were not as strongly sustained but
appeared plausible and could not be discounted.10
Even with these findings and conclusions being offered in explanation of why no
further preventive deployment missions, an important follow-on question still remains for
future research, equally as critical: if not preventive deployment, then what?
Implications: Further Research and Analysis
A salient question is whether or not the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine,
developed in 2001, has truly and completely adopted, and fully incorporated into UN
culture, norms, and processes.11 The impetuses behind it were the 1994 massacre in
Rwanda, genocide in Bosnia during 1992–1995, and large-scale human atrocities in
Kosovo in 1998–1999. The General Assembly and the Security Council of the UN
accepted the concept of “conditional sovereignty” in 2005 and 2006 as part of R2P, and

10
11

See pages 2 through 4 of this document.

Gareth Evans. The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All. Washington
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008.
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more generally, the R2P program itself. But “conditional sovereignty” has not had an
appreciable real-world effect on the UN’s actions, plans, missions or other interventions.
Absolute sovereignty tenets appear to rule instead, largely because of language in the UN
Charter, even though there are multiple legitimate ways to circumvent this ostensible
roadblock.
Research indicates R2P has not been completely assimilated or implemented to
date (although an R2P-type offer was made to Darfur, which was rejected, and a UNNATO mission in Libya under Security Council Resolution 1973 of March 17, 201112
was asserted to be R2P because Muammer Gaddafi was publicly advocating genocide,
using the term “cockroaches”, far too evocative of the 1995 Rwandan genocide.) The
Libyan mission has been highly criticized for exceeding R2P’s tenets and engaging in a
“change of regime” effort against Muammer Gaddafi; this R2P attempt resulted in far
more deaths than Gaddafi or his weaker military caused, some critics argue.
In a 2012 report on R2P in Libya, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon indicated
that lesser or non-coercive efforts were not fully explored or attempted prior to military
action. In other words, preventive efforts and diplomacy had not been fully exhausted. 13
There were also concerns that the mandate had been markedly exceeded by NATO in its

12

It is very important to note that Russia and China abstained from voting on SC Resolution 1973
regarding a Libya mission, leaving the so-called P-3 to pass it (the U.S., U.K. and France).
Ban Ki-Moon, Overview of United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s Report on the
Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, August 2012. Accessed at
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/Summary%20of%20the%20Report%20of%20the%20Secretary%20
Cf. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect; and The
Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the report of the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa, ON, Canada: International
Research Development Centre, 2001).
13
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air campaign. R2P definitely requires an active conflict underway to which to directly
respond (more specifically, war crimes, genocide or credible threats of it, crimes against
humanity, or ethnic cleansing) whereas preventive deployment does not, a crucial
difference between the two affecting mandates, implementation, operations, and results.
R2P also has three requisite “pillars”: first, preventive diplomacy/deployment; second,
military reaction if level one is ineffective; and third, that the operations area be rebuilt
and/or restored post-conflict. All three did not occur in the Libyan mission. One may also
note that within the exigencies of R2P, some type of UN “standing force” appears to be
assumed. This currently does not exist.
Kenya’s 2008 mission has also been mentioned as an R2P engagement, a
humanitarian intervention, but this may well be even more arguable.14
If not R2P’s adoption and efficacy, its success, why no more preventive
deployments instead? If R2P has been completely assimilated or implemented, why?
Does it replace or eliminate, within its terms, the pillar of preventive deployment as part
of preventive diplomacy? What are the ramifications for policy and praxis changes under
R2P’s terms?15 On their faces, the Libyan mission and its outcomes does not bode well
for R2P, at least not at this time.

Alex Stark, “Alex Stark interviews Professor the Hon. Gareth Evans AO QC”, 2 September 2011 in
online e-International Relations at http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/gareth-_interview-the-rtopbalance-sheet-after-libya.pdf. Republished November 2011 as The Responsibility to Protect: Challenges &
Opportunities in Light of the Libyan Intervention” (contributions by Alex Stark, Thomas G. Weiss, Ramesh
Thakur, Mary Ellen O’Connell, Aidan Hehir, Alex J. Bellamy, David Chandler, Rodger Shanahan, Rachel
Gerber, Abiodun Williams, and Gareth Evans). Note that Gareth Evans is one of the two co-chairs of the
original commission that developed R2P (see prior footnote).
14

15

Cf. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect; and
The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the report
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Strict sovereignty principles, as set forth in the UN Charter, would demand reexamination under this doctrine, since a crucial aspect of it is “conditional sovereignty”,
as noted earlier, which the UN’s main bodies (Security Council and General Assembly)
accepted in 2005 and 2006. Furthermore, R2P has not been fully developed or
implemented by the UN or its states (evidenced by today’s Syrian, Lebanese, and Yemeni
situations, along with certain conflicts in Africa, to name a few.) No one called on R2P or
preventive deployment to motivate and legitimate intervention in Georgia’s, Ukraine’s,
Syria’s or Yemen’s crises (Syria was not believed to be a suitable case for R2P,
according to the UN and Gareth Evans of ICISS). 16
Still, R2P has apparently integrated some aspects of preventive deployment
within its principles even if, again, like preventive deployment, it is subject to greater
analysis and not currently being well-utilized.17 Refer to Appendix C for a comparison of
preventive deployment and R2P.
How, in order to respond sooner rather than later, and avoid proceeding too
slowly, with too little, too late, does the UN fulfill the first affirmation set out in the

of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa, ON, Canada: International
Research Development Centre, 2001).
Alex Stark, “Alex Stark interviews Professor the Hon. Gareth Evans AO QC”, 2 September 2011 in
online e-International Relations at http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/gareth-_interview-the-rtopbalance-sheet-after-libya.pdf. Republished November 2011 as "The Responsibility to Protect: Challenges &
Opportunities in Light of the Libyan Intervention" (contributions by Alex Stark, Thomas G. Weiss, Ramesh
Thakur, Mary Ellen O’Connell, Aidan Hehir, Alex J. Bellamy, David Chandler, Rodger Shanahan, Rachel
Gerber, Abiodun Williams, and Gareth Evans). Note that Gareth Evans is one of the two co-chairs of the
original commission that developed R2P (see prior footnote).
16

17

Cf. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect; and
The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the report
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Both published Ottawa, ON,
Canada: International Research Development Centre, 2001).
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Preamble of its Charter as adopted on the 26th of June, 1945: “We the peoples of the
United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,
which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind…”?18 Those untold
sorrows of conflict and war continue despite this proclamation of seven decades ago. This
makes it even more evident that crucial and effective elements of mitigation, limitation,
and prevention concerning conflict and war are still absent.

18

Preamble to the United Nations Charter, 1945, at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter
/preamble.shtml, accessed on 17 September 2013.
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A-1. Interviewee Consent
Primary Researcher:
Project Title:
Researcher:
Faculty Sponsor:

Mary Frances Rosett Lebamoff – Loyola University
Chicago

Learning from the United Nations Preventive Deployment
Mission in Macedonia
Mary Frances Rosett Lebamoff
Dr. Alexandru Grigorescu – Department of Political Science

Introduction
You are being asked to take part in a research study being conducted by Mary Frances
Rosett Lebamoff for a doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Professor Dr.
Alexandru Grigorescu in the Department of Political Science at Loyola University of
Chicago.
You are being asked to participate because you have had extensive experience in a
significant capacity related to the United Nations Preventive Deployment Mission
(UNPREDEP) and/or UNPROFOR/M.
Please read this form carefully and ask any questions you may have before deciding
whether to participate in the study.
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to explore the question of why, as part of preventive diplomacy
efforts, there have been no further preventive deployments since UNPREDEP’s success
between 1993 and 1999. Issues addressed in particular relate to learning, communications
and understanding/knowledge emanating from UNPREDEP and the associated
organizations.
Procedures
If you agree to be in the study, you will be asked to:
 Take part in an interview with the primary researcher about your experiences with
and direct knowledge of UNPREDEP, its mission, operations and communications
with local offices and officials, the UN and other international organizations and
their representatives. The questions focus on periods before, during and after
UNPREDEP, related to preventive deployment as part of preventive diplomacy.
 It will be very helpful to the researcher and for the dissertation and its accuracy if
you agree to the interview being audio-recorded, but the interview is not dependent
on agreement to be recorded. Please indicate whether you agree for your interview
to be audio-recorded by checking the appropriate box at the end of this form.
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Length of Interview: The interview is anticipated to last approximately one (1)
hour.

Risks/Benefits
 There are no foreseeable risks involved in participating in this research beyond
those experienced in everyday life.
 There are no direct benefits anticipated for you from participation, but given the
ongoing and increasing global demands for conflict prevention, management and
resolution, benefits are expected for the military, international and domestic
organizations, and others who participate in and/or are called upon to be involved
with preventive diplomacy efforts in all its manifestations. The primary outcome
anticipated from this research will be potential explanations for non-utilization of
pre-conflict interventions since UNPREDEP. Additional outcomes may be
recommendations for policy and actions, especially pre-conflict efforts which may
be similar to UNPREDEP.
Confidentiality
 You may choose whether you would like your identity and participation in this
research to remain confidential. If you request that the researcher keep your identity
confidential the field notes and audio-recordings will not be labeled with your name
and your name will not appear in any published work resulting from this research.
Given the goals of the research it is impossible to avoid indicating that you may be
from the Nordic countries, for example, or from the United Nations even if you
request that your identity remain confidential. Given your position, lengthy
experience, and elite status, it may be possible for others to deduce your identity
from your comments that may be published. Please indicate your preference
regarding confidentiality by checking the appropriate box at the end of this
form.
 If you agree for your identity to be associated with your comments and the
researcher wishes to cite you in the resulting dissertation, the researcher will contact
you and provide you with a copy of the proposed citation, and request your approval
to use materials resulting from the relevant interview(s). If you do not respond to
the researcher, citations from your interview will be used at the discretion of the
researcher.
 Audio recordings and related transcripts, if created, will be retained on a separate
computer drive (portable), password-protected, in an encrypted format, and will be
kept in a locked cabinet on the researcher's premises. The researcher is the only
individual with access and will be the only person who will transcribe such notes
and/or recordings. It is anticipated such recordings and records, if any, will be
retained for a period not exceeding three (3) to five (5) years for future scholarly
research and for responsive purposes.
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Voluntary Participation
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you do not want to be in this study, you do not
have to participate. Even if you decide to participate, you are free not to answer any
question(s) or to withdraw from participation at any time without penalty.
Contacts and Questions
If you have questions about this research study, please feel free to contact Mary Frances R.
Lebamoff at mflebamoff@gmail.com. You may also contact Dr. Alexandru Grigorescu,
faculty sponsor at Loyola University Chicago, at agrigor@luc.edu or by telephone at
+1.773.508.3059.
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the
Compliance Manager, Loyola University Chicago’s Office of Research Services at +1.773.
508.2689.
Statement of Consent
Your signature below indicates that you have read and understood the information provided
above, have had an opportunity to ask questions, and agree to participate in this research
study. You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records.
 Yes  No
 Yes  No

I agree for my name, position, and other relevant information to be
associated with my comments and participation in this research.
I agree to the audio-recording of this interview.

____________________________________________ _________________, 2009
Participant’s Signature
Date
Participant’s e-mail

____________________________@ ____________________

____________________________________________ _________________, 2009
Researcher’s Signature
Date
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A-2. Contact Letter
Dear General/Mr./Ms. ___________,
I am writing to you because of your leadership role (close involvement) with the United
Nations Preventive Deployment Mission (UNPREDEP), Republic of Macedonia between
1993 and 1999. As a doctoral candidate at Loyola University Chicago, I am engaged in
research utilizing UNPREDEP as the case study. I attach the Dissertation Proposal Abstract
for your review, and would be pleased to provide you with the entire proposal should you
wish.
The primary question this research examines is why there have been no further preventive
deployment missions since UNPREDEP, given that it was assessed as successful and costeffective in meeting the terms of its mandate. Your knowledge and experiences are of
critical importance to exploring this question; few understand UNPREDEP better than
those who were on the ground/directly involved in its operations and missions.
I would appreciate the opportunity to speak with you, and to include your insights into
UNPREDEP as part of these dissertation efforts. I will be in ______________ the week of
____________, 2009, and ask if it is possible to set up an appointment with you during that
week. About one (1) hour of your time would be deeply appreciated. Prior to this
appointment, I could send you the general questions we would likely discuss upon your
request.
Because the dates I will be in ____________ are rapidly approaching, and my time is,
unfortunately, limited to some extent, I would appreciate your reply at your earliest
convenience. I will be as flexible as possible in setting up meeting times and places; please
do not hesitate to indicate your preferences – there may be some possibility for alternate
dates or arrangements.
It is best to respond to me via e-mail at mflebamoff@gmail.com. On or before Wednesday,
10 June 2000, I will have a Sonera-based cell phone number with SMS text capabilities. I
will forward that information to you immediately upon service activation.
Thank you so much for your professional generosity in addressing UNPREDEP and its
importance. Your involvement is vital to this research, and I am truly grateful.
Respectfully,
Mary Frances Lebamoff
Ph.D. Candidate - Department of Political Science
Loyola University Chicago
Land Line (Chicago) 773.728.3668
Cell Phone (US-based)
313.247.9473
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A-3. Interview Questions
Please note: It is not anticipated all questions will be asked of all individuals. These are
provided as an indicator of possible interview questions/topic areas. It will be deeply
appreciated if those who consent to these discussions take an active approach to bringing
up key issues, examples and concerns.
General View of UNPROFOR/M and/or UNPREDEP
 When did you join the mission and in what capacity?
 How did the mission and your view of it develop during your involvement with
it?
Challenges of UNPROFOR/M and/or UNPREDEP
 What were some of the particular challenges you faced?
 What were the approaches to resolving them? How and why these chosen, and
what were the results?
 Can you speak to your perceptions of the domestic situation at the time? Interethnic relations? Government actors and their roles/activities?
Information and Intelligence
 What kinds of information did you have access to from the UN?
 How did you share information?
 Was information/intel from you specifically sought by the UN?
 Were you able to request specific information from UN? (Whom?)
 Did others volunteer information? (Who?)
Interactions with Other Entities and Individuals
 Can you describe interactions with other organizations/entities, and what their
significance was to this mission:
o Macedonian authorities, CoE, OSCE, EU or NATO, etc.?
UNPREDEP: Success, Failure or Something In Between?
The Future of Preventive Deployment
 How would you evaluate the outcome of UNPREDEP?
 Thoughts on why another PreDep has not been attempted since UNPREDEP?
 Other situations where PreDep might have been applicable – and if there is/are
any, why it was not have been utilized?
 Do you feel there is a future for preventive deployment in the preventive
diplomacy/conflict management arsenal?
 Is what you learned as part of UNPREDEP transferrable in some respects to other
PKOs or conflict management situations? Please explain.
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B-1. The Republic of Macedonia

B-2. Macedonia relative to Kosovo
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B-3. Balkan Region Map

Provided courtesy of Zoran Ilievski, Ph.D.
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APPENDIX C
COMPARISON OF PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P)
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Comparison of Preventive Deployment and Responsibility to Protect
(R2P) Terms and Conditions
Condition

Preventive
Deployment

R2P

Protection of
Civilians
(POC)/Comme
nts

Mid-Conflict entry or
Later – not early
intervention
Host State must request
State can deny
Preventive Deployment
Included

No

Yes

No

Approved Security
Council
Resolution Required
Protection from and
Preventing
Incitements to
Atrocities

Yes

Yes
No
Can ask to leave Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Largely untried Yes
in a single field
operation to date,
but within
concepts

Must determine relevant No
human rights
violations before
invoking
Gravity/Seriousness of No
Human Rights
Violations determined
Application of R2P
Yes (some)
principles

Yes

State obviously failing
to meet its
responsibility to
protect? Determine.

No

Yes

Covers all violations of
Human Rights?

Undetermined

No: strong
link to HR

Related to
Armed
Conflict only

Yes
No

Not pre-conflict

Direct Conflict only?
No
Root Cause Deterrence? Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes (possible)
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Any form of a military intervention under R2P must fulfill the following six
criteria to be justified as an extraordinary measure of intervention:
1. Just cause (large-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing)
2. Right intention (primary purpose: to halt or avert human suffering)
3. Last resort – every non-military option for prevention or peaceful resolution exhausted
4. Proportional means (minimum necessary means to achieve objective of
human protection)
5. Reasonable Prospects (of halting or averting the suffering; consequences of
inaction greater than those of action)
6. Right Authority (UN Security Council)
Sovereignty was re-conceptualized by ICISS commission as responsibility – for
protecting lives and safety of citizens; that national political authorities are responsible
to citizens internally and to the IC through the UN; third, that state agents are
responsible (and accountable) for their actions (omission and commission).
The key standard under which R2P will be considered is if the examination of the
situation establishes a real risk that exceptionally grave human rights violations, as
described in genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing
are occurring or could occur in the future.1
THREE PILLARS or LEVELS of R2P: Responsibility to “protect”
1. Prevent atrocity and suffering;
2. Intervene in cases of human rights violations;
3. Rebuild post-intervention to prevent future rights abuses.
FOUR CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH MOST APPLICABLE:
1. War crimes
2. Ethnic cleansing
3. Crimes against humanity
4. Genocide

Sheri P. Rosenberg and Ekkehard Strauss, Cardozo Law Policy Brief, “A Common Standard for
Applying R2P,” Holocaust, Genocide and Human Rights Program, at http://www.globalr2p.org/ media
/files/r2p_standards_policy_letter-1.pdf (undated, no copyright). See also Manfred Eisele, “Peace
Operations and Humanitarian Intervention in a Time of Change,” The Cornwallis Group VI: Analysis for
Assessment, Evaluation, and Crisis Management (Nova Scotia: 2002 out of print), 10-23.
1
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